Rif War

Geographic and Political Background

The northern zone of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, delimited by the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of Fez and the subsequent Franco-Spanish Convention of Madrid in 1912, comprised approximately 20,000 square kilometres, representing about 5 percent of Moroccan territory. This rugged terrain was dominated by the Rif mountain range, one of the four mountain chains in Morocco. Administratively and geographically, the zone was divided from west to east into four distinct sectors: the Jbala-Luxos between Tangier to the north and Alcazarquivir (Ksar El Kebir) to the south in the western Rif; the Gomara (or Chaouen) region between Oued Laou to the north and Chefchaouen to the south; the Central Rif encompassing the Bay of Al Hoceima; and the Eastern Rif or Kert sector stretching from Midar to the Moulouya River, which included Nador and the Spanish coastal stronghold of Melilla.^[1] A portion of the eastern Rif fell under the French protectorate, comprising the north of the provinces of Taza, Guercif, and Taourirt.

Formally, the Sultan of Morocco kept nominal supreme authority, and in the Spanish zone he was represented by a khalifa, who in practice answered to the Spanish. In both the French and the Spanish zones, all economic, political and military power lay with European officials. In Spanish Morocco, unlike the French zone, the number of Spanish settlers was small, and a policy of strict segregation separated the Spanish from the native Arabs and Berbers. Morocco had become politically divided into the Blaad El Makhzan, the land of the government, and the Blaad Es Siba, the land of no organization. Although the Rif tribes were nominally subject to the authority of the Moroccan sultan, most of them had kept considerable local self-government and rejected the rule of the Christian Spaniards.^[2][3] For centuries, the Berber tribes of the Rif had fought off any attempt by outsiders to impose control on them.^[4][5]

European travelers had almost never penetrated the interior of the Rif mountains prior to the twentieth century, despite their visibility from Mediterranean shipping routes.^[4] Walter Burton Harris, the Morocco correspondent for The Times, noted that as late as 1912 only one or two Europeans had ever visited the cedar forests south of Fez, and that the mountain Berbers were as inhospitable to outside Arabs as they were to foreign Christians, routinely killing intruders.^[4] Vincent Sheean, reporting for The New York Times, described the Rif as a territory of crimson mountains set against blue skies, cut by precipitous ravines and verdant valleys that reminded him of Colorado.^[4]

Colonial Interests and Mining Concessions

Spanish claims over northern Morocco had been asserted at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, but Spanish sovereignty over the interior remained strictly de jure because local sultans could never exercise practical control over the tribes.^[4][6] Following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and sold the Caroline and Mariana Islands to the German Empire in 1899.^[7] Stripped of its overseas empire except for small coastal footholds in Morocco and Spanish Guinea, Spain saw the emergence of an influential Africanist military and political faction led by King Alfonso XIII, which sought imperial resurgence in North Africa to restore national prestige.^[7] Elements within the Catholic Church supported this push, preaching the necessity of continuing the historical Reconquista across the Strait of Gibraltar.^[7]

Commercial incentives also drove Spanish colonial penetration into the Rif. The mountains near Melilla contained rich deposits of nearly pure magnetite iron ore that could be extracted through open-pit mining.^[7] The Spanish Crown granted extensive mining concessions in the Rif to the Basque financier Horacio Echevarrieta through the Minas del Rif company.^[8] By 1920, Echevarrieta had extracted over 800,000 tons of high-grade ore.^[8] This mining activity led to severe environmental disruption and displaced local inhabitants, who were excluded from any share of the substantial corporate profits.^[8]

Tensions exploded in July 1909 when Rifian tribesmen attacked Spanish workers constructing a railway bridge to connect Melilla to the iron mines.^[9] The Spanish government dispatched reinforcements, sparking weeks of combat that resulted in more than 1,000 Spanish casualties and escalated into the Second Melilla Campaign.^[9][10] By September 1909, Spain had mobilized 40,000 soldiers in northern Morocco to occupy the mountains south and southeast of Melilla.^[10] In Spain, the mobilization of working-class reservists triggered the Tragic Week uprising in Barcelona, where trade unions argued that Spanish workers had no quarrel with the Rifian people.^[11]

Early Resistance and the Uprising of El-Raisuni

Early resistance to Spanish occupation in the eastern Rif was led by Mohamed Ameziane (El Mizzian), whose rebellion near Melilla was put down in the Kert campaign a few months before the protectorate treaty was signed.^[12] In the western Moroccan region of Jebala, Spanish military operations began in 1911 with the amphibious landing at Larache. Spanish expansion in Jebala was contested by the local warlord Mohamed ben Abdallah el-Raisuni (Ahmad al-Raisuni), the master of Asilah and the Atlantic coastline, who gained notoriety for kidnapping foreign nationals for ransom and disrupting communications toward Tetouan.^[12][13]

Spanish commanders clashed repeatedly with el-Raisuni's irregular forces around Oued Ras, Beni Sidel, and Alcazarquivir, where Gonzalo Queipo de Llano checked his advance.^[13] By 1915, the Spanish High Commissioner, General Francisco Gómez Jordana, adopted a policy of political agreements with el-Raisuni, allowing military operations to subside into minor skirmishes during the First World War.^[12] Following Jordana's death in late 1918, his successor, General Dámaso Berenguer, broke relations with el-Raisuni, defeating him at the Battle of the Fondak near Tetouan and forcing him to withdraw into the mountains of Jbel Bouhachem.^[12][14]

To secure communications and isolate el-Raisuni, Spanish troops under General Alberto Castro Girona occupied the holy city of Chefchaouen on 14 October 1920 without initial resistance.^[15] To maintain control over the mountainous region, the Spanish army constructed nearly 400 small fortified posts, known as blocaos, stretching across the Martin River valley and toward the coast along the Oued Lau.^[16][17][18] These blocaos were placed on elevated ridges but lacked internal water supplies, forcing small garrisons to rely on daily mule convoys that were regularly ambushed by local tribesmen.^[16][17][18]

Opposing Forces

The opposing armies represented completely different military systems. On one side stood the indigenous tribal levies and regular units of the Rif, relying on terrain knowledge, mobile defense, and marksmanship. On the other stood the colonial armies of Spain, and later France, equipped with modern artillery, aviation, armored vehicles, and industrial logistics.

Rifian Organization and Tactics

The Berber tribes of the Rif had a tradition of mountain combat, scouting, and accurate marksmanship. Under the political and military direction of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, tribal fighting elements were transformed into a coordinated military force.^[19][20] The core of the Rifian army consisted of regular units known as tabors, whose numbers were estimated by Abd el-Krim, as quoted by Spanish General Manuel Goded, at between 6,000 and 7,000 men, though other accounts place the permanent regular force at between 2,000 and 3,000 soldiers.^[19] These regular troops were supplemented by a small number of Algerian deserters from the French Foreign Legion.^[21]

The bulk of the Rifian fighting strength consisted of tribal militias mobilized by local caids. These levies operated under a rotational obligation, serving at the front lines for periods of no more than fifteen consecutive days before returning to their farms.^[22][23] General Goded estimated that at their peak in June 1924, potential Rifian mobilized manpower reached 80,000 men.^[22][23][24] However, due to severe shortages of arms and ammunition, Abd el-Krim was never able to equip more than 20,000 men with firearms simultaneously.^[23][25] By the final campaigns of 1926, effective Rifian strength had dropped to approximately 12,000 fighters, possessing worn weapons and dwindling ammunition stocks.^[26][27]

Rifian tactics relied heavily on decentralized guerrilla methods, rapid infiltration, field camouflage, and the construction of deep trench systems and covered bunkers that neutralized enemy artillery and air observation.^[28] Fighters exploited the rugged topography of ravines and peaks, encircling isolated enemy outposts and denying them water until they surrendered. Captured European Mauser and Berthier rifles, along with seized artillery pieces and machine guns, formed the primary armament of the Rifian forces.^[28]

Spanish Military Condition and Africanist Units

In 1921, Spanish colonial forces in northern Morocco consisted largely of peninsular conscripts and reservists. More than half of these conscripts were illiterate young men from the poorest strata of Spanish society, who received minimal combat instruction and little rifle training before deployment.^[29][30] Spanish soldiers received a daily wage equivalent to 34 US cents and subsisted on a meager diet of coffee, bread, beans, and rice, frequently bartering ammunition in local markets for fresh vegetables.^[31] Medical facilities were deficient, barracks were unsanitary, and venereal disease was widespread.^[31] Outposts were often small blocaos lacking sanitation, exposing soldiers to sniper fire whenever they left their bunkers.^[31]

Widespread corruption among the Spanish officer corps undermined logistics and military readiness. Supplies intended for the troops were frequently sold on the black market, while funds allocated for road and railway construction were embezzled.^[31][32] Officers in Melilla often neglected military duties, and many lacked basic map-reading skills, resulting in Spanish columns repeatedly getting lost in the mountains.^[31] Approximately three-quarters of the rifles stored at the Melilla arsenal in late 1920 were unserviceable due to lack of maintenance, posing greater danger to the soldiers firing them than to the enemy.^[31] General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, the military commander of the Melilla sector, dismissed reports of poor morale, believing the Rifians were too inferior to pose a serious threat.^[31]

Due to the weakness of the conscript infantry, Spanish authorities relied on professional units of the Army of Africa. Beginning in 1911, Spain recruited Moroccan indigenous troops into regiments of Regulares, who demonstrated superior combat efficiency.^[33][34] Following the unrest of Tragic Week in 1909, the Spanish government pursued a deliberate policy of 'Moroccanizing' the frontline forces to limit political backlash in the peninsula.^[34] In 1920, Lieutenant Colonel José Millán-Astray founded the Tercio de Extranjeros (the Spanish Legion), modeled on the French Foreign Legion, with Major Francisco Franco serving as its deputy commander.^[35][36] Although named a foreign legion, over 75 percent of its recruits were Spanish nationals, while Latin American immigrants formed a large share of the remainder.^[37] The Legion and the Regulares established a reputation for strict discipline and ruthlessness, spearheading subsequent offensive counter-offensives.^[37]

Spain also used tanks in Morocco: in 1921 it bought 12 Renault FT-17 tanks from France, 11 of them armed with Hotchkiss machine guns converted to take the Spanish Mauser cartridge and one a command version with a radio, and six Schneider CA1 tanks bought in France also took part. This was the first use of tanks in Africa.

