North African campaign

Strategic context and geography

For more than a century before the Second World War, European colonial powers had competed for supremacy across North Africa. Control over the region possessed enormous strategic value, as military bases along the coast allowed a belligerent to secure or disrupt maritime routes connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, India, Malaya, and the British dominions in Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, British oil infrastructure in Iraq and Iran grew increasingly important during the interwar era. Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 to 1936, Italian air and naval installations in Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, Libya, Sicily, the Dodecanese archipelago, and temporary facilities in the Balearic Islands created an extensive arc of influence that threatened British imperial communication lines through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar.^[1]

In his political and military directives of 31 March 1940, Benito Mussolini outlined Italy's general strategy in anticipation of entering the war alongside the Third Reich.^[2][3] Mussolini observed that Italian Libya occupied an exposed geographical position, bordered to the west by French North Africa and to the east by Egypt, where British forces were based.^[2][3] Consequently, he instructed the Governor-General of Libya and Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Italo Balbo, to maintain a strictly defensive posture.^[2][3] At the time of Italy's declaration of war on 10 June 1940, French forces in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia under General Charles Noguès numbered approximately eight divisions, while British Middle East Command under General Archibald Wavell was estimated by Italian military intelligence at five divisions.^[4][5] The rapid defeat of France and the armistice signed at Villa Incisa on 24 June 1940 neutralized French North Africa, allowing Balbo to concentrate the bulk of his forces eastward on the border with Egypt.^[4][5]

The main battlefield was a strip of land roughly 1,000 kilometers long along the Mediterranean, bounded in the west by the fortified position of El Agheila on the Gulf of Sirte in Libya and in the east by the border and port town of Sollum in Egypt. The strip was only about 100 kilometers wide, with the Mediterranean to the north and the open desert to the south. The ground was mostly dry and stony, and because there were few villages and towns, traditional warfare did not apply: gains of ground mattered much less and could even be dangerous by overextending supply lines. The desert sand placed a heavy load on the vehicles of the time and caused increased wear. The desert climate, with temperatures of up to 50 degrees Celsius by day and below freezing at night, placed heavy demands on men and equipment; a man typically needed four to five liters of water a day, so supply shortages could quickly do harm, and military success here depended more heavily on working supply lines than it did on any other battlefield. The open terrain offered very few natural bottlenecks that could not be bypassed by flanking maneuvers, and its deep flanks made it easier to use motorized commando groups such as the Special Air Service and the Long Range Desert Group.

Opposing forces in 1940

On 10 June 1940, Italian military strength in Libya was organized into two field armies under Marshal Balbo, totaling fourteen divisions, 236,000 men, 1,427 artillery pieces, 339 light L3 tankettes, and 8,039 motor vehicles.^[6][7] General Italo Gariboldi's 5th Army guarded Tripolitania along the Tunisian border with six infantry divisions and two Blackshirt divisions.^[8][9] General Mario Berti's 10th Army defended Cyrenaica along the Egyptian border with three infantry divisions, two Libyan colonial divisions, and one Blackshirt division.^[8][9] The Regia Aeronautica maintained approximately 250 combat aircraft in Libya, predominantly obsolete models.^[10][11] Although numerically formidable, the Italian forces consisted mostly of unmotorized infantry lacking cross-country transport, specialized desert training, anti-tank artillery, and modern medium tanks.^[10][11] Furthermore, demobilization measures ordered by Rome in the summer of 1940 disrupted personnel cohorts and worsened equipment shortages across numerous formations.

Opposing them, British Middle East Command commanded by General Archibald Wavell possessed only 36,000 soldiers in Egypt.^[12][13] The frontline Western Desert Force comprised the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Infantry Division. While heavily outnumbered, British units were fully motorized, had developed effective desert navigational methods, and deployed heavily armored Matilda II infantry tanks alongside Cruiser tanks and armored cars.^{[12][13][14][15]} Marshal Balbo recognized the tactical and mechanical superiority of the British forces and warned Marshal Pietro Badoglio against premature offensive adventures.^[12][13] Nevertheless, on 28 June 1940, the Italian Supreme Command (Comando Supremo) ordered Balbo to mass his troops along the Egyptian frontier and prepare to invade.^[12][13] That very day, Balbo was killed at Tobruk when his plane was accidentally shot down by Italian anti-aircraft gunners.^[16][17] Mussolini immediately replaced him with the Chief of Staff of the Army, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani.^[16][17]

Upon arriving in North Africa, Graziani resisted launching an immediate offensive, citing technical and logistical deficiencies, severe water shortages, and inadequate vehicle maintenance.^[18][19] Mussolini dismissed these objections, insisting that the available forces were adequate, that British forces were weak, and that for reasons of high politics some success in North Africa was indispensable to secure Italy's strategic objectives in the event of a rapid total Axis victory.^[18][19] On 19 August 1940, the Duce sent Graziani a strict ultimatum to attack or face dismissal.^[20][21] In London, Winston Churchill resisted suggestions from naval staff to evacuate the eastern Mediterranean and route shipping entirely around the Cape of Good Hope.^[22][23] Instead, Churchill urged the regrouping of all available forces in the Middle East and Africa and went as far as planning to send reinforcements from Britain itself, even though Britain was then threatened by a German invasion.^[24][25]

Western Desert campaign

Opening clashes and Italian invasion of Egypt

Italy declared war on France and the United Kingdom on 10 June 1940.^[26] On 11 June, British forces launched a series of raids against Italian border posts in Libya.^[27] On 14 June, the British 11th Hussars, supported by elements of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment, crossed the frontier and captured Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena. In early border skirmishes, the Italians lost 3,500 men killed, wounded, or captured, compared to only 150 British casualties. Facing equipment wear and mounting Italian troop concentrations in Cyrenaica, Wavell ordered an end to aggressive cross-border incursions, placing border defense in the hands of a mobile screening force.^[28]

On 13 September 1940, Marshal Graziani launched Operazione E, directing motorized columns from General Mario Berti's 10th Army across the frontier into Egypt.^[29][30] British screening forces fell back deliberately, conducting delaying actions toward their fortified base at Mersa Matruh.^[29][30] Advancing along the coast road, Italian units under General Annibale Bergonzoli reached Sidi Barrani on 16 September.^[29][30] Confronted by severe supply bottlenecks and vehicle breakdowns, Graziani halted the advance at Maktila, roughly 130 kilometers west of Mersa Matruh.^[31] Rejecting Mussolini's urgent appeals to push on toward the Nile, Graziani ordered his army to dig in, constructing a chain of fortified camps at Maktila, Tummar, Nibeiwa, and the Sofafi plateau.^[32] A buffer zone of roughly 130 kilometers separated the opposing main armies for the next two and a half months.

