Japan Air Lines Flight 123

Aircraft and Maintenance History

The aircraft involved was a Boeing 747SR-46, serial number 20783, line number 230, registered in Japan as JA8119.^[1][2] The Short Range variant of the Boeing 747-100 was developed specifically for Japanese domestic routes with high passenger density and frequent short-distance flight cycles.^[3][4] The airframe featured reinforced fuselage structures and heavy-duty landing gear capable of withstanding frequent takeoffs, pressurization cycles, and landings.^[4] The aircraft completed its first flight on January 28, 1974, and was delivered to Japan Air Lines on February 19, 1974.^[1][2] At the time of the accident, JA8119 was eleven years old and had accumulated 25,030 flight hours and 18 minutes across 18,835 takeoff and landing cycles.^[5] Its registration was formally cancelled on August 19, 1985.^[5]

The aircraft was powered by four Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7A turbofan engines.^[2][6] On the day of the disaster, August 12, 1985, the aircraft was assigned to operate six domestic flight sectors: Flights 503 and 504 between Haneda and New Chitose Airport in Sapporo, Flights 363 and 366 between Haneda and Fukuoka Airport, and Flights 123 and 130 between Haneda and Itami Airport in Osaka.^[7] Flight 123 was the aircraft's fifth flight of the day, and because it was to return to Tokyo as Flight 130 after reaching Osaka, it carried enough fuel from Haneda for three hours and fifteen minutes of flight, so it did not need to refuel in Osaka.^[8]

Seven years prior to the crash, on June 2, 1978, the same aircraft had suffered a severe landing accident at Osaka Itami Airport while operating Japan Air Lines Flight 115 from Haneda.^[9] During an instrument approach to Runway 32L, the aircraft bounced heavily upon touchdown; the pilot then pulled the control column excessively upward, causing a tailstrike during the second touchdown.^[6][9] The impact fractured the lower hemisphere of the aft pressure bulkhead, which separates the pressurized passenger cabin from the unpressurized tail cone.^[9] Twenty-five of the 394 people on board sustained injuries, including two serious injuries.^[9][10] Between the completion of repairs following that incident and the 1985 accident, JA8119 made 12,318 successful flights.^[6]

In the months leading up to the disaster, JA8119 had experienced recurring cabin discrepancies. Between February 1985 and the date of the crash, twenty-eight separate malfunctions of the aft lavatory doors were logged in the aircraft's records, with twenty of these occurrences noted on international flights between Osaka and Guam. An airline investigation identified that service supplies and cargo had been piled in the aft coatroom, pushing against interior paneling; after storage under the coatroom shelves was prohibited, the door malfunctions ceased. However, the official accident investigation noted that structural distortion of the rear fuselage from the 1978 tailstrike could not be entirely ruled out as an underlying factor. Furthermore, passengers and crew who had flown on Flight 366 from Fukuoka to Haneda immediately preceding the accident reported hearing creaking and groaning sounds coming from beneath the cabin floor.

Crew and Flight Personnel

The cockpit crew consisted of three experienced personnel.^[11] The captain was Masami Takahama, aged 49, from Miyazaki Prefecture.^[12] Takahama was a senior supervisory instructor in the operations division.^[12] He joined Japan Air Lines on December 1, 1966, having previously served in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, where his flight instructor was Lieutenant Commander Sugino, a former Imperial Japanese Navy warrant officer pilot.^[11][13] Takahama later flew for Fuji Air Lines and Japan Domestic Airlines before joining JAL.^[11][13] He logged 12,423 flight hours and 41 minutes in his career, including 4,842 hours and 22 minutes on the Boeing 747.^[11] Takahama also held flight ratings for the NAMC YS-11, Boeing 727, and Douglas DC-8.^[11] On Flight 123, Takahama was serving as an instructor and evaluator, occupying the right cockpit seat to handle radio communications and monitor the first officer.^[11][12]

The first officer was Yutaka Sasaki, aged 39, from Kumamoto Prefecture.^[6][11] Sasaki joined Japan Air Lines on April 18, 1970, and had logged 3,963 flight hours and 34 minutes, of which 2,665 hours and 30 minutes were in the Boeing 747.^[11] He had previously served as a captain on the Douglas DC-8.^[11] Sasaki was undergoing captain promotion training on the Boeing 747, and Flight 123 served as one of his final evaluation flights; consequently, he occupied the left cockpit seat as the pilot flying, giving operational orders to the crew.^[6][11]