The Campaign of Annual and the Disaster (1920–1921)

In January 1920, General Manuel Fernández Silvestre assumed command of the Melilla division, determined to push westward to Alhucemas Bay and subjugate the central Rif.^[38] His rapid advance initially met little opposition, but it quickly overstretched Spanish supply lines across hostile territory.

Spanish Advance into the Eastern Rif

By August 1920, Silvestre's army had occupied the region between Melilla and Midar against sporadic opposition from local clans weakened by regional food shortages.^[39][40] On 5 December 1920, Spanish troops took Ben Taieb in the territory of the Ait Oulichek.^[41] In January 1921, Spanish columns entered the lands of the Temsamane and Ait Touzine, doubling the area under Spanish control within a single year.^[42] Silvestre established an advanced forward post at Annual, a small village near the border between Temsamane and Ait Oulichek, while deploying his troops across 144 isolated forts and blocaos extending from Sidi Driss on the coast through Annual to Melilla.^[31][42]

On 12 March 1921, Silvestre occupied the coastal position of Sidi Driss on the mouth of the Amekran River, preceded by an earlier landing at Afrau on 12 January 1921.^[43] These advances deeply alarmed the powerful Ait Ouriaghel confederation in the central Rif. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, a former Islamic judge (cadi) in Melilla and former editor of the Arabic section of El Telegrama del Rif, began rallying the Ait Ouriaghel, Temsamane, and Iboqayen tribes, issuing calls for jihad in central markets such as Ait Bouayach.^[44][45] Abd el-Krim sent a formal letter warning Silvestre not to cross the Amekran River, declaring that any crossing would be treated as an act of war.^[46][47] Silvestre dismissed the threat publicly, calling Abd el-Krim a madman whose insolence deserved severe punishment.^[46]

The Battle of Dhar Abarran

Disregarding warnings from subordinate officers regarding fragile logistics, Silvestre ordered an advance across the Amekran River.^[48] On 1 June 1921, a Spanish detachment of 250 men occupied the strategic hill of Dhar Abarran (Monte Abarrán), rising 525 meters above sea level in Temsamane territory overlooking Alhucemas Bay.^[47][49][50] The position was fortified with trenches and barbed wire, and defended by artillery and indigenous police auxiliaries.^[51]

At dawn on 2 June 1921, approximately 1,000 Rifian fighters led by the religious scholar Fqih Muhammed Ben Ali (known as Boulahya of the Ait Touzine) launched an assault on Dhar Abarran.^[28][51] During the battle, indigenous Moroccan auxiliaries serving with the Spanish turned their weapons on their Spanish officers.^[51][52] Out of 250 Spanish soldiers defending the position, 179 were killed, and the Rifians captured four artillery pieces, 250 rifles, and ammunition.^[47][51][53] On the same day, a Rifian force attacked the coastal post of Sidi Driss, inflicting casualties before withdrawing.^[53][54] The victory at Dhar Abarran was celebrated throughout the Rif with traditional poetry (izran), elevating Abd el-Krim's status and marking the military opening of the Rif War.^[55]

Siege of Ighriben and the Disaster of Annual

On 7 June 1921, Silvestre established an outpost on the hill of Ighriben (Igueriben), six kilometers south of Annual, garrisoned by roughly 350 men under Major Julio Benítez Benítez.^[56] On 15 June, Rifians captured the nearby height of Sidi Brahim, giving them fire control over the road connecting Annual to Ighriben.^[28] By mid-July, approximately 3,000 Rifian fighters surrounded Ighriben, cutting off all supplies.^[28][57] The besieged Spanish soldiers suffered from extreme heat and dehydration, eventually resorting to drinking cologne, ink, and their own urine.^[57][58] Spanish relief columns dispatched by Silvestre from Annual were repeatedly turned back with heavy casualties by Rifian snipers.^[59]

On 21 July 1921, after all food and water had been exhausted, Silvestre authorized Major Benítez to break through the encirclement.^[28][60] The breakout attempt ended in an ambush: Major Benítez was killed, and out of the garrison of roughly 350 soldiers, only 25 (or according to some sources, 11) reached Annual alive.^[52][59] The destruction of Ighriben caused widespread panic among the 4,000 to 5,000 Spanish troops concentrated at the Annual camp, who came under daily rifle fire from surrounding heights.^[57][59]

On the morning of 22 July 1921, Silvestre ordered an evacuation toward Ben Taieb and the Garet plain.^[61] The withdrawal collapsed into a disorganized rout as Rifian fighters attacked the retreating columns from surrounding ridges.^[61] General Silvestre was killed during the battle; accounts differed as to whether he committed suicide in despair or fell to enemy fire, and his body was never recovered.^[52][62] General Felipe Navarro assumed command of the retreating forces at Dar Driouch, attempting to organize a fighting withdrawal while Spanish outposts across the eastern protectorate collapsed in succession.^[62]

Massacres at Selouane and Monte Arruit

During the general retreat toward Melilla, the Alcántara Cavalry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Primo de Rivera carried out repeated sacrificial charges against pursuing Metalsa tribesmen, sustaining heavy losses to allow Navarro's retreating columns to reach the fortified camp of Monte Arruit.^[63][64] Nador was evacuated by the Spanish army on 2 August, and Selouane fell to Rifian fighters on 3 August, where hundreds of surrendering Spanish soldiers were put to death.^[65][66]

By 29 July 1921, General Navarro and roughly 1,200 to 3,000 exhausted soldiers were besieged at Monte Arruit by 3,000 to 5,000 Rifian warriors.^[63] The garrison held out for twelve days under continuous bombardment without medical supplies or adequate drinking water.^[67] On 9 August 1921, having exhausted all ammunition, Navarro agreed to terms of surrender negotiated with local tribal leaders, who promised safe passage to Melilla in exchange for the surrender of arms.^[68] When the unarmed Spanish soldiers exited the fortress, the besiegers attacked the column, slaughtering between 2,000 and 2,600 men.^[67][68][69] General Navarro and approximately 400 to 600 officers and soldiers were spared for ransom and marched as prisoners to Abd el-Krim's headquarters at Ajdir.^[52][68]

The collapse of the Melilla division was one of the worst defeats sustained by a European colonial army in Africa.^[2][3][70] Total Spanish fatalities between the initial attack at Annual and the fall of Monte Arruit were officially reported to the Cortes Generales at 13,192, while other military estimates placed Spanish dead and missing between 13,000 and 19,000 soldiers.^[71][72][73] The Rifians captured over 130 fortified positions, 20,000 to 30,000 rifles, 350 to 400 machine guns, 129 artillery pieces, vehicles, and vast stockpiles of ammunition, completely reversing all Spanish territorial gains made since 1909.^{[71][72][74][75][76]}

The Republic of the Rif

Following the victory at Annual, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi moved to consolidate his political authority over the tribes. On 19 September 1921, twelve Berber tribes assembled to establish the Republic of the Rif, which was reorganized on 1 February 1923 as the Confederate Republic of the Tribes of the Rif, with its capital at Ajdir.^[28][52][77] Abd el-Krim was president of the Republic.^[28] He also held the title Amir al-Jihad, emir of the jihad.