Operation Compass and the fall of Cyrenaica

Taking advantage of the static, dispersed deployment of the Italian camps, General Wavell and Major-General Richard O'Connor planned Operation Compass, conceived initially as a limited five-day raid to destroy the forward Italian fortifications.^{[14][15][33][34]} On the night of 7 to 8 December 1940, the Western Desert Force, numbering 36,000 men and 225 tanks, moved through a desert gap between the fortified camps.^[35][36][37] On 9 December, British and Indian troops attacked the fortified camp of Nibeiwa from the rear, supported by 72 artillery pieces and heavily armored Matilda II tanks.^[38] The Italian garrison was taken by surprise, General Pietro Maletti was killed, and the camp fell quickly. Continuing their attacks against the Tummar camps, British forces recaptured Sidi Barrani by 10 December, taking roughly 38,000 prisoners.^[36][37]

Encouraged by the collapse of Italian frontline resistance, O'Connor pursued the retreating remnants of the 10th Army across the Libyan frontier.^[39][40] On 3 January 1941, the Australian 6th Division assaulted the fortified port of Bardia, held by 45,000 Italian soldiers and 430 guns under General Bergonzoli.^[41][42] Matilda tanks punched through the perimeter, and by 5 January the garrison surrendered, yielding over 40,000 prisoners and 236 guns.^[43][44] Advancing west along the Via Balbia, Australian troops attacked and captured Tobruk on 21 to 22 January, taking another 30,000 prisoners.^[45][46][47] Graziani attempted to form a defensive line between Derna and El Mechili with the newly arrived Special Armoured Brigade Babini, equipped with roughly 70 M11/39 and M13/40 medium tanks.^[48][49] Following intense armored clashes on 24 January, the Babini brigade withdrew, leaving the inland desert track toward the Gulf of Sirte unprotected.^[48][49]

On 3 February 1941, O'Connor dispatched an ad hoc mechanized detachment known as Combeforce, comprising armored cars and motorized artillery from the 7th Armoured Division, on a rapid dash across the Cyrenaican desert interior.^[50][51] Covering 270 kilometers in thirty-six hours across rocky terrain, Combeforce cut the coastal road at Beda Fomm on 5 February, ahead of the retreating Italian columns.^[50][51] In the Battle of Beda Fomm on 6 to 7 February, desperate Italian breakout attempts led by their surviving tanks were repulsed with severe losses.^[48][49] General Giuseppe Tellera was mortally wounded, and the remnants of the 10th Army surrendered.^[48][49] In ten weeks, the Western Desert Force had advanced 800 kilometers to El Agheila, destroyed ten Italian divisions, captured 130,000 prisoners, 845 artillery pieces, and 380 tanks, while suffering only 500 dead, 1,373 wounded, and 56 missing.^{[52][53][54][55][56][57][58]}

Operation Sonnenblume and Rommel's first offensive

The destruction of the Italian 10th Army threatened to eliminate Axis influence in North Africa entirely.^[59][60] Hitler initially hesitated to commit ground troops, as General Wilhelm von Thoma had reported in late 1940 that logistical difficulties and poor Italian organization made large-scale operations in Egypt impractical without massive supply commitments.^[59][60] However, the worsening course of the war in Libya and the advice of his generals convinced Hitler at the beginning of February 1941 to confirm Operation Sonnenblume.^[61][62] This operation established a blocking force (Sperrverband), termed the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), comprising the 5th Light Division and the 15th Panzer Division, under the command of Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel.^{[61][62][63][64]} Rommel arrived in Tripoli on 12 February 1941, and the first German combat units disembarked on 14 February.^{[65][66][67][68]} Concurrently, the Italian army dispatched the elite 132nd Armoured Division Ariete under General Ettore Baldassarre and the 102nd Motorised Division Trento.^[69][70][71]

British positions in Cyrenaica had been substantially weakened following orders from Churchill to redeploy veteran formations, including the 6th Australian Division, the 7th Australian Division, and parts of the 7th Armoured Division, to mainland Greece in Operation Lustre.^[72][73] Command of Cyrenaica had passed to Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, whose frontline forces consisted primarily of the under-equipped, newly arrived 2nd Armoured Division and an Indian motorized brigade.^[74][75] Although ordered by the German High Command and General Gariboldi to remain strictly defensive, Rommel launched an aggressive reconnaissance from El Agheila on 24 March 1941.^{[63][64][76][77]} Capturing the defile at Marsa El Brega on 31 March, Rommel pressed his motorized columns forward across the Cyrenaican desert.^[78][79]

The British defense collapsed rapidly. On 3 April, Axis troops entered Benghazi, and Rommel divided his forces into four columns to pursue the Allies across the Jebel Akhdar plateau.^[78][79] Between 6 and 8 April, mobile German and Italian patrols captured several senior Allied commanders, including Generals Philip Neame, Richard O'Connor, John Combe, and Adrian Carton de Wiart, who were sent to the Vincigliata prison in Italy.^[80][81] By mid-April, Australian and British forces under Major-General Leslie Morshead fell back into the perimeter of Tobruk, while Rommel's vanguard under Colonel Maximilian von Herff advanced east to the Egyptian frontier, seizing Bardia, Fort Capuzzo, Sollum, and the Halfaya Pass.^{[82][83][84][85][86]}