The flight engineer was Hiroshi Fukuda, aged 46, from Yamanashi Prefecture, an instructor in the flight engineering division.^[6][11] Fukuda joined Japan Air Lines on April 1, 1957, and had accumulated 9,831 flight hours and 3 minutes, including 3,846 hours and 31 minutes on the Boeing 747.^[6][11] He held type qualifications on the Douglas DC-6, Boeing 727, and Douglas DC-8.^[11] Fukuda had crewed JA8119 earlier that day on the round-trip flights between Haneda and Fukuoka.^[11] Because First Officer Sasaki was being evaluated for command, the captain and first officer were seated in inverted positions compared to standard commercial operations. In 1987, following the publication of the official investigation report, the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations posthumously awarded all three cockpit crew members the Polaris Award.

The cabin was staffed by twelve flight attendants.^[6] The remaining eleven cabin crew members were female attendants aged 24 to 31: Mariko Akata, Mitsuyo Ebina, Kaori Fujita, Sachiyo Kihara, Reiko Miyamichi, Yumiko Tsushima, Masayo Yoshida, Kyoko Hatano, Mikiko Ono, Seiko Ono, and Yumiko Shirabeyoshi.^[6] In addition, off-duty Japan Air Lines flight purser Yumi Ochiai, aged 26, was traveling on the aircraft as an off-duty passenger in row 56.^[6]

Passengers and Travel Circumstances

Flight 123 took place on the eve of the traditional Japanese Obon festival, an annual holiday period when urban residents travel in large numbers to visit family graves and reunite with relatives in their hometowns.^[14] Additional domestic passenger traffic was generated by visitors returning from Tokyo Disneyland and the Expo '85 science and technology exposition held in Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture, for which Haneda was the primary domestic aviation gateway.^[15][16] As a result, the flight was nearly full, carrying 509 passengers, including twelve infants.^[17]

Among the passengers, between 21 and 22 were non-Japanese nationals.^[17][18][19] These foreign travelers included four residents of British Hong Kong, two from Italy, one from West Germany, three from South Korea, three from India, six from the United States, one from the United Kingdom, and one from China.^[20][21] Several foreign passengers held dual nationality or had permanent residency in Japan.^[14] Most foreign travelers were visiting Japan on corporate assignments or business trips.^[22]

Numerous prominent Japanese figures perished on board. Kyu Sakamoto, the 43-year-old popular singer and actor famous internationally for his hit song Sukiyaki (original title Ue o Muite Arukō), had finished taping an NHK-FM radio special earlier in the afternoon and was travelling to Osaka to attend the campaign office opening for a former manager.^[23][24] Sakamoto had long criticized the corporate culture of Japan Air Lines and usually flew with All Nippon Airways; however, because all ANA flights were fully booked for the holiday, his staff reserved a ticket on JAL Flight 123.^[24] Also killed were actress Yōko Kitahara, a former member of the Takarazuka Revue; Hajimu Nakano, managing director of Hanshin Electric Railway and president of the Hanshin Tigers baseball team, and fellow director Kazuo Ishida, who had attended railway association meetings in Tokyo; Ikuo Uragami, president of House Food Industrial, travelling to his father's grave following the receipt of an extortion cessation note from the Glico Morinaga criminal group; and Akihisa Yukawa, vice president of Sumigin General Lease and father of violinist Diana Yukawa, who was born one month after the crash.^{[23][25][26][27][28][29]}

Other victims included Motoaki Takeshita, a former professional baseball catcher for the Hiroshima Toyo Carp, who was traveling to Hyogo Prefecture to watch his son play for Tokyo Nodai Daini High School in the National High School Baseball Championship at Koshien Stadium; Nakaakira Tsukahara, a professor of biophysics at Osaka University leading a government research project on brain plasticity; Masanori Tsuji, an Olympic cyclist and director of the Shimano Racing Team; Kiichi Ishino, president of Shinei Ishino Securities; doujin manga creator Korin Himoto (real name Takako Ikoma), returning from Comic Market 28; Dentsu copywriter Katsuhiko Fujishima; and Misawa Homes managing director Yukio Yamamoto.^{[30][31][32][33][34][35]}