Political and Administrative Institutions

The government was structured with a centralized administration. Abd el-Krim served as head of state, while his brother, M'hamed ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, served as general delegate and chief of military operations.^[77] The ministerial cabinet was staffed largely by members of Abd el-Krim's family and the Ait Ouriaghel confederation: Ahmed Boudra was appointed Minister of War; Caid Lyazid was named Minister of the Interior; Mohamed Azerkane was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Abd es-Salam el-Khattabi became Minister of Finance; and the religious scholar Zerhouni was named Minister of Justice and Instruction.^[77]

The Rifian state established a diplomatic presence abroad, sending missions to London and Paris and communicating directly with the League of Nations to seek international recognition as an independent sovereign republic.^[28][78] In these communications, Abd el-Krim asserted that the Republic of the Rif possessed a functional government, an established territory, and an organized army, and offered commercial concessions to foreign enterprises, particularly British firms, to foster diplomatic ties.^[28] However, European governments refused to grant diplomatic recognition, viewing the Rif as legally subject to the Moroccan protectorate treaties.^[78]

Social, Legal, and Religious Reforms

The administration of the Republic rested on the strict application of Islamic law (Sharia), which superseded traditional customary law (azref) and outlawed the blood feuds that had historically fractured Rifian society.^[28] Abd el-Krim declared that any individual who committed murder in a blood feud would face execution.^[28][79] Religious teachers (fouqaha) and Islamic judges (cadis) were assigned to every district to enforce legal codes, resolve disputes, and promote religious education.^[28] The consumption of tea and tobacco was banned in the Republic. Men were ordered to cut off their traditional hair locks, and traditional superstitions were actively discouraged.^[80][81]

To modernize the region's defense and economy, the administration built a network of unpaved roads connecting the interior valleys and installed a military telephone system that allowed Abd el-Krim to transmit orders across front lines.^[28][80] The military formations were divided into 'mia', companies of about a hundred men, which were subdivided into groups of 25 to 50 men, led respectively by mokaddem and caids khamsine.^[82] Despite establishing an independent republican administration, Abd el-Krim maintained a careful stance toward the Sultan of Morocco, Moulay Youssef, directing that Friday prayers across the Rif continue to be delivered in the Sultan's name.^[28][83]

Warfare and Tribal Struggles (1921–1924)

Between the collapse at Annual in August 1921 and the intervention of France in 1925, the war settled into prolonged operational stalemates punctuated by intense regional campaigns. Spain fought to stabilize its remaining enclaves, while the Rifian leadership struggled to assert authority over recalcitrant neighboring tribes.

Spanish Reconquest of the Plains (1921–1922)

Following Annual, the Spanish garrison at Melilla was reduced to 14,000 demoralized soldiers, but Abd el-Krim refrained from ordering an immediate assault on the city.^[72][74] He later stated to writer J. Roger-Matthieu that he feared foreign European powers would intervene if their nationals inside Melilla were harmed, a decision he subsequently regretted as his greatest operational error.^[72][74][84] During August 1921, Spain moved substantial reinforcements to Melilla, including Foreign Legion and Regulares units, bringing total strength under General José Sanjurjo to 36,000 men by the end of the month.^[28][85][86]

On 12 September 1921, the Spanish army initiated a counter-offensive. Souk El-Arba of the Kebdana was occupied after heavy fighting in which 75 Rifians were killed, followed by the retaking of Nador on 17 September.^[28] Spanish forces captured Zeghanghane on 5 October, cleared Mount Gourougou on 10 October, and occupied Selouane on 14 October.^[28] On 24 October 1921, Spanish troops re-entered Monte Arruit, discovering thousands of unburied corpses from the August massacre.^[28][87] Pushing across the flat Garet plain, Spanish columns reached the Kert River by late December and reoccupied Dar Driouch on 9 January 1922, restoring Spanish control over the eastern plains while the Rifian mountains remained unassailable.^[28][88]

In March 1922, Spanish forces launched an offensive against the Ait Said confederation, employing tanks to breach defensive trenches.^[28][88] Rifian warriors climbed onto the armored vehicles to attack the viewports, but Dar El Kebdani was captured on 8 April 1922.^[28][88] Despite these gains, Spanish naval assets suffered setbacks: the transport ship Juan de Joanes was sunk by Rifian shore batteries in Alhucemas Bay in March 1922, and the dreadnought battleship España ran aground off Cape Tres Forcas in August 1923 and had to be dismantled on site.^{[88][89][90][91]}

Inter-Tribal Conflicts and Southern Frontiers

Abd el-Krim faced internal opposition within the Rif from regional rivals who resisted his centralized rule. Foremost among them were Amar Hamidou, caid of the Marnissa tribe, and Hajj Bekkiche of the Igzennayen.^[28] In July 1922, Amar Hamidou engaged Rifian government forces in armed clashes.^[28] Hamidou was supported by Bekkiche and by Abdelmalik al-Jazairi, a grandson of the Algerian leader Emir Abdelkader who had led anti-French fighters in northern Morocco since the 1910s and viewed Abd el-Krim's rise as a threat to his own influence.^[28][92]

In December 1922, Amar Hamidou attacked the Ait Ammart, a Rifian tribe loyal to Abd el-Krim, seeking to sever supply routes between the central Rif and the French zone from which the Rifians imported grain and weapons.^[28][49] Hamidou captured the Ait Ammart caid, Mouhand Ben Tayyeb, and resumed his offensive in January 1923 with 1,800 warriors, destroying several villages.^[28] Abd el-Krim diverted veteran units southward to counter the threat, forcing Amar Hamidou to submit on 7 May 1923 and release Ben Tayyeb.^[28] On 22 May, Bekkiche also submitted and enlisted in the Rifian military, while Abdelmalik was expelled from the central Rif and subsequently accepted Spanish command over an auxiliary force of 1,400 pro-Spanish Moroccans known as the Harka of Abdelmalik.^[28]

Campaigns in the West and the Jbala

Seeking to relieve Spanish military pressure in the eastern sector, Abd el-Krim dispatched an expeditionary force under his brother M'hamed in late 1922 toward the Ghomara and Jebala regions in western Morocco.^[28] M'hamed sought to coordinate with local rebels fighting Spanish forces around Chefchaouen, but relations with the Ghomara confederation quickly deteriorated over Rifian requisitions and garrisoning, forcing M'hamed to withdraw to El-Jebha.^[28] Meanwhile, el-Raisuni, encircled in his mountain redoubt at Jbel Bouhachem, concluded an agreement with Spanish High Commissioner Ricardo Burguete in September 1922, agreeing to keep peace in Jebala in exchange for Spanish arms, money, and recognition.^[14][28]

In July 1923, Abd el-Krim dispatched 1,000 central Rifian warriors under Caid Abdelkrim Ben Ali El-Hattach to re-establish control over the Ghomara, arresting several dissenting local chieftains and sending them as prisoners to Ajdir.^[28] In August 1923, Abd el-Krim achieved a political victory when Ahmed Ben Mohammed Isbou, known as Khériro (or Heriro), abandoned his former commander el-Raisuni to join the Rifian Republic.^[28][93] A skilled guerrilla fighter from the Beni Hozmar tribe, Khériro became Abd el-Krim's chief field commander in Jebala, leading a nocturnal raid into the Spanish-occupied city of Tetouan on 22 August 1923 that killed ten Spanish soldiers.^[28]

Stalemate at Tizi Azza and the 1923 Operations

In the eastern sector, the strategic mountain pass of Tizi Azza commanded the gateway into the central Rif. In June 1923, Rifian regular forces under War Minister Abdeslam n-Hajj Mouhand launched an assault against the fortified Spanish outpost at Tizi Azza, inflicting over 100 casualties in the initial fighting.^[28] Spanish forces defended the pass tenaciously, later describing the position as an inferno of fire and steel.^[94] On 5 June 1923, the Spanish Foreign Legion mounted a counter-attack led by its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Valenzuela, who was killed by rifle fire alongside 40 legionnaires while charging Rifian positions.^[28][95][96]

Francisco Franco was promoted to command the Spanish Legion on 8 June 1923 following Valenzuela's death.^[96] On 19 August 1923, Abd el-Krim opened a new offensive against Spanish positions at Afrau and Tifarouine, drawing Spanish reserves into ferocious close-quarters fighting.^[28] On 22 August, Franco's legionnaires relieved the besieged garrison at Tifarouine; Spanish losses totaled 800 casualties against 600 Rifian dead and wounded.^[28][96][97]

The problem of hundreds of Spanish soldiers captured at Annual was resolved in January 1923. Spanish representatives met Rifian delegates at Ajdir, negotiating a ransom agreement on 24 January under which Spain paid 4 million pesetas and released all Rifian prisoners in exchange for the surviving Spanish captives.^[28][98] The Basque industrialist Horacio Echevarrieta financed the ransom payment, and on 28 January 1923 the surviving Spanish prisoners, including General Navarro, were repatriated to Melilla.^[28][98][99]

The Primo de Rivera Coup and the Primo Line

The protracted conflict polarized Spanish society between the 'africanistas', who demanded complete military conquest to restore imperial honor, and the 'abandonistas', who argued that the barren mountains of northern Morocco were not worth the expenditure of Spanish lives and national wealth.^[100][101] In August 1923, Spanish conscripts mutinied at railway stations, soldiers in Malaga refused to embark on transport ships, and left-wing demonstrations in Barcelona saw Spanish flags burned while the flag of the Rif Republic was displayed.^[100][101]

On 13 September 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera carried out a military coup d'état with the approval of King Alfonso XIII, establishing a military directory.^{[28][93][100]} Primo de Rivera had historically leaned toward the abandonista camp, and after taking power he soon concluded that the war was unwinnable and considered pulling his troops back to the coast.^{[28][100][102]} In late July 1924, Primo de Rivera visited the Foreign Legion post at Ben Taieb, where officers symbolically served him a banquet of eggs in varied preparations to mock his perceived lack of courage.^[103][104] Primo de Rivera maintained his composure, reminding junior officers that national policy was determined by the government, but he adjusted his retreat plans to hold an extensive fortified perimeter designated the 'Primo Line' (or Estella Line) running south of Tetouan toward the western coast.^{[103][105][106]}

The Ghomara Revolt and Suppression (1924)