Siege of Tobruk, Brevity, and Battleaxe

Rommel's swift advance was halted by the fortress port of Tobruk, garrisoned by the Australian 9th Division and British armored elements.^[87] Axis assaults on 14 and 16 April 1941 were repulsed with severe casualties.^[88][89] The Chief of the German Army General Staff, General Franz Halder, severely criticized Rommel for overextending his supply lines and ignoring operational directives. Halder dispatched General Friedrich Paulus to Libya on 27 April to evaluate the situation.^[90][91] After observing another costly, unsuccessful assault on Tobruk on 30 April, Paulus ordered Rommel to suspend further attacks against the fortress and concentrate on holding defensive positions along the Egyptian frontier.^[90][91] Tobruk remained an isolated outpost, supplied at night by Royal Navy destroyers, which tied down significant Axis forces and prevented any deep drive toward the Nile.^[92][93][94]

To relieve pressure on Tobruk, Wavell launched Operation Brevity on 15 May 1941 under Brigadier William Gott, recapturing Halfaya Pass, Sollum, and Fort Capuzzo.^[95][96] However, a surprise counter-attack by the newly arrived tanks of the 15th Panzer Division forced the British back to their starting positions on 16 May, abandoning Sollum and Capuzzo, and on 27 May a combined tank and infantry attack retook Halfaya Pass.^{[95][96][97][98]} The Tiger convoy brought almost 250 modern tanks across the Mediterranean.^[99][100] Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe on 15 June 1941, with General Noel Beresford-Peirse attacking along the frontier with about 25,000 men and 180 tanks.^[101][102] The British frontal attacks against the anti-tank screen at Halfaya and Capuzzo failed with heavy tank losses.^[103][104] On 17 June, Rommel concentrated the 5th Light and 15th Panzer Divisions to envelop the British southern flank, forcing an immediate retreat.^[105][106] Following the failure of Battleaxe, Churchill relieved Wavell on 21 June 1941, appointing General Claude Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief Middle East.^[107][108]

Operation Crusader and the relief of Tobruk

On 26 September 1941, British forces in the Western Desert were officially reconstituted as the Eighth Army under Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham.^[109][110] Extensively reinforced with American-built M3 Stuart light tanks, Crusader tanks, and Matilda tanks, the Eighth Army assembled 118,000 men, over 700 tanks, and 600 combat aircraft across XIII Corps and XXX Corps.^{[111][112][113][114]} Rommel's command, redesignated Panzergruppe Afrika on 15 August 1941, comprised 119,000 German and Italian troops, 260 German panzers, and 154 Italian tanks.^{[115][116][117][118]} Cunningham launched Operation Crusader on 18 November 1941, aiming to draw the Axis armored formations into a decisive battle around Gabr Saleh and link up with a breakout by the Tobruk garrison, where Australian troops had been replaced by the British 70th Division, the Polish Carpathian Brigade, and a Czechoslovak battalion.^{[119][120][121][122][123][124]}

The offensive degenerated into days of chaotic armor engagements around Sidi Rezegh and Bir el Gobi, where the Italian Ariete Division successfully repulsed the British 22nd Armoured Brigade on 19 November.^[125][126] On Totensonntag (Sunday of the Dead), 23 November, German and Italian panzer units crushed the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh.^[127][128] Believing the Eighth Army had been decisively beaten, Rommel made a bold but reckless decision on 24 November: leading the Afrika Korps on a deep raid toward the Egyptian border, the dash to the wire, to sever Allied communications and relieve his border garrisons.^[129][130] The raid caused panic at Cunningham's headquarters, but Auchinleck intervened personally, dismissed Cunningham, placed Major-General Neil Ritchie in command, and insisted on maintaining the offensive.^{[131][132][133][134]}

Rommel's raid stalled against British border defenses and caused severe fuel shortages while communications with his rear broke down.^[131][133] In his absence, the 2nd New Zealand Division advanced along the coast, linking up with the Tobruk garrison on 27 November.^{[135][136][137][138]} Returning to Tobruk, Rommel fought fiercely around Sidi Rezegh until 5 December, but with his operational armor reduced to a few dozen vehicles, he abandoned the siege and retreated to Gazala on 7 December.^{[139][140][141][142][143]} Pressed by Ritchie and facing acute supply deficiencies caused by British naval and air strikes from Malta, Rommel ordered a general retreat through Cyrenaica on 16 December, reaching El Agheila by January 1942.^[144][145] The isolated Axis border garrisons at Bardia and Halfaya Pass surrendered in January 1942, yielding 32,000 prisoners.^[146][147]

Rommel's second offensive and the Battle of Gazala

Allied plans to advance into Tripolitania via Operation Acrobat were disrupted when Japan's entry into the war in December 1941 compelled the transfer of Australian divisions, British air squadrons, and equipment to the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters.^{[148][149][150][151]} Concurrently, German U-boats in the Mediterranean sank the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and the battleship HMS Barham, while Italian frogmen of the Decima MAS disabled the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant in Alexandria harbor on 18 to 19 December 1941. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, appointed Commander-in-Chief South (Oberbefehlshaber Süd) on 2 December 1941, unleashed the Luftwaffe against Malta, temporarily securing Axis convoy lanes and allowing 55 new tanks to reach Rommel by 5 January 1942.^{[152][153][154][155]}

On 21 January 1942, Rommel launched a surprise counter-offensive from El Agheila without informing Berlin or Rome.^[156][157] The newly arrived British 1st Armoured Division was routed in piecemeal engagements, and the Axis forces recaptured Benghazi on 29 January.^{[158][159][160][161][162][163]} By 3 February, Rommel had driven the Eighth Army back 350 miles to the Gazala line, a defensive barrier running from Gazala south to the fortified box of Bir Hakeim, anchored by vast minefields and fortified infantry enclosures.^{[160][163][164][165]} During the ensuing spring lull, Hitler promoted Rommel to Generaloberst and renamed his command Panzerarmee Afrika.^[166] Cavallero approved Rommel's plans but ruled that, even after a victory at Tobruk, the Axis advance was to halt at the border to await the attack on Malta, Operation Herkules, planned for the end of June.^[167][168]