Several public figures narrowly avoided the flight by switching reservations or taking alternate transport.^[36] Television personality Sanma Akashiya frequently commuted between Tokyo and Osaka on Flight 123 for weekly radio broadcasts of MBS Young Town; however, beginning in July 1985, filming for his television comedy program Sanma no Chūzaisan was moved from Tuesdays to Mondays, shifting his regular travel day to Sunday and averting his presence on the flight.^[37][38] Broadcaster Masataka Itsumi and his family had booked tickets on Flight 123 to visit relatives in Osaka, but cancelled them in favor of the Tokaido Shinkansen after his wife observed that the high-speed rail was more economical for four travelers.^[36][39][40] The core cast of the long-running television comedy show Shōten, including 5th generation San'yūtei Enraku, Katsura Utamaru, and Hayashiya Konpei, considered boarding Flight 123 to reach Tokushima via boat from Kobe after their direct flight was delayed by poor weather, but decided to wait for their scheduled flight after Konpei argued against the rerouting.^[41] Talent agency founder Johnny Kitagawa had planned to board Flight 123 but flew to Osaka one day early for a press conference, while members of the idol group Shonentai stayed in Tokyo.^[36][42]

Flight Sequence and Decompression

JA8119 arrived at Haneda Airport from Fukuoka at 17:12 as Flight 366.^[6] After almost an hour on the ground, the aircraft pushed back from gate 18 at 18:04.^[6][43] The aircraft taxied to the runway and took off at 18:12, twelve minutes late.^[6] The planned flight route called for climbing southwest across Tokyo Bay, passing south of the Izu Peninsula over Izu Oshima, proceeding west along the southern coast of Honshu, turning northwest over Kushimoto in Wakayama Prefecture, and touching down at Osaka Itami Airport at 18:56.^[8]

At 18:24:35, twelve minutes after takeoff, the aircraft was climbing through 23,900 feet (7,300 m) toward its assigned cruising altitude of 24,000 feet (7,300 m) over Sagami Bay, near Kawazu on the eastern coast of the Izu Peninsula.^[6][44][45] A loud explosive shock occurred in the aft fuselage, exerting an estimated forward force of 11 tonnes on the airframe.^[44][45] Captain Takahama exclaimed, "Something exploded!" and the autopilot immediately disengaged.^[6] Flight Engineer Fukuda initiated a system check, observing normal engine and electrical parameters, but quickly noticed that hydraulic pressure gauges were showing zero across all lines.^[6]

The structural failure of the aft pressure bulkhead had allowed pressurized cabin air to rush into the unpressurized tail cone.^[6][44] The air blast ruptured the ceiling around the aft lavatories, tore through the auxiliary power unit (APU) firewall, and entered the vertical fin.^[6][44][46] Within less than half a second, the internal air pressure blew away the vertical stabilizer, severed the auxiliary power unit, and severed all four independent hydraulic fluid lines routed through the tail structure.^[6][44][46] Without hydraulic pressure, all primary aerodynamic flight control surfaces, including the rudder, elevators, and ailerons, were completely disabled.^[6][44]

At 18:24:47, the pilots set their cockpit transponder to squawk emergency code 7700, which was immediately received by the Tokyo Area Control Center (Tokyo ACC) in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture.^[6] Captain Takahama radioed Tokyo ACC at 18:25, declaring an emergency, requesting an immediate descent to 22,000 feet (6,700 m), and asking for radar vectors back to Haneda Airport.^[6] Tokyo ACC acknowledged the emergency and cleared the flight to make a right-hand turn to a heading of 090° toward Izu Oshima.^[6] The aircraft banked right to 40°, far steeper than standard maneuvers.^[6] Captain Takahama ordered First Officer Sasaki to level the wings, but Sasaki reported that turning the control wheel to the left produced no response from the aircraft.^[6]

Uncontrolled Oscillations and Wandering Flight

Having lost the vertical fin and directional damping, the aircraft entered two concurrent, uncommanded aerodynamic modes: phugoid oscillations and Dutch roll.^[6][44][47] In the phugoid cycle, which lasted approximately ninety seconds, the aircraft repeatedly climbed, lost airspeed, pitched down into a dive, regained airspeed, generated increased wing lift, and climbed again.^[47] Flight data recorded pitch attitudes fluctuating between 20° nose-up and 15° nose-down, with bank angles swinging between 60° right and 50° left in twelve-second cycles.^[47] The crew continued to turn the control wheel, pull on the control column, and pump the rudder pedals, but all flight controls remained nonfunctional.^[6][44]