During early 1924, Abd el-Krim's administration faced tribal rebellions in the west. In January 1924, Amar Hamidou broke with Abd el-Krim once more, coordinating with Hajj Bekkiche and the pro-French caid Medbouh.^[28] Abd el-Krim placed a bounty of 15,000 pesetas on Hamidou's head, dispatched several thousand warriors to punish the Marnissa clan, and forced Hamidou to flee behind French lines.^[28] In April and May 1924, Rifian forces engaged warriors of Cherif Abderahmane Derkaoui, head of the powerful Derkaouia Sufi brotherhood based at Amjott in the fertile Beni Zeroual region.^[28] Influenced by reformist Salafi ideas, Abd el-Krim condemned maraboutic Sufi orders as backward, heterodox, and politically complicit with French colonialism, while the Derkaoui and Nasiriya brotherhoods rejected Abd el-Krim's political legitimacy.^[28][107]

Resentment among the Ghomara tribes over high taxation, grain requisitions, and military conscription erupted into open rebellion in mid-May 1924, when Abd el-Krim ordered Caid El-Hattach to disarm the Ghomari clans.^[28] The Ghomara severed telephone lines to the central Rif, laid siege to Rifian forces at Amtar on the Mediterranean coast, and spread the uprising into the Senhaja de Srair and the Targuist district.^[28] The veteran commander Fqih Boulahya narrowly escaped capture and alerted Abd el-Krim.^[28]

The Rifian regular army responded with severe punitive measures. Columns commanded by El-Hattach and Khériro suppressed the uprising in late May 1924, burning non-compliant villages and confiscating tribal property.^[28] By early June 1924, the Ghomara uprising was crushed, and Abd el-Krim's brother M'hamed deployed 15,000 men to garrison the western mountains, while concluding a temporary truce with Cherif Derkaoui on 5 June.^[28]

The Spanish Retreat from Chefchaouen

In the summer of 1924, Primo de Rivera enacted the evacuation of the interior garrisons in western Morocco.^[28][93] Guerrilla pressure intensified across the Oued Lau valley and the road connecting Chefchaouen to Tetouan, under the field command of M'hamed al-Khattabi, El-Hattach, and Khériro.^[28] On 7 August 1924, Spanish auxiliary commander Abdelmalik al-Jazairi was killed in action by Rifian fighters near Midar.^[28] By September, over 10,000 Spanish troops were isolated in Chefchaouen and surrounding forts.^[28]

Primo de Rivera assembled 40,000 soldiers in three columns under Generals Castro Girona, Serrano, and Oliva to relieve the garrisons and protect the retreat down the Beni Hassan valley.^[28][108] Spanish forces relieved Chefchaouen on 30 September 1924, exchanging rifles and ammunition with surrounding tribes in several locations to secure unmolested withdrawal.^[28][108] Colonialist officers such as Francisco Franco and Queipo de Llano bitterly opposed the withdrawal, viewing the abandonment of Chefchaouen as an unbearable humiliation, and briefly contemplated a coup against Primo de Rivera.^[28][109]

The formal evacuation of Chefchaouen began on 15 November 1924.^[28][110] Franco's legionnaires formed the rearguard on 17 November, placing dressed mannequins along the city ramparts to deceive Rifian observers.^[28][110] Rifian and Jebala fighters entered the holy city barefoot as a gesture of religious respect, while torrential winter storms turned mountain tracks into quagmires.^{[28][110][111]} On 19 November, 7,000 Moroccan fighters ambushed the Spanish column struggling through the mud.^[28][110] At Cherouta, 1,000 Spanish soldiers were killed, including General Serrano.^[28] Surrounded Spanish detachments at Souk El-Arba and Dar Akoba endured three weeks of relentless attacks.^[28]

The surviving Spanish columns reached Tetouan on 13 December 1924, having suffered estimated losses of 800 officers and 17,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing during the retreat.^[28][112] While disaster had been averted through the rearguard actions of the Foreign Legion and Regulares, the retreat surrendered almost the entire interior of the protectorate to Abd el-Krim, leaving Spain in possession of only Ceuta, Melilla, Asilah, and Larache behind the fortified Primo Line.^{[28][36][93][113]}

French Intervention and Coalition Warfare (1925)

By early 1925, the Republic of the Rif controlled approximately three-quarters of the Spanish protectorate. Abd el-Krim's authority had reached its zenith, but his consolidation of power brought him into direct conflict with independent tribal factions and the neighboring French colonial empire.

Subjugation of the Akhmas and Capture of El-Raisuni

The powerful Arabic-speaking Akhmas confederation around Chefchaouen chafed under Rifian governance, resenting requisitions from religious endowments (habous) and the appointment of Ait Ouriaghel administrators.^[28] Encouraged by el-Raisuni from his mountain base at Tazrout, the Akhmas ambushed a Rifian unit on 13 January 1925, decapitating the dead soldiers and displaying their heads in local villages.^[28] In response, Khériro led a punitive expedition of 500 Rifian regular troops into Akhmas territory, carrying out village burnings, executing dissidents, and levying an indemnity of 250,000 pesetas.^[28]

On 8 February 1925, Rifian forces assaulted el-Raisuni's fortified compound at Tazrout.^[28] Seriously ill with dropsy, the aged warlord surrendered and was transported as a prisoner to the central Rif, where he was incarcerated in the prison of Tamasint.^[28] The Rifians seized el-Raisuni's substantial treasury, including 75,000 pesetas and forty cases of ammunition.^[28] El-Raisuni died in captivity at Tamasint on 5 April 1925, leaving Abd el-Krim without any serious native rival in northern Morocco.^[28]

The Battle of the Ouergha and French Entry

In May 1924, French forces under Marshal Hubert Lyautey had established an advanced defensive cordon of 66 outposts north of the Oureghla (Ouergha) River, encroaching on tribal territories that served as the primary agricultural granary for the Rif.^[28][114] Facing food shortages and threatened by French cooperation with the anti-Rifian Derkaouia brotherhood, Abd el-Krim launched an offensive across the protectorate boundary on 12 April 1925.^{[28][114][115]}

An assault force of 4,000 to 8,000 Rifian and allied Jebala fighters overran the territory of the Beni Zeroual, burning Cherif Derkaoui's religious lodge at Amjott and laying siege to French fortified garrisons at Bibane, Taounate, Tafrant, Ourtzagh, and Beni Derkoul.^{[28][114][115][116]} The French garrison at Bibane fell on 5 June 1925 after weeks of close-quarters grenade combat that cost 400 French and 1,000 Moroccan lives.^[28][117] At Beni Derkoul, the surrounded commander Lieutenant Pol Lapeyre detonated his post's ammunition magazines on 15 June 1925, killing himself and his men alongside attacking Rifians rather than surrender.^[28][117]

The northern Moroccan tribes of Branes and Tsoul revolted against French rule, forcing the evacuation of European civilians from Taza and Ouezzane.^[28][117] Rifian raiding columns advanced to within 40 kilometers of Fez, threatening communication links between French Morocco and Algeria.^[28][118] Out of 66 French border outposts along the Ouergha line, 43 to 48 were captured or abandoned.^{[28][118][119]} French military losses exceeded 1,000 dead, 3,700 wounded, and 1,000 missing, representing over 20 percent of their deployed frontline troops.^{[119][120][121]} Marshal Lyautey wrote in 1925 that, given the suddenness and violence of the Rifian attack, it was impossible to remain in that situation without risking the loss of Morocco.^[122]

Franco-Spanish Diplomacy and Coalition Build-up

French and Spanish delegations met in Madrid to negotiate a military pact against the Republic of the Rif, from 17 June to 25 July 1925 according to one account and from 17 to 25 June 1925 according to another.^{[2][3][28][123]} An effective naval blockade was imposed on the Republic of the Rif.^[124] The two powers also agreed to fight the arms trade between the Rif and Europe and pledged not to sign a separate peace with Abd el-Krim. Autonomy under international treaties was formally offered to the Rifians on condition that they evacuate the French protectorate and permit Spanish occupation of Alhucemas Bay, terms which Abd el-Krim rejected.^[28][123]

Marshal Lyautey, who had long opposed joint military operations with Spain, was replaced in military command in July 1925 by General Stanislas Naulin and Marshal Philippe Pétain, the victor of Verdun.^{[28][125][126]} Pétain arrived in Morocco to command an expeditionary corps of 100,000 to 160,000 metropolitan, Algerian, Senegalese, and Foreign Legion soldiers, alongside Moroccan tirailleurs and goumiers, supported by dozens of artillery batteries and tanks.^{[126][127][128][129]} Spanish armed forces in northern Morocco numbered between 90,000 and 140,000 men under General Primo de Rivera.^{[125][128][130]} On 17 September 1925, the Escadrille Chérifienne, a mercenary squadron of American volunteer aviators serving France, carried out air bombardments on Chefchaouen.^[131][132]

The Al Hoceima Amphibious Landing

In response to coalition planning, Abd el-Krim launched a preemptive attack against the Spanish perimeter defending Tetouan on 3 September 1925, laying siege to Kudia Tahar in an attempt to pin Spanish reserves in the west.^[133][134] General Primo de Rivera refused to halt his amphibious plans, dispatching emergency reinforcements to relieve Kudia Tahar on 13 September while moving ahead with the coastal assault.^[134][135]