On 26 May 1942, Rommel launched Operation Venezia against the Gazala line with 113,000 men and 560 tanks, including 332 German panzers and 228 Italian tanks, against Ritchie's 125,000 men and 850 tanks, which included newly arrived American M3 Grant tanks.^{[169][170][171][172][173]} While Italian infantry made diversionary frontal attacks, Rommel led the DAK and the Italian XX Motorised Corps on a wide outflanking sweep around the southern tip of Bir Hakeim.^[174][175] The Axis armor became trapped east of the minefields under heavy British counter-attacks, suffering severe attrition.^[176][177] Rommel consolidated his forces in a defensive pocket known as the Cauldron, protected by 88 mm anti-tank batteries, and breached the minefields from the east to re-establish supply lines.^[178][179]

From 27 May to 11 June 1942, the 1st Free French Brigade under Brigadier Marie-Pierre Kœnig held the isolated desert fortress of Bir Hakeim against relentless attacks by the Ariete Division and the Luftwaffe, delaying Rommel's timetable before successfully withdrawing under the cover of darkness.^[180][181] On 12 to 13 June, in the armored clashes around Knightsbridge, German panzers inflicted a devastating defeat on British armor, destroying 140 tanks and leaving the Eighth Army with only 70 operational vehicles.^{[182][183][184][185][186][187]} Ritchie ordered a general retreat, abandoning the 2nd South African Division and British formations inside Tobruk under Major-General Hendrik Klopper.^{[188][189][190][191]} On 20 June, Rommel stormed Tobruk with concentrated Stuka airstrikes, artillery, and pioneer units, capturing the fortress on 21 June along with 33,000 prisoners and substantial logistical depots.^{[192][193][194][195][196][197]} Hitler immediately promoted Rommel to Generalfeldmarschall.^[198][199]

The decision at El Alamein

Following the fall of Tobruk, Rommel persuaded Hitler and Mussolini to postpone Operation Herkules against Malta and authorize an immediate invasion of Egypt to capture Alexandria and Cairo before Allied forces could recover.^{[200][201][202][203]} Auchinleck dismissed Ritchie on 25 June and assumed direct command of the Eighth Army, fighting a sharp delaying action at Mersa Matruh on 26 to 28 June before withdrawing into prepared positions at El Alamein, located 100 kilometers west of Alexandria between the Mediterranean Sea and the impassable Qattara Depression.^{[204][205][206][207][208][209][210][211][212][213]} In the First Battle of El Alamein (1 to 27 July 1942), Rommel's exhausted vanguard of only 41 tanks was halted by determined resistance from South African, New Zealand, Indian, and Australian formations, compelling the Axis forces to dig in.^{[214][215][216][217][218][219]}

In August 1942, Churchill visited Cairo and restructured the Middle East command, appointing General Harold Alexander as Commander-in-Chief Middle East and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery to command the Eighth Army following the death of Lieutenant-General William Gott in an air ambush.^{[220][221][222][223]} Montgomery restored morale, suspended piecemeal attacks, and prepared for a set-piece battle of attrition.^[224][225] Rommel attempted a final breakthrough on 30 August in the Battle of Alam Halfa, seeking to outflank the British southern sector.^{[226][227][228][229]} Forewarned by Ultra intercepts, Montgomery anticipated the maneuver and blunted the panzers with entrenched 6-pounder anti-tank guns and relentless bombardment from the Desert Air Force, forcing Rommel to withdraw on 3 September.^{[227][229][230][231][232]}

Suffering from severe physical and mental exhaustion, Rommel returned to Germany on sick leave on 23 September 1942, leaving General Georg Stumme in command of Panzerarmee Afrika.^{[233][234][235][236]} The Axis deployed 104,000 men and 497 tanks (238 German and 259 Italian) behind dense minefields known as the Devil's Gardens.^{[237][238][239][240]} Montgomery massed 195,000 men, 1,348 tanks (including 300 new American M4 Shermans), 939 field guns, and 1,200 aircraft.^[241][242] On the night of 23 October 1942, Montgomery opened the Second Battle of El Alamein (Operation Lightfoot) with an intensive 20-minute artillery bombardment across the northern front.^[243][244] Stumme died of a heart attack on 24 October, prompting Rommel's hasty return to the front on 25 October.^[245][246]

Montgomery launched Operation Supercharge on 2 November 1942; New Zealand infantry opened a gap in the Axis lines, but the tank battle at Tel el Aqqaqir halted the British advance and left the Axis with only 35 serviceable tanks.^{[247][248][249][250][251][252]} Despite Hitler's strict order to hold fast and victory or death, Rommel ordered a general retreat on 4 November to preserve his motorized formations, leaving behind the unmotorized Italian infantry divisions, including the Folgore and Ariete, which were largely destroyed or captured.^{[253][254][255][256][257]} The Eighth Army captured 30,000 prisoners and destroyed 320 Axis tanks, while suffering 13,560 casualties and 500 damaged or destroyed tanks.^[258][259] Rommel withdrew across Libya, abandoning Tobruk without a fight, Benghazi on 17 November and the El Agheila position on the night of 10 December, then evacuated Tripoli on 22 January 1943 and moved toward the Mareth Line in Tunisia.^{[260][261][262][263][264][265][266]}

Operation Torch and the invasion of French North Africa

Operation Torch in November 1942 represented an Anglo-American strategic compromise. While American military planners led by General George Marshall favored an early cross-Channel assault into northern France in 1942 or 1943, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff advocated clearing the Mediterranean basin to eliminate Italy from the war.^{[267][268][269][270][271]} Marshall suggested to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the U.S. take the offensive in the Pacific instead, but Roosevelt said it would do nothing to help Russia.^[272] After long discussions between the leaders of the two powers, Roosevelt gave his consent, and Operation Torch was approved on 24 July 1942.^[273][274] General Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed supreme command of the combined forces assigned to Operation Torch on 27 July 1942.^[273][274] More than 500 ships carried the expeditionary force, while Admiral Andrew Cunningham's fleet of six battleships and four aircraft carriers provided naval protection.^[275][276]