By 18:27, Flight Engineer Fukuda confirmed the complete loss of all hydraulic systems, telling the pilots, "Hydraulic pressure all lost."^[6][44] Tokyo ACC inquired about the nature of the emergency at 18:27:02, but the pilots did not respond, and hypoxia appeared to have begun setting in.^[6] At 18:28:31, Tokyo ACC instructed the flight to fly due east; Captain Takahama replied, "But now uncontrol."^[6][48] This was the first confirmation to air traffic controllers that the aircraft was uncontrollable, prompting Tokyo ACC to turn on the main loudspeaker so all controllers in the facility could monitor the emergency.^[48]

At 18:31:02, while the aircraft was passing over Yaizu in Shizuoka Prefecture and traversing Suruga Bay, Tokyo ACC asked if the aircraft could descend.^[6][49] Captain Takahama replied that they were descending and reported an altitude of 24,000 feet (7,300 m), although flight data showed the plane was actually oscillating up and down.^[6][49] Controllers suggested an emergency diversion to Nagoya Airport, located 72 nautical miles (133 km) to the west, which required minimal turning; however, Captain Takahama declined and maintained his preference for Haneda, which had the runway length and emergency facilities required to accommodate a Boeing 747.^[6][49] Recognizing the severe workload in the cockpit, Tokyo ACC informed the crew, "You may speak in Japanese from now on"; subsequent communications were conducted primarily in Japanese.^[49]

For eighteen minutes following the decompression, from 18:24 until approximately 18:42, the aircraft drifted between 20,000 feet (6,100 m) and 25,000 feet (7,600 m).^[6] The pilots did not don their oxygen masks.^[6] The accident report observed that when the flight engineer recommended using oxygen masks after word arrived from the cabin that passenger masks were failing, the captain merely answered "yes" without donning his mask.^[6] The clear audibility of the pilots' voices on the cockpit area microphone confirmed that they never wore oxygen masks throughout the crisis, an omission that the accident report counted among several signs of hypoxia in the recording, while a 2011 explanatory document by the Japan Transport Safety Board said the crew had probably given priority to flying the aircraft over dealing with the decompression.^[6]

Thrust Modulation and Alternate Systems

At 18:35, Flight Engineer Fukuda answered calls from Japan Air Lines' Tokyo operations center via the selective-calling (SELCAL) radio system.^[6] Based on reports from cabin attendants that masks in the rear had ceased operating, Fukuda stated an erroneous assumption that the R5 cabin door had broken and reported that the aircraft was making an emergency descent.^[6] Over the next several minutes, the pilots began experimenting with differential engine thrust to steer the plane and regulate altitude.^[6][50] Increasing power on all four engines pitched the nose up and produced a climb, while reducing power pitched the nose down and initiated a descent.^[47] Applying higher thrust to one side produced a gradual yaw and turn in the opposite direction.^[6]

At 18:40, in an attempt to stabilize the violent phugoid motion and increase drag for descent, the crew activated the emergency electrical gear extension system to lower the landing gear.^[47] Extending the gear produced significant aerodynamic drag, which successfully dampened the phugoid oscillations and reduced the rolling amplitude of the Dutch roll.^[47] However, the drag also diminished the directional effectiveness of differential engine thrust, making yaw control substantially harder.^[47] Shortly afterward, an engine thrust imbalance with Engine 1 producing higher thrust than the other engines caused the aircraft to enter a wide descending 420° loop over Otsuki in Yamanashi Prefecture, descending from 22,000 feet (6,700 m) to 6,000 feet (1,800 m).^[6]

At 18:46:33, Captain Takahama voiced the severity of their plight, stating, "This may be hopeless."^[6][48] At 18:47, the crew asked to be guided to the radar site at Kisarazu in Chiba Prefecture; Tokyo ACC told them to fly due east and asked whether the aircraft was controllable, and the crew replied that it was uncontrollable.^[48] Around 18:50, a photographer on the ground in Okutama captured a photograph of JA8119, clearly revealing that its vertical tail fin was entirely missing.^[6][51]