On 8 September 1925, the Spanish and French navies launched the Al Hoceima amphibious landing (Desembarco de Alhucemas) in the heart of the central Rif.^{[134][136][137]} The assault convoy consisted of 63 transport vessels carrying 13,000 to 16,300 Spanish soldiers from Ceuta and Melilla, escorted by 33 Spanish and eight French warships, with aerial support from over 100 aircraft including the seaplane carrier Dédalo.^[136][137] General Miguel Primo de Rivera served as supreme commander, with General José Sanjurjo directing ground landing forces.^[134] Diversionary naval bombardments struck Sidi Driss and Oued Laou, while landing craft delivered the initial assault waves onto Cebadilla beach (known in Berber as Tahjarout).^{[28][134][137]}

The landing was the first combined amphibious operation in military history to employ armored tanks and seaborne close air support.^[136] Facing approximately 5,000 entrenched Rifian defenders, Spanish troops secured beachheads using landing craft and Renault FT tanks, bringing 9,000 men ashore by 10 September.^[28][137] The Rifians counter-attacked from caves and ravines, but Spanish columns under Colonel Francisco Franco captured Mount Malmousi on 23 September after brutal fighting that cost 700 Spanish casualties, followed by the capture of Cala Quemada.^[138][139] On 2 October 1925, Spanish troops entered and burned Abd el-Krim's capital at Ajdir, forcing the Rifian government to retreat southward to Tamasint.^[14][140]

French Autumn Offensive in the South

Simultaneously with the Al Hoceima landing, Marshal Pétain initiated a major southern offensive on 10 September 1925, driving northward from the Ouergha valley.^{[14][28][115]} French armored and infantry columns reoccupied the Beni Zeroual region and recaptured Bibane on 16 September.^[28][115] On 4 October, French forces advanced toward the Senhaja de Srair, and on 6 October 1925, French and Spanish units linked up near Ouled Boubker in Metalsa territory.^[28][115]

The capture of the southern frontier severed the Rif Republic's food supply and communication lines. On 7 October, French troops captured the Nador pass among the Igzennayen, while seasonal winter rains forced an operational halt on 13 October.^[28] Internal Rifian solidarity eroded as several Igzennayen clans offered their submission. In October 1925, Abd el-Krim's former rival, Hajj Bekkiche, died under disputed circumstances, attributed either to French bombardment or Rifian poisoning.^[28][141] Amar Hamidou returned to the southern front leading French Moroccan auxiliary goumiers, encouraging southern tribes to surrender.^[28]

Collapse and Pacification (1926–1927)

By early 1926, the Republic of the Rif was completely encircled by land and sea, suffering under relentless aerial bombardment, chemical attacks, and severe famine.

The Oujda Peace Conference

In March 1926, Abd el-Krim sought negotiations with Spain and France, and the colonial powers, under pressure from international public opinion, agreed to talks; a ceasefire was proclaimed on all fronts.^[28][142] Formal negotiations opened on 27 April 1926 at Oujda.^[28][143] The Rifian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Mohamed Azerkane, accompanied by Si Ahmed Chiddi and Haddou Lakhal.^[28][143] European representatives demanded the total disarmament of all Rifian tribes, recognition of the Sultan's nominal authority, and the unconditional surrender of all European prisoners before political discussions could proceed.^{[28][143][144][145]}

The Rifian delegates offered to release women, children, and sick captives, and sought internal administrative autonomy within Morocco.^[28][143] However, French and Spanish delegates refused to compromise on complete tribal disarmament and the immediate release of all male prisoners.^{[28][143][145]} With both sides refusing concessions, the Rifian delegation departed on 6 May 1926, and the Oujda conference collapsed.^{[28][143][145]}

The Final Spring Offensive of 1926

On 8 May 1926, two days after the failure of the Oujda conference, France and Spain launched their final combined offensive.^[146] French forces deployed 80,000 men advancing from the south, while 43,000 Spanish troops pushed inland from Ajdir and the eastern front, supported by 150 aircraft and heavy artillery, confronting approximately 12,000 remaining Rifian fighters.^{[26][28][146]}

Spanish troops captured Azghar on the first day of combat despite suffering 629 casualties, and fought a three-day battle at Ait Hichem from 8 to 10 May, which broke the defenses of the Ait Ouriaghel at a cost of 1,276 Spanish casualties and roughly 1,000 Rifian dead.^[28][147] On the eastern front, Spanish forces advanced toward the market of Azlaf, where Rifian defenders under Idris Mimoun Khoja resisted fiercely before being overrun.^[146] On 15 May, Spanish columns captured Tamasint, the Ait Said clans surrendered their weapons, and Spanish forces retook the Annual battlefield on 18 May.^[28]

Advancing from the south, French troops captured Djebel Izekrithen among the Igzennayen on 11 May, took the territories of the Beni Zeroual, Jaia, M'tioua and Beni Ouriaguel by 17 May, entered the territory of the Ait Ammart on 19 May, and by 23 May controlled the whole of Jebel Hamam, linking up with Spanish forces at Arbia Taourirt.^[49][143] A diversionary assault near Tetouan by 1,000 Jebala and Ghomara fighters led by Khériro and Ahmed Boudra failed to relieve the pressure on the central Rif.^[28]

Surrender of Abd el-Krim and Subsequent Exile

On 23 May 1926, French Moroccan irregular troops under Amar Hamidou captured the strategic mountain junction of Targuist, severing Abd el-Krim's escape route toward the western mountains of Jebala.^[28][148] On 25 May, Abd el-Krim fled to the religious sanctuary of Snada among the Ait Itteft.^[28][148] Facing military destruction, he released all surviving French and Spanish prisoners of war and surrendered to French forces under Colonel Gaston Billotte and Colonel Alphonse Juin (commanded locally by Colonel Corap) at Targuist on 26–27 May 1926.^{[28][148][149][150][151]}

Spain demanded the death penalty for Abd el-Krim. The victorious powers did not execute him.^[152] Abd el-Krim and his immediate family were placed on board a vessel and sent into exile on the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean, where he remained in custody for 21 years.^[2][136]

In 1947, he was allowed to be transferred to France.^[152] The permission was granted on condition that he give up political activity. He sailed for France on the Australian ship Katoomba, which stopped at Port Said. At the Suez Canal he left the ship and requested political asylum in Egypt.^[152] He headed the Liberation Committee of the Arab Maghreb and died in Cairo in 1963. Until his death he supported the independence movements of the Maghreb.^[152]

The Last Resistance and Pacification in Senhaja de Srair (1926–1927)

Despite Abd el-Krim's surrender, guerrilla resistance continued in the western and southern mountain regions for over a year.^{[28][153][154]} On 29 May 1926, a Spanish column was ambushed at Thisar in the heart of Ait Ouriaghel territory, suffering over 200 casualties in the tribe's final stand.^[28][49] In June 1926, Spanish Lieutenant Colonel Osvaldo Capaz launched an expedition into the coastal mountains, securing the submission of the Mestassa and M'tioua clans, and entering Chefchaouen on 10 August 1926.^[28][155]

By October 1926, 55 of the 66 tribes in the Spanish protectorate had submitted, but insurgent groups remained active in the heavily forested mountains of the Senhaja de Srair and among the Beni Arous, Beni Idir, and Akhmas.^[28][155] The guerrilla commander Khériro was killed in a firefight with Spanish forces among the Beni Idir on 3 November 1926.^[28][156] The remaining resistance coalesced around the religious leader Sliten of the Khamlichi family, the Temsamani brothers, and the veteran Ait Ouriaghel caid Mohand Azdad.^{[28][49][157]}

On 26 March 1927, insurgent fighters attacked the isolated Spanish garrison at Taghzout in the Senhaja de Srair, wiping out the post.^[28][158] A relief column commanded by Captain Luis Ostáriz Ferrándiz advanced from Targuist but was ambushed near the village of Admam, where Ostáriz and more than 300 Spanish soldiers were killed.^{[28][157][158]} Spanish columns under Colonels Pozas and Emilio Mola responded with an expedition into the cedar forests, although a blizzard halted operations on 11 April 1927.^[157]

Taking advantage of the lull, Sliten crossed the frontier into the French protectorate to surrender, while Spanish columns hunted down the remaining fighters in May and June 1927.^[157] Mohand Azdad was killed in a firefight at Sidi Miskine on 22 May 1927.^[157] On 10 July 1927 (reported in some sources as 8 or 9 July), High Commissioner General José Sanjurjo issued an official communique proclaiming that military operations had ended and that the entire Spanish protectorate was pacified.^{[153][154][159]}

Warfare Methods and Atrocities

The Rif War was marked by widespread violations of accepted laws of war, characterized by the execution of prisoners, the mutilation of corpses, and the deployment of chemical agents against combatants and civilian populations.