On 8 November 1942, Allied task forces landed simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.^[277][278] While clandestine negotiations by Robert Murphy and an internal coup by the French Resistance in Algiers neutralized the Vichy XIX Corps, enabling Algiers to be captured on the first day, Vichy French forces resisted fiercely at Oran and in Morocco.^{[277][278][279][280]} The 35,000 American troops under General George Patton who landed at Casablanca and Fedhala met strong resistance from French land, air and naval forces.^[277][278] Resistance ceased on 10 to 11 November after Major General Mark Clark and Eisenhower negotiated the Darlan Deal with Admiral François Darlan, the visiting commander-in-chief of Vichy military forces, appointing him civil High Commissioner of French North Africa in exchange for an immediate ceasefire.^{[281][282][283][284]} General Henri Giraud assumed command of French colonial troops, which joined the Allied cause.^[282][284] In response, Germany and Italy invaded unoccupied Vichy France in Operation Anton on 11 November; French sailors subsequently scuttled the fleet at Toulon to prevent its capture.^[285][286]

Tunisian campaign

Run for Tunis and winter stalemate

Immediately following the Torch landings, Axis forces moved swiftly to occupy French Tunisia, landing paratroopers at Tunis airfields on the afternoon of 9 November 1942.^[287][288] Generalleutnant Walther Nehring assumed command of the newly formed German-Italian bridgehead on 17 November.^[289][290] The Allied Eastern Task Force, organized into the British First Army under Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson, advanced east from Algeria in the Run for Tunis alongside French troops under General Georges Barré.^[289][290] By late November, Allied advanced elements reached within 30 kilometers of Tunis.^[291][292] However, reinforced by the 10th Panzer Division and the 501st Heavy Panzer Battalion deploying the new Tiger I tanks, Nehring counter-attacked at Tebourba between 1 and 4 December 1942, repulsing the Allies and establishing a solid Axis perimeter around Tunis and Bizerta.^{[291][292][293]}

Hitler created the 5th Panzer Army on 9 December 1942 under Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, promising six motorized and armored divisions, including the Hermann Göring Division, though only a fraction arrived due to shipping losses.^{[294][295][296][297]} On the Allied side, Eisenhower remained in Algiers, occupied mainly with political and diplomatic matters.^[298][299] General Giraud had demanded that the French contingents of Generals Koeltz and Barré, deployed in the centre, report directly to him, while the Anglo-American troops in the north were grouped under the command of General Anderson's British First Army; the US II Corps under General Lloyd Fredendall was to intervene on the French right and attack towards Sfax.^[298][299] Lack of unified battlefield command and inadequate communication contributed to significant Allied vulnerability throughout January 1943.^[298][299]

Axis counter-attacks and the Battle of Kasserine Pass

Having completed his retreat across Libya, Rommel occupied the Mareth Line in southern Tunisia by late January 1943, bringing 30,000 German and 48,000 Italian troops and 130 armored fighting vehicles.^{[263][300][301]} Recognizing that Montgomery's Eighth Army was reorganizing at Tripoli, Rommel proposed a combined offensive with von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army against the inexperienced US II Corps in central Tunisia.^[302][303] On 14 February 1943, Axis forces launched Operation Frühlingswind: German panzers struck the US 1st Armored Division at Sidi Bou Zid, destroying over 100 American armored vehicles and capturing the eastern passes of the Grand Dorsal.^[304][305] Rommel pressed through Gafsa, advancing 120 kilometers and capturing the Kasserine Pass on 21 February 1943.^{[306][307][308][309]}

The defeat showed the inexperience of the American troops and weaknesses in their command. However, Rommel's ambitious proposal to thrust deep toward the Allied logistical hub at Tébessa was scaled back by Kesselring and von Arnim, who retained armored units in the north.^[310][311] Rushed British and American artillery and armored reinforcements checked Rommel's advance at Thala and Le Kef on 22 February.^[307][309] Facing mounting Allied pressure and a threatening buildup by Montgomery's Eighth Army in the south, Rommel withdrew to his starting lines on 24 February, having inflicted 7,000 casualties and captured 235 armored vehicles from the Americans.^[307][309] Following the battle, Eisenhower relieved Fredendall, placing Major General George S. Patton in command of US II Corps, with Major General Omar Bradley as his deputy.^[312][313]

On 23 February 1943, Rommel became Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Army Group Afrika (Heeresgruppe Afrika).^[314] Other accounts date his formal assumption of command to 25 February.^[315][316] He handed operational command of the Mareth Line to Italian General Giovanni Messe, whose command was redesignated the Italian 1st Army.^{[315][316][317]} Without coordinating his plans with von Arnim, Rommel decided to launch a preventive attack at Medenine against Montgomery's Eighth Army, which was concentrating in a threatening way; his assault failed completely on 6 March 1943.^[315][316] Plagued by chronic illness, Rommel departed Africa permanently on 9 March 1943, leaving von Arnim in supreme command of all Axis forces in Tunisia.^{[314][315][316]}

Operation Vulcan and final Axis collapse

In February 1943, General Harold Alexander assumed command of the newly created 18th Army Group, unifying operational command over Anderson's First Army and Montgomery's Eighth Army.^[318][319] By March, the 18th Army Group numbered 500,000 men, 1,800 tanks, and 1,200 field guns, backed by the Mediterranean Air Command with 3,400 aircraft.^{[320][321][322][323]} In contrast, Army Group Afrika fielded only 150,000 frontline combat troops and 200 operable tanks, severely crippled by Allied air and naval interdiction that turned the Sicilian narrows into a shooting gallery.^{[320][322][324][325][326][327]} On 20 March 1943, Montgomery launched Operation Pugilist against the Mareth Line; while frontal assaults stalled, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks executed a sweeping left hook through the Tebaga Gap, breaking the Axis position on 26 March.^[328][329] Messe fell back to the Wadi Akarit line, but was forced to withdraw northward on 7 April after intense fighting.^{[330][331][332][333]}

On 8 April 1943, the British First and Eighth Armies linked up on the Gabès road, compressing the Axis forces into a 215-kilometer pocket around Tunis and Bizerta.^{[334][335][336][337]} Attempts to supply the Axis troops by air with the Luftwaffe's large transport aircraft failed through lack of sufficient means and strong opposition from Allied air forces.^[338][339] On 6 May 1943, Alexander unleashed the final offensive, Operation Vulcan, focusing armor and air strikes through the Medjerda valley.^[340][341] British armor entered Tunis and American troops captured Bizerta on 7 May.^[342][343] Isolated in two shrinking pockets with ammunition and fuel exhausted, Axis forces collapsed. General Gustav von Vaerst surrendered the 5th Panzer Army in the north on 11 May.^[344][345] In the south, General Giovanni Messe, promoted to Marshal of Italy on 12 May, surrendered the Italian 1st Army on 13 May 1943.^{[317][346][347][348][349]} Approximately 240,000 to 250,000 Axis soldiers were captured, concluding nearly three years of fighting in North Africa.^{[350][351][352]}