Chemical Warfare and Aerial Bombardment

Beginning in 1923 and expanding heavily in the summer of 1924, the Spanish military systematically deployed chemical weapons against Rifian combatants and civilian populations, representing the first widespread use of chemical warfare in the post-World War I era.^{[36][160][161][162]} Spanish authorities procured chemical agents and production equipment through clandestine agreements with the German chemist Hugo Stoltzenberg, who assisted in the construction of the Fábrica Nacional de Productos Químicos at La Marañosa near Madrid.^{[36][161][162][163][164]} Spain employed mustard gas (iperite), phosgene, diphosgene, and chloropicrin.^{[36][165][166]}

Chemical munitions were delivered primarily by aerial bombardment using Farman F.60 Goliath and other aircraft.^{[163][167][168]} Spanish aviator Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros recounted in his autobiography that he dropped the first 100-kilogram mustard gas bomb from a Farman Goliath in the summer of 1924.^[163][167] An estimated 127 aircraft participated in operations that dropped upwards of 1,680 bombs daily, targeting markets, rivers, springs, villages, and agricultural fields.^{[160][167][169][170]} An estimated 500 tons of mustard gas, containing approximately 10,000 containers, were dropped on the Rif between 1923 and 1927.^{[36][171][172]}

Spain signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and biological warfare; some accounts note that the protocol did not cover internal conflicts and that, from Spain's point of view, the war was fought on the territory of its own protectorate, while others describe the gas attacks on the Rif as a violation of it.^[173][174] French forces also conducted aerial bombardments and were suspected by observers and Abd el-Krim of utilizing chemical bombs along the southern front.^[175][176] Some have cited the Spanish chemical weapons as the main cause of widespread cancer in the Rif region, whose cancer rate is still the highest in Morocco.^[177][178] The writer Juan Pando, however, pointed out that areas of France and Belgium that were gassed far more heavily during World War I do not have abnormal cancer rates.^{[177][178][179]}

Spain has never officially acknowledged using chemical weapons in the Rif War.^{[99][178][180]} In 2005 and 2007, proposals submitted to the Spanish Congress of Deputies by the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) to formally recognize the systematic use of chemical weapons against Rifian civilians and provide compensatory health assistance were rejected by parliamentary majorities.^[99][180] In Morocco, associations representing victims of toxic gas have periodically faced official restrictions.^[99]

Treatment of Prisoners and Reprisals

Both sides engaged in severe violence against captured personnel. Following the surrender of Spanish outposts at Annual, Selouane, and Monte Arruit in July and August 1921, thousands of unarmed Spanish soldiers were killed by tribal forces.^[67][68] Spanish officers reported that bodies recovered during the subsequent reconquest showed evidence of torture and mutilation.^[67][87]

In response, units of the Spanish Foreign Legion and Moroccan Regulares conducted punitive reprisals driven by revenge.^[181][182] Legionnaires were reported to have executed captured tribesmen, burned settlements, and decapitated dead or wounded fighters, displaying severed heads on bayonets or wearing ears as trophies.^{[183][184][185][186]} Military historians have noted that the methods of interrogation, torture, summary executions, and total suppression practiced by the Army of Africa in the Rif were later applied directly in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 by Nationalist officers who rose to prominence during the Moroccan campaigns.^{[187][188][189][190]}

Political, Social, and Historical Legacy

The Rif War exerted profound political reverberations across Spain, contributed to the collapse of the parliamentary monarchy of King Alfonso XIII, and influenced twentieth-century anti-colonial movements and guerrilla warfare theory.

Repercussions in Spain and the Africanistas

The defeat at Annual caused a serious political crisis in Spain. The Minister of War ordered a commission of inquiry headed by General Juan Picasso González, whose report, the Expediente Picasso, pointed out many military errors.^[52] Because some ministers and judges obstructed it, the inquiry did not get to the bottom of political responsibility, including that of King Alfonso XIII, who according to some had encouraged Silvestre's irresponsible advance far from Melilla without adequate defence in the rear. Before the report could be debated in the Cortes, General Miguel Primo de Rivera launched his coup d'état on 13 September 1923, establishing a military dictatorship with royal assent.^[100]

The economic cost of the Moroccan campaigns was staggering, exceeding 3.2 billion pesetas for the Spanish treasury.^[2][3] The conscription system generated deep class resentment across the Iberian Peninsula: under the 'cuota' system established in 1912, wealthy families could secure shortened domestic service for their sons by paying a cash exemption fee, ensuring that the burden of fighting and dying in Morocco fell disproportionately on the working classes, who were popularly termed the 'sons of the poor'.^[191]

The war fostered a distinct Africanist officer corps (los africanistas), including Francisco Franco, José Sanjurjo, Emilio Mola, Manuel Goded, and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, who developed a shared ideology characterized by authoritarianism, hostility to parliamentary politics, and contempt for civilian politicians.^{[35][36][190]} When the Spanish monarchy collapsed in 1931 and the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed, this Africanist network formed the core of the military conspiracy that launched the coup of July 1936, triggering the Spanish Civil War.^[190]

Impact on Morocco and Influence on Guerrilla Warfare

In Morocco, the suppression of the Republic of the Rif consolidated Franco-Spanish colonial control until independence in 1956. However, regional grievances persisted; in 1958–1959, the Rif region staged a major armed revolt against the central government of Sultan Mohammed V, which was suppressed with severe military force by the Royal Moroccan Army.^[192] Historians view the Rif War either as the culmination of nineteenth-century colonial pacification campaigns or as the opening conflict of modern twentieth-century decolonization, and some interpret it as a precursor to the Algerian War of Independence three decades later.^{[193][194][195][196][197][198]}

The tactics developed by Abd el-Krim, which combined concealed tunnel networks, coordinated night infiltration, decentralized squad tactics and the use of captured modern weapons, became models for modern guerrilla warfare.^[199][200] General Alberto Bayo, who fought in the Spanish Foreign Legion during the Rif War, later taught these irregular combat methods to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Mexico prior to the Cuban Revolution.^[199] According to some accounts, revolutionary leaders including Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh drew on Abd el-Krim's tactics and cited them in their memoirs and letters.^{[199][200][201][202]}

Representation in Culture

The conflict inspired numerous cultural adaptations in international theater and cinema. Sigmund Romberg's 1926 Broadway operetta The Desert Song, which was subsequently adapted into multiple feature films, was directly based on news coverage of the Rifian uprising.^[203] The Jewish-Algerian novelist Elissa Rhaïs published the romantic novel La riffaine in 1929 set during the conflict.^[203] Pierre Mac Orlan's 1931 novel La Bandera and its 1935 film adaptation directed by Julien Duvivier depicted life within the Spanish Foreign Legion during the war.^[203] Other cinematic depictions include the 1930 film Morocco (adapted from the novel Amy Jolly), the 1951 Hollywood adventure Ten Tall Men, the 1971 Italian-German production Il sergente Klems, the 1977 British-American film March or Die, and the 1998 action drama Legionnaire.^[203]

The Spanish television miniseries Tiempos de guerra (Morocco: Love in Times of War), released in 2017, portrayed the role of Spanish Red Cross nurses sent to Melilla following the disaster of Annual.^[203]