Intelligence and signals warfare

Intelligence operations exerted a decisive influence on the conduct of the desert war. From January to June 1942, Axis intelligence achieved considerable success through the interception of reports sent by Colonel Bonner Fellers, the US military attaché in Cairo.^[353] Tasked by General Marshall with providing comprehensive updates on British operations, Fellers transmitted detailed assessments of British positions, unit strengths, supply levels, and tactical intentions using the US State Department's Black Code.^[353] Italian intelligence agents of the Servizio Informazioni Segrete (SIS) had photographed the Black Code in Rome in September 1941, allowing Italian and German cryptanalysts of the Chiffrierabteilung to decipher Fellers' dispatches promptly.^{[354][355][356]} The Germans referred to Fellers as die gute Quelle (the good source).^[353]

Axis ground reconnaissance was further enhanced by the 621st Signals Battalion, a mobile radio monitoring unit commanded by Captain Alfred Seeböhm that arrived in Libya in April 1941.^{[357][358][359]} Capitalizing on poor British radio discipline and uncoded voice transmissions, Seeböhm's unit provided tactical warnings of British movements until it was overrun and destroyed during the Battle of Gazala in July 1942.^{[353][360][361][362]} In response, British commanders instituted rigid wireless silence, strict radio codes, and elaborate deception networks that contributed to Montgomery's successful deception operations prior to Alam Halfa and El Alamein.^{[360][361][362]}

For the Allies, intelligence derived from the Ultra program at Bletchley Park, which deciphered Enigma machine communications, proved invaluable in interdicting Axis maritime supply lines across the Mediterranean.^{[363][364][365][366]} Ultra intercepts revealed convoy departure times, routes, and escorts, enabling British submarines and aircraft from Malta and Egypt to destroy between 40% and 60% of Axis supply shipping by late 1942.^{[363][364][365][366]} To protect the secret that German ciphers were compromised, British authorities routinely mandated reconnaissance overflights before dispatching strike forces against convoys.^{[367][368][369]} Historians Vincent O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi have argued that Ultra's impact was sometimes exaggerated, noting that out of 2.67 million tons of materiel and fuel dispatched to North Africa by Italian merchant vessels, 2.24 million tons safely arrived.^{[370][371][372][373][374]}

Logistics and desert conditions

Supplying the troops with food, fuel, ammunition and equipment was difficult because of the distances in North Africa.^[365] Heavy attrition among Italian merchant ships, caused by British air and submarine patrols based at Malta, severely restricted fuel and spare parts for the Panzerarmee Afrika. In 1940, 44 Axis merchant vessels were sunk, rising to 134 in 1941 and 150 in 1942, with Italian shipyards unable to replace the lost tonnage.

Persecution and the Holocaust

While post-war narratives frequently depicted the desert campaign as a chivalrous war without hate, free of ideological violence, recent historians have challenged this view, citing numerous atrocities and abuses by Italian and German forces against Allied prisoners of war and local Jewish, Berber, and Arab populations.^{[375][376][377][378][379]} According to historian Patrick Bernhard, these included the mistreatment and killing of captured enemy soldiers, the plundering of the indigenous population, the rape of local women, and the exploitation, killing, and mass detention in concentration camps of Arabs, Berbers, and Jews, often motivated by racial and antisemitic hatred.^{[375][379][380]}

During the Axis occupation of Tunisia from November 1942 to May 1943, Nazi antisemitic policies were extended directly into North Africa.^{[381][382][383][384]} An Einsatzkommando under SS-Obersturmbannführer Walther Rauff arrived in Tunis on 24 November 1942, tasked with implementing anti-Jewish measures.^{[381][382][384]} Rauff extorted a 20-million-franc fine from the Jewish community and instituted a system of forced labor for fortification and road-building projects around Bizerta and Tunis, subjecting thousands of Tunisian Jews to brutal conditions under which at least 39 died.^{[381][382][383][384]} Earlier in July 1942, as the Panzerarmee advanced toward the Nile, Rauff's Einsatzgruppe stood ready in Athens under orders to carry out the mass murder of Jewish populations in Egypt and Mandatory Palestine had Axis forces captured the region.^[385][386]

Casualties and aftermath

The North African campaign resulted in heavy human and material losses for both coalitions. British Commonwealth forces sustained approximately 220,000 casualties, including 35,478 dead.^{[387][388][389][390][391][392]} United States forces suffered 18,221 casualties, comprising 2,715 killed, 8,978 wounded, and 6,528 missing or captured.^{[393][394][395][396]} Free French losses totaled approximately 16,000 casualties.^{[391][397][398]} Overall Axis losses were estimated at between 620,000 and 950,000 men killed, wounded, missing, or captured over the three-year campaign.^[391][399] Germany lost 18,594 dead, 3,400 missing, and roughly 130,000 captured.^[400][401] Italy sustained 22,341 dead or missing, with between 250,000 and 340,000 troops captured.^{[388][402][403][404][405]} Vichy French forces lost roughly 1,346 dead and 1,997 wounded during Operation Torch.^{[391][401][406]}

The Allied triumph in North Africa fundamentally altered the strategic landscape of World War II. It eliminated Axis forces from Africa, dissolved Italy's colonial empire, reopened the Mediterranean sea route to Allied commercial and military traffic, and relieved Axis threats to Middle Eastern oil reserves.^{[407][408][409]} The presence of large, battle-hardened Anglo-American armies in North Africa provided the staging ground for the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, which precipitated the collapse of Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime and Italy's exit from the war in September 1943.^[410][411] For the Western Allies, North Africa was the proving ground where combined-arms cooperation, amphibious warfare techniques, and joint Anglo-American command structures were developed for subsequent campaigns in Western Europe.^[407][408]

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187. Barnett 2001, p. 229. (Correlli Barnett, I generali del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2001, ISBN 88-17-12540-7.)
188. Carell 2000, p.314
189. Barnett 2001 - p. 241-242
190. Carell 2000, p. 314. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
191. Barnett 2001, pp. 241-242. (Correlli Barnett, I generali del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2001, ISBN 88-17-12540-7.)
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194. Massignani/Greene, p.133
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201. De Felice 1996 - p. 645-650
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207. Barnett 2001 - p. 272-274
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210. Barnett 2001, pp. 251-264. (Correlli Barnett, I generali del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2001, ISBN 88-17-12540-7.)
211. Carell 2000, pp. 377-378. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
212. Barnett 2001, pp. 272-274. (Correlli Barnett, I generali del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2001, ISBN 88-17-12540-7.)
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219. Carell 2000, pp. 395-401. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
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221. Bauer 1971 - Vol. IV, p. 200-203
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223. Bauer 1971, Vol. IV, pp. 200-203. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
224. Bauer 1971 - Vol. IV, p. 198 i 211-212
225. Bauer 1971, Vol. IV, pp. 198 e 211-212. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
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237. Carell 2000 - p. 447-455
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279. Cartier 1996|Vol. II, p. 62-65
280. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, pp. 62-65. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
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282. Bauer 1971 - Vol. IV, p. 246-247
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284. Bauer 1971, Vol. IV, pp. 246-247. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
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293. "AFTA Tiger I Page". armorfortheages.com. Retrieved 28 September 2016.
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297. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, pp. 126-127. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
298. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 88-92
299. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 88-92. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
300. Liddell Hart 1996 - p. 564-565
301. Liddell Hart 1996, pp. 564-565. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
302. Carell 2000 - p. 561-565
303. Carell 2000, pp. 561-565. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
304. Cartier 1996 - Vol. II, p. 130
305. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, p. 130. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
306. Cartier 1996|Vol. II, p. 131
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308. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, p. 131. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
309. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, pp. 132-133. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
310. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 96-97
311. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 96-97. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
312. Liddell Hart 1996 - p. 583-586 i 591-592
313. Liddell Hart 1996, pp. 583-586 e 591-592. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
314. Seite 407
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316. Irving 1978, pp. 292-299.
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319. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, p. 94. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
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322. Liddell Hart 1996, p. 581. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
323. Mollo 1982, p. 135. (Andrew Mollo, Le forze armate della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1982.)
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326. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 99-100. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
327. Carell 2000, pp. 587-588. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
328. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 104-105
329. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 104-105. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
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332. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 105-106. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
333. Liddell Hart 1996, pp. 592-594. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
334. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 107-108
335. Liddell Hart 1996, p.598
336. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 107-108. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
337. Liddell Hart 1996, p. 598. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
338. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 100
339. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, p. 100. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
340. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 113-116
341. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 113-116. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
342. Carell 2000 - p. 595-596
343. Carell 2000, pp. 595-596. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
344. Carell 2000 - p. 596-597
345. Carell 2000, pp. 596-597. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
346. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 117-118
347. Bauer 1971 - Vol. V, p. 118
348. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, pp. 117-118. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
349. Bauer 1971, Vol. V, p. 118. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
350. Carell 1960, p. 597. (Carell, Paul (1960). Le volpi del deserto. 1941–1943: le armate italo-tedesche in Africa settentrionale [The wolves of the desert. 1941–1943: the Italo-German armies in North Africa]. New York: Bantam.)
351. Liddell Hart 1996, p.608
352. Liddell Hart 1996, p. 608. (Basil H. Liddell Hart, Storia militare della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, ISBN 88-04-42151-7.)
353. Wil Deac (12 June 2006). "Intercepted Communications for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel". World War II Magazine. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 26 February 2013.
354. Lewin 1998, p. 251. (Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3.)
355. Lewin 1998, p. 251. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLewin1998 (help)
356. Lewin 1998, стр. 251. (Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3.)
357. Forty 1998, pp. 97, 148. (Forty, George (1998). The Armies of Rommel. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-379-0.)
358. Forty 1998, pp. 97, 148. sfn error: no target: CITEREFForty1998 (help)
359. Forty 1998, стр. 97 and 148. (Forty, George (1998). The Armies of Rommel. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-379-0.)
360. Lewin 1998, p. 252. (Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3.)
361. Lewin 1998, p. 252. sfn error: no target: CITEREFLewin1998 (help)