References

1. J.-L. Miège, « Le Maroc espagnol », L'information géographique, vol. 19, no 5,‎ 1955, p. 181–188 (ISSN 0020-0093, DOI 10.3406/ingeo.1955.1528, lire en ligne, consulté le 8 février 2024)
2. Shannon Fleming. Rif War // Encyclopædia Britannica, 5 декември 2019. Посетен на 22 юли 2020.
3. „Rif War” (engleski). Encyclopædia Britannica. Pristupljeno 26. 11. 2018.
4. Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 273.
5. de Boer, Sietske (2013). Het volk van Abdelkrim. Wijdemeer. ISBN 978-90-818521-9-7.
6. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa (PDF). February 25, 1885.
7. Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 274.
8. Alvarez, José "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925" pp. 75–98 from The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999 p. 77.
9. David S. Woolman, page 42 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press 1968
10. David S. Woolman, pp. 42–43 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press 1968
11. Alvarez, Jose "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925" pp. 75–98 from The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999 p. 77.
13. (en) José E. Álvarez, The Betrothed of Death: The Spanish Foreign Legion During the Rif Rebellion, 1920-1927, Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 30 janvier 2001 (ISBN 978-0-313-07341-0, lire en ligne), p. 4
15. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 70-71.
16. Los ¿felices? años veinte — Windows Live.
17. Los ¿felices? años veinte (en castelán).
18. Los ¿felices? años venti — Windows Live.
19. C. R. Pennell – A Country with a government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921–1926[link removed], Outwell, Wisbech, Cambridgeshire, England: Middle East & North African Studies Press Ltd, 1986, ISBN 0-906559-23-5, p. 132; (University of Melbourne – University Library Digital Repository)
20. "Riffians Use German Methods". The New York Times. 24 May 1925.
21. Daudin, Pascal (2023). "The Rif War: A forgotten war?". International Review of the Red Cross. 105 (923): 917. doi:10.1017/S1816383122001023.
22. "Rebels in the Rif" pp. 149–152, David S. Woolman, Stanford University Press, 1968
23. Woolman 1968 ↓, s. 149–152. (David S. Woolman: Rebels in the Rif. Palo Alta, California: Stanford University Press, 1968. ISBN 978-0804706643. (ang.).)
24. Timeline for the Third Rif War (1920–25) Steven Thomas.
25. Woolman, p. 149
26. Pennell, C. R.; p. 214
27. David E. Omissi: Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939, Manchester University Press, 1990, (ISBN 0-7190-2960-0), page 188.
28. (en) Charles Edmund Richard Pennell, « A critical investigation of the opposition of the Rifi confederation led by Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi to Spanish colonial expansion in northern Morocco, 1920-1925, and its political and social background », Université de Leeds (thèse),‎ 1979 (lire en ligne, consulté le 9 juillet 2022)
29. David S. Woolman, p. 98 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
30. Perry, James Arrogant Armies Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 277
31. Perry, James Arrogant Armies Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 278
32. David S. Woolman, p. 57 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
33. David S. Woolman, p. 44 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
34. Alvarez, Jose "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925" pp. 75–98 from The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999 p. 78.
35. David S. Woolman, p. 68 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
36. Alain Ruscio: La alianza entre Pétain y Franco contra la insurrección marroquí. Viento Sur, 23. Dezember 2020, abgerufen am 3. Februar 2021 (spanisch).
37. Alvarez, Jose "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925" pp. 75–98 from The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999 p. 79.
38. P. La Porte (1997), p. 137.
39. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 265.
40. J. Albi de la Cuesta (2014), p. 177.
41. J. Albi de la Cuesta (2014), p. 178.
42. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 284.
43. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 244.
44. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 79.
45. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 327 & 358.
46. Perry, James Arrogant Armies Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 279
47. José Antonio CANO MARTÍN: En el 98 aniversario de la pérdida de ABARRÁN....CARCOMA DE LOS HUESOS... Prologo del Desastre de Annual (I). Melilla Hoy, 14. Juli 2019, abgerufen am 19. Februar 2021 (spanisch).
48. Alvarez, Jose "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925" pp. 75–98 from The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999 p. 81.
49. D. S. Woolman (1968).
50. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 298.
51. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 301.
52. Leguineche, Manuel (1997). «Annual 1921: el desastre de España en el Rif». Ed. Alfaguara. ISBN 84-204-8235-8.
53. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 88.
54. L. Canteras Zubieta (2016), p. 121.
55. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 374-375.
56. L. Canteras Zubieta (2016), p. 122.
57. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 90.
58. J. Pando Despierto (1999), p. 87.
59. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 324.
60. J. Pando Despierto (1999), p. 92.
61. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 325.
62. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 324-325.
63. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 328-329.
64. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 94.
65. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 332.
66. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 93.
67. Julio Albi de la Cuesta, En torno a Annual (Ministerio de Defensa de España, 2016) pp. 432–439
68. C. E. R. Pennell (1979), p. 336.
69. Albi de la Cuesta 2016 ↓, s. 432–439. (Julio Albi de la Cuesta: En torno a Annual. Ministerio de Defensa de España, 2016. (hiszp.).)
70. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 96-97.
71. David S. Woolman, p. 96 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
72. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 374.
73. Domingo Marchena: Los pecados de Alfonso XIII en Annual. In: La Vanguardia. 13. Dezember 2020, abgerufen am 19. Februar 2021 (spanisch).
74. Dirk Sasse, Franzosen, Briten und Deutsche im Rifkrieg 1921–1926, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006, ISBN 3-486-57983-5, pp. 40–41 (in German)
75. Obdeijn, Herman, Paolo De Mas, Nadia Bouras (2021). De geschiedenis van Marokko. Bulaaq Amsterdam, p. 134. ISBN 978-90-5460-187-6.
76. Long, David E.; Bernard Reich (2002). The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. sayfa 393
77. Mathieu Marly, « La guerre du Rif (1921-1926), une guerre coloniale ? », sur Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe - EHNE, Paris, Université Sorbonne, mis en ligne le 01/03/21 (consulté le 28 avril 24)
78. Rudi Schrever, De Rifoorlog (1920-1926). Historiek.net.
79. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 381.
80. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 389-390.
81. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 149 & 218-219.
82. Cyril B., « La guerre du Rif : un conflit méconnu entre guerre coloniale et conflit de la Décolonisation », La Revue d'Histoire Militaire,‎ 17 juillet 2018 (lire en ligne, consulté le 9 novembre 2018)
83. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 389.
84. Franzosen, Briten und Deutsche im Rifkrieg 1921-1926 25 Nisan 2012 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi., Dirk Sasse, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006, ISBN 3486579835, sayfa 41
85. Arturo Barea, pp. 313–314 The Forging of a Rebel, SBN 670-32367-5, The Viking Press 1974
86. Woolman, David S. (1968). Rebels in the Rif. Stanford University Press. pp. 95–102. ISBN 0196903769.
87. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 103.
88. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 105.
89. "Juan de Joanes – Trasmeships". www.trasmeships.es. Archived from the original on 2015-09-26. Retrieved 2015-10-14.
90. Fernandez, Rafael (2007). The Spanish Dreadnoughts of the España class. Warship Internacional. Issue 41. Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization. pp. 63–117.
91. Fernandez 2007 ↓, s. 63–117. (Rafael Fernandez: The Spanish Dreadnoughts of the España class. Warship Internacional. Issue 41. Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization, 2007. (ang.).)
92. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 114.
93. Feliu Bernárdez, Luis. Comisión Española de Historia Militar, ed. La Guerra del RIF (1921-1926) durante el Protectorado Español de Marruecos. Academia de las Artes y las ciencias Militares.
94. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 113-114.
95. Andrée Bachoud, Franco, ou la réussite d'un homme ordinaire, Paris, Fayard, septembre 1997, 530 p. (ISBN 978-2213027838), p. 54.
96. (es) Stanley G. Payne et Jesús Palacios, Franco. Una biografía personal y política, Barcelone, Espasa, 2014, 813 p. (ISBN 978-84-670-0992-7), p. 58-59.
97. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 120.
98. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 110-111.
99. Sarrionandia, Joseba. (imp. 2010). Moroak gara behelaino artean?. Pamiela, 222-226 or. ISBN 978-84-7681-656-1. PMC 776562167. (kontsulta data: 2021-04-25).
100. Perry, James Arrogant Armies Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them, Edison: Castle Books, 2005 p. 286.
101. Perry 2005 ↓, s. 286 (James Perry: Arrogant Armies. Great Military Disasters and the Generals Behind Them. Edison: Castle Books, 2005. ISBN 978-0471119760. (ang.).)
102. Woolman 1968 ↓, s. 131. (David S. Woolman: Rebels in the Rif. Palo Alta, California: Stanford University Press, 1968. ISBN 978-0804706643. (ang.).)
103. David S. Woolman, p. 132 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
104. Woolman 1968 ↓, s. 132. (David S. Woolman: Rebels in the Rif. Palo Alta, California: Stanford University Press, 1968. ISBN 978-0804706643. (ang.).)
105. David S. Woolman, p. 133 Rebels in the Rif, Stanford University Press
106. Woolman 1968 ↓, s. 133. (David S. Woolman: Rebels in the Rif. Palo Alta, California: Stanford University Press, 1968. ISBN 978-0804706643. (ang.).)
107. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 393.
108. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 137.
109. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 138.
110. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 139.
111. Vincent Courcelle-Labrousse et Nicolas Marmié, La Guerre du Rif, Tallandier, 30 avril 2008 (ISBN 979-10-210-0897-7, lire en ligne)
112. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 140-141.
113. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 144-145.
114. Martin Windrow, p. 15 "French Foreign Legion 1914–1945, ISBN 1-85532-761-9
115. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 174.
116. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 395.
117. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 178.
118. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 179 & 183.