362. Lewin 1998, стр. 252 (Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3.)
363. Kingsly, Sir Harry "The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War" Archived 22 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine
364. Hinsley 1993, p. . (Hinsley, Francis Harry (1993). British intelligence in the Second World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44304-3.)
365. Colin F. Baxter: The War in North Africa, 1940-1943. Greenwood Press 1996, ISBN 0-313-29120-9, S. 21.
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367. Hinsley & Stripp 1993, p. 3. (Hinsley, Francis Harry; Stripp, Alan (1993). Codebreakers: The inside story of Bletchley Park. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280132-6.)
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369. Hinsley, F. H.; Stripp, Alan, ур. (1993). Codebreakers: The inside story of Bletchley Park. Oxford: Oxford University Press. стр. 3. ISBN 978-0-19-280132-6.
370. O'Hara & Cernuschi 2013, p. 135. (O'Hara, Vincent; Cernuschi, Enrico (Summer 2013). "The Other Ultra: Signal Intelligence and the Battle to Supply Rommel's Attack toward Suez". Naval War College Review. 66 (3): 117–138.)
371. O'Hara & Cernuschi 2013, p. 118. (O'Hara, Vincent; Cernuschi, Enrico (Summer 2013). "The Other Ultra: Signal Intelligence and the Battle to Supply Rommel's Attack toward Suez". Naval War College Review. 66 (3): 117–138.)
372. O'Hara & Cernuschi 2013, p. 135. sfn error: no target: CITEREFO'HaraCernuschi2013 (help)
373. O'Hara & Cernuschi 2013, p. 118. sfn error: no target: CITEREFO'HaraCernuschi2013 (help)
374. Vincent P. O'Hara and Enrico Cernuschi, (2013). p. 135.
375. Citino 2007, p. 116; Bernhard 2012, pp. 425–446. (Citino, Robert (2007). Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-70-062821-6.)
376. Rochat 2005, p.347
377. Rochat 2005, p. 347. (Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943, Torino, Einaudi, 2005, ISBN 88-06-16118-0.)
378. (en) Robert Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press of Kansas, 2007, p. 116.
379. (en) Patrick Bernhard, « Behind the Battle Lines: Italian Atrocities and the Persecution of Arabs, Berbers, and Jews in North Africa during World War II », Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 26, no 3,‎ 1er décembre 2012, p. 425–446 (DOI 10.1093/hgs/dcs054)
380. (de) Patrick Bernhard, Im Rücken Rommels. Kriegsverbrechen, koloniale Massengewalt und Judenverfolgung in Nordafrika, 1940-1943 in:ZfGen Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung, p. 83-122 ZfGen, Volume 17 (2019), Issue 1-2, (ISSN 1438-8332), ISSN online: 1438-8332, "la campagne d'Afrique du Nord était tout sauf une guerre sans haine. Il y a eu de nombreux crimes intentionnels et des infractions aux règles de conduite, notamment le mauvais traitement et le meurtre de soldats ennemis capturés, le pillage de la population indigène, le viol de femmes locales, ainsi que l'exploitation, le meurtre et la détention massive dans des camps de concentration d'Arabes, de Berbères et de Juifs, souvent motivés par la haine raciale et antisémite."
381. Hilberg 1999|Vol. I, p. 668-669
382. Hilberg 1999, Vol. I, pp. 668-669. (Raul Hilberg, La distruzione degli ebrei d'Europa, Torino, Einaudi, 1999, ISBN 88-06-15191-6.)
383. Namensliste auf dem Gedenkstein für die ums Leben gekommenen Zwangsarbeiter auf dem jüdischen Friedhof Borgel/Tunis (PDF; 6,1 MB) (Memento vom 7. Oktober 2009 im Internet Archive)
384. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Martin Cüppers: Halbmond und Hakenkreuz – Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24025-8, S. 204 und 206 f.
385. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Martin Cüppers: „Beseitigung der jüdisch-nationalen Heimstätte in Palästina“. Das Einsatzkommando bei der Panzerarmee Afrika 1942. In: Jürgen Matthäus, Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Hrsg.): Deutsche, Juden, Völkermord. Der Holocaust als Geschichte und Gegenwart. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2006, ISBN 978-3-534-18481-1, S. 153–176.
386. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Martin Cüppers: „Beseitigung der jüdisch-nationalen Heimstätte in Palästina“. Das Einsatzkommando bei der Panzerarmee Afrika 1942. In: Jürgen Matthäus, Klaus-Michael Mallmann (Hg.): Deutsche, Juden, Völkermord. Der Holocaust als Geschichte und Gegenwart. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2006, S. 153–176.
387. Atkinson 2004, p. 618
388. Cartier 1996 - Vol. II, p. 136
389. Carell 2000, p. 598. (Paul Carell, Le volpi del deserto, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000, ISBN 88-17-25834-2.)
390. Mollo 1982, p. 131. (Andrew Mollo, Le forze armate della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1982.)
391. Zabecki, North Africa
392. Carell, p. 597
393. Colin F. Baxter, The War in North Africa, 1940–1943: A Selected Bibliography, 1996, p. 38: 500.000 capturats sono stati catturati in Nord Africa, Africa Orientale e Sicilia; siccome furono 150000 i capturats di guerra italiani catturati durante l'invasione alleata della Sicilia e circa 100000 quelli presi nella campagna dell'Africa Orientale Italiana, rimangono ~250000 nel Nordafrica: 130000 durante l'Operazione Compass e 120000 successivamente.
394. Atkinson 2004, p. 618. (Rick Atkinson, Un esercito all'alba, Milano, Mondadori, 2004, ISBN 88-04-53670-5.)
395. Playfair, Volume IV, p. 460. United States losses from ngày 12 tháng 11 năm 1942
396. Atkinson, p. 536
397. Rochat 2005, p. 446: Sono circa 400000 i capturats fatti dagli inglesi in Etiopia e in Africa settentrionale, 125000 presi dagli americani in Tunisia e in Sicilia, 40000 lasciati ai francesi in Tunisia}}Considerando che i capturats italiani in Africa orientale furono circa 100000 e che i capturats fatti dagli americani furono presi soprattutto in Sicilia, si arriva alla cifra approssimativa di 340-350000
398. Cartier 1996, Vol. II, p. 136. (Raymond Cartier, La seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mondadori, 1996.)
399. Barclay, Mediterranean Operations
400. Bauer 1971, Vol. IV, p. 243
401. Carell, p. 596
402. Playfair et al. 2004, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press, p. 460
403. Colin F. Baxter, The War in North Africa, 1940–1943: A Selected Bibliography, 1996, p. 38: 500000 prigionieri sono stati catturati in Nord Africa, Africa Orientale e Sicilia; siccome furono 150000 i prigionieri di guerra italiani catturati durante l'invasione alleata della Sicilia e circa 100000 quelli presi nella campagna dell'Africa Orientale Italiana, rimangono ~250000 nel Nordafrica: 130000 durante l'Operazione Compass e 120000 successivamente.
404. Rochat 2005, p. 446: «Sono circa 400000 i prigionieri fatti dagli inglesi in Etiopia e in Africa settentrionale, 125000 presi dagli americani in Tunisia e in Sicilia, 40000 lasciati ai francesi in Tunisia» Considerando che i prigionieri italiani in Africa orientale furono circa 100000 e che i prigionieri fatti dagli americani furono presi soprattutto in Sicilia, si arriva alla cifra approssimativa di 340-350000 (Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943, Torino, Einaudi, 2005, ISBN 88-06-16118-0.)
405. Roma: Instituto Centrale Statistica' Morti E Dispersi Per Cause Belliche Negli Anni 1940–45 Roma 1957
406. Bauer 1971, Vol. IV, p. 243. (Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda guerra mondiale, Novara, De Agostini, 1971.)
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