119. The French empire between the wars: imperialism, politics and society, Martin Thomas, Manchester University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-7190-6518-6, p. 212
120. Thomas 2005 ↓, s. 212. (Martin Thomas: The French empire between the wars: imperialism, politics and society. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-7190-6518-6. (niem.).)
121. The French empire between the wars: imperialism, politics and society, Martin Thomas, Manchester University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-7190-6518-6, page 212
122. La guerre du Rif n'aura pas lieu, critique sur nonfiction.fr par Anne Pédron
123. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 179-182.
124. L’histoire oubliée des surréalistes et la guerre du Rif (Memento vom 12. Februar 2008 im Internet Archive) (franz.).
125. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 398.
126. Fabien Laurençon-Bohnekamp, « Max Schiavon : La guerre du Rif - Un conflit colonial oublié (1925-1926) ; Éditions Pierre de Taillac, 2016 ; 352 pages: », Revue Défense Nationale, vol. no 792, no 7,‎ 1er juillet 2016, p. 192–194 (ISSN 2105-7508, DOI 10.3917/rdna.792.0192, lire en ligne, consulté le 6 janvier 2023)
127. David S. Woolman, p. 186 "Rebels in the Rif", Stanford University Press
128. "Abd el-Krim". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. I: A-Ak – Bayes (15th ed.). Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 2010. p. 18. ISBN 978-1-59339-837-8.
129. Mbark Wanaïm, « La France et Abdelkrim : de l’apaisement politique à l’action militaire (1920-1926) », Cahiers de la Méditerranée, no 85,‎ 15 décembre 2012, p. 285–301 (ISSN 0395-9317, DOI 10.4000/cdlm.6780, lire en ligne, consulté le 25 mai 2022)
130. "Rebels in the Rif" pages 149-152 David S. Woolman, Stanford University Press 1968
131. Babas, Latifa. "History : When an American squadron violated US neutrality laws, bombing Chefchaouen". en.yabiladi.com. Retrieved 2019-07-14.
132. Latifa Babas: History: When an American squadron violated US neutrality laws, bombing Chefchaouen. Yabiladi.com, 29.04.2019. [dostęp 2020-11-19]. (ang.).
133. https://www.despertaferro-ediciones.com/2020/la-defensa-de-kudia-tahar-marruecos-preludio-de-alhucemas/
134. https://elfarodeceuta.es/septiembre-1925-desembarco-alhucemas-iii/
135. https://alabarda.net/teniente-de-regulares-melilla-no-2-kudia-tahar-1925/
136. Douglas Porch, "Spain's African Nightmare," MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History (2006) 18#2 pp 28–37.
137. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 191.
138. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 191-192.
139. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 192.
140. Domínguez Llosá, Santiago (2002). El desembarco de Alhucemas. ISBN 84-338-2919-X.
141. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 399.
142. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 198.
143. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 400.
144. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 199, 203 & 206.
145. https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/viewer?id=5ba397a0-8cc8-46c1-bfde-f7afb18c10bb
146. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 205.
147. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 204-205.
148. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 401.
149. C.R. Pennell, A Critical Investigation, p. 828.
150. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 207.
151. https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/viewer?id=70b4c4a1-109a-4192-82d9-c91753418888&page=3
152. Zakya Daoud (1999). Abdelkrim: Une épopée d'or et de sang. Éditions Séguier. ISBN 978-2840491446.
153. C.R. Pennell, A Critical Investigation, pp. 833-834.
154. https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/viewer?id=de3c62a8-5716-461a-a187-a708f2714c59&page=2
155. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 212.
156. https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/viewer?id=fcd2f7f1-faf4-44e2-96d1-674b7d3a85dd
157. (en) David Montgomery Hart, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History, University of Arizona Press, 1976, 556 p. (ISBN 978-0-8357-5290-9, lire en ligne)
158. D. S. Woolman (1968), p. 213.
159. D. M. Hart (1976), p. 402.
160. Rada, Javier (September 2006). "Los últimos de Alhucemas" (in Spanish). 20minutos.es. Retrieved 2007-04-13. Durante la guerra del Rif (1921–1927), la última pesadilla colonial, España fue una de las primeras potencias en utilizar armas químicas contra población civil.
161. Javier Espinosa. «Gas mostaza sobre el Rif» (html). El Mundo, Abril 2001. [Consulta: 13 abril 2007]. «Juan Pando, en su reciente libro Historia secreta de Annual, han documentado su uso»
162. Rudibert Kunz, Giftgas gegen Abd el Krim. Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko, 1922–1927, 1990
163. Hidalgo, de Cisneros. Cambio de Rumbo, p. 193-7
164. (en) Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the road to the Spanish Civil War, Oxford University Press, 2002 (ISBN 0-1992-5296-3), p. 142.
165. Noguer, Miquel (July 2005). "ERC exige que España pida perdón por el uso de armas químicas en la guerra del Rif". El País (in Spanish). Retrieved 2007-04-13. Tras tan estrepitosa derrota, el ejército español no tuvo reparos en utilizar productos como fosgeno, difosgeno, cloropicrina o el mismo gas mostaza contra la población civil.
166. ERC exige que España pida perdón por el uso de armas químicas en la guerra del Rif 3.7.2005. El Pais. Viitattu 7.4.2014. (espanjaksi)
167. Balfour Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the road to the Spanish Civil War, pàg. 142
168. Chemical weapons in the Rif War 6.12.2012. La Fondation. Viitattu 7.4.2014. (englanniksi)
169. Informe sobre l'actuació de l'Aviació al Protectorat. 4 març 1924. Aga África, caixa M12, exp. 2 .
170. "Legion Condor-ek eragindako Gernikaren suntsipena - 36/37ko gerran nazien bidegabekeria, iragana eta oraina" erakusketako liburuxka. .
171. Marruecos. El Ejército colonial español empleó armas químicas en la guerra del Rif - Tortuga. www.grupotortuga.com.
172. Rudibert Kunz, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Giftgas gegen Abd el Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko 1922–1927, Rombach, 1990
173. Pascal Daudin (June 2023). "The Rif War: A forgotten war?". International Review of the Red Cross.
174. "Geneva Protocol: Protocol For the Prohibition of the Use In War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, And of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)". Nuclear Threat Initiative.
175. Omar Mezoug, « Chronique du livre de Courcelle-Labrousse et Marmié », La guerre du Rif, Maroc 1921-1926, dans La Quinzaine littéraire no 973, 16 juillet 2008, p. 26.
176. Major cases of chemical weapons use 23.8.2013. The Voice of Russia American Edition. Viitattu 7.4.2014. (englanniksi)
177. Yabiladi.com. "حرب الريف: عريضة تدعو إسبانيا وفرنسا وألمانيا والولايات المتحدة لتحمل مسؤولياتهم". www.yabiladi.ma (in Arabic). Retrieved 2021-05-06.
178. "Morocco bans historical conference". BBC News. January 19, 2002. Retrieved 2007-04-11.
179. William Weir (2008). Guerrilla Warfare: Irregular Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Stackpole Books. p. 99.
180. Spanish parliament refuses to discuss Spain's use of chemical weapons during Rif war in Morocco 14.2.2007. Maghreb Arabe Presse. Viitattu 7.4.2014. (englanniksi)
181. Potì, Giorgio (2016). Imperial Violence, Anti-Colonial Nationalism and International Society: The Politics of Revolt across Mediterranean Empires,1919–1927 (PDF). Florence: European University Institute: Department of history and Civilization. p. 202.
182. Potì 2016 ↓, s. 202. (Giorgio Potì: Imperial Violence, Anti-Colonial Nationalism and International Society: The Politics of Revolt across Mediterranean Empires,1919–1927. Florence: European University Institute: Department of history and Civilization, 2016. (hiszp.).)
183. Susan Martin-Márquez (2008). Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity. Yale Univ Pr. p. 193.
184. Martin-Márquez 2008 ↓, s. 193. (Susan Martin-Márquez: Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity. Yale Univ Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0300125207. (ang.).)
185. Susan Martin-Márquez, Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity, Yale Univ. Pr., 2008, p. 193.
186. Objetivo Euskadi. 2015, 0:-50'-50"
187. Miguel Alonso; Alan Kramer; Javier Rodrigo (2019). Fascist Warfare, 1922–1945: Aggression, Occupation, Annihilation. Springer International Publishing. p. 32. ISBN 978-3030276478.
188. Alonso, Kramer i Rodrigo 2019 ↓, s. 32. (Miguel Alonso, Alan Kramer, Javier Rodrigo: Fascist Warfare, 1922–1945: Aggression, Occupation, Annihilation. Springer International Publishing, 2019. ISBN 978-3030276478. (ang.).)
189. Miguel Alonso, Alan Kramer e Javier Rodrigo, Fascist Warfare, 1922–1945: Aggression, Occupation, Annihilation, Springer International Publishing, 2019, p. 32, ISBN 978-3030276478.
190. Preston, Paul. 2013, 9. or.
191. Luis Francisco Miguel (2014). Morir en África. La epopeya de los soldados españoles en el desastre de Annual. Páginas 135 y 136.
192. Thomas, Steven. "Timeline for the Third Rif War (1920–25)". Steven's Balagan. Publicáu'l 30 de xunu de 2002. Consultáu'l 13 de mayu de 2015.
193. Jan Pascal, L'Armée française face à Abdelkrim ou la tentation de mener une guerre conventionnelle dans une guerre irrégulière 1924–1927, Cairn.Info, 2009, p. 732.
194. Entelis, John P. (9 March 2017). "La Guerre du Rif: Maroc (1925–1926)". The Journal of North African Studies. 22 (3): 500–503. doi:10.1080/13629387.2017.1300383. S2CID 151998348.
195. Micheal Clodfelter: Warfare and armed conflicts: a statistical reference to casualty and other figures, 1500–2000, McFarland, 2002, (ISBN 0-7864-1204-6), page 398.
196. John P. Entelis, La Guerre du Rif: Maroc (1925–1926), in The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 22, n. 3, 9 marzo 2017, pp. 500-503, DOI:10.1080/13629387.2017.1300383.
197. Pascal 2009 ↓, s. 319–338. (JanJ. Pascal JanJ., L'Armée française face à Abdelkrim ou la tentation de mener une guerre conventionnelle dans une guerre irrégulière 1924-1927, „Stratégique”, 2009 [dostęp 2020-11-19] (fr.).)
198. Entelis 2017 ↓, s. 500–503. (John P. Entelis. La Guerre du Rif: Maroc (1925–1926). „The Journal of North African Studies”. 22 (3), 2017. DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2017.1300383. (ang.).)
199. (en) Mevliyar Er, « Abd-el-Krim al-Khattabi: The Unknown Mentor of Che Guevara », Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 2, no 1,‎ 2015, p. 137-159 (DOI 10.1080/09546553.2014.997355)
200. Castro, Fidel; Ramonet, Ignacio. Fidel Castro: My Life - A Spoken Autobiography. Translated by Hurley, Andrew. p. 680..
201. Jean-Louis Miège, « 'Abd el-Krim », Encyclopédie berbère, Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, vol. 1 « Abadir – Acridophagie »,‎ 1984, p. 73-77 (lire en ligne).
202. Er, Mevliyar (2015), "Abd-el-Krim al-Khattabi: The Unknown Mentor of Che Guevara", Terrorism and Political Violence, 27 (5): 137–159, doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.997355, S2CID 145622371.
203. Lorcin, Patricia M. E. (2012-12-01). "Manipulating Elissa: the uses and abuses of Elissa Rhaïs and her works". The Journal of North African Studies. 17 (5): 903–922. doi:10.1080/13629387.2012.723436. ISSN 1362-9387. S2CID 143680947.