Final Maneuvers and Impact

At 18:48, flying below 7,000 feet (2,100 m) amidst mountain peaks, Captain Takahama ordered maximum engine thrust to avoid rising terrain.^[6] The abrupt power addition excited a violent pitch-up, climbing steeply to 40°.^[6] Airspeed plummeted to 108 knots (200 km/h; 124 mph) at 18:49:30, activating the stick shaker stall warning at 9,000 feet (2,700 m).^[6] Takahama ordered maximum power at 18:49:40 as the stick shaker sounded.^[6]

To stabilize the aircraft and prevent further stalling, the crew deployed the wing flaps using the backup electrical system at 18:51, which required three minutes and ten seconds to extend the trailing edge flaps to 5 units.^[6] At 18:54:30, flap extension continued past 10 units, reaching 20 units.^[6] However, asymmetric flap extension and differential engine power caused the aircraft to enter an uncontrolled right-hand roll exceeding 60° and descending rapidly.^[6] Takahama ordered the flaps to be retracted and applied full throttle, but the right bank steepened to over 80°, dropping the nose 36° downward.^[6]

The ground proximity warning system sounded as the aircraft continued its descent toward the mountains.^[6] The crew applied full engine thrust in a final effort to raise the nose.^[6] The dive leveled out momentarily, subjecting the aircraft and passengers to 3 g of vertical upward acceleration as airspeed reached 340 knots (630 km/h; 390 mph).^[6] At 18:56:23, while banked 40° to the right, the aircraft's number 4 engine struck trees on a ridge about 1.4 km northwest of Mount Mikuni at an elevation of 1,530 metres (5,020 ft); the impact produced a backward shock of about 0.14 g, and the number 4 engine lost thrust.^[6][52]

Within the next three seconds, the right wing struck a second ridge containing a U-shaped ditch, 520 metres (1,710 ft) from the first, at an elevation of 1,610 metres (5,280 ft).^[6] The airframe flipped onto its back, slammed into a forested ravine on the northeastern slope of Mount Takamagahara (a location known locally as Osutaka Ridge) at an elevation of 1,565 metres (5,135 ft), and exploded.^[6][53] The final impact occurred at 18:56:30, thirty-two minutes after the bulkhead failure.^[6][54] The shockwaves registered on seismometers at Tokyo University's Shin-Etsu Earthquake Observatory from 18:56:27 to 18:56:32.^[6][54]

Cabin Environment and Passenger Farewells

Survivor testimony and physical evidence recovered from the wreckage provided a clear picture of conditions inside the cabin during the thirty-two-minute ordeal.^[55][56] Immediately following the decompression, oxygen masks dropped automatically throughout the passenger cabin, accompanied by automated emergency broadcast announcements.^[55] Dense white condensation fog formed momentarily due to rapid adiabatic expansion, clearing within a few seconds.^[55] Survivors reported that passengers remained remarkably orderly, following cabin crew instructions to secure seat belts, extinguish cigarettes, and assist children with oxygen equipment.^[55]

When the emergency oxygen supply was exhausted after approximately ten minutes, the pitching and rolling of the aircraft intensified to the point where flight attendants were unable to remain standing.^[55] At 18:47, cabin attendants instructed passengers to put on life vests in preparation for a potential water landing and demonstrate the brace impact position, placing heads down against knees with arms clasped.^[55] Flight attendants continued to assist passengers until the final seconds; handwritten instruction notes prepared by attendants were subsequently discovered in the wreckage, detailing emergency briefing points for parents with young children.^[57][58]

Realizing that survival was uncertain, numerous passengers used the extended flight duration to write farewell letters and wills to their families on boarding pass envelopes, notebook pages, and air sickness bags.^[59][60][61] Other passengers photographed the cabin interior and the deployed masks using compact cameras; film rolls recovered by police investigators and processed as evidence were released to surviving family members after the expiration of the criminal statute of limitations.^[62][63][64]

Search and Rescue Operations

The Japanese search and rescue response was characterized by severe organizational delays and conflicting information.^[47][65][66] When the radar blip disappeared at 18:56, the commander ordered two F-4EJ Phantom fighters of the 305th Tactical Fighter Squadron to scramble from Hyakuri Base in Ibaraki Prefecture; they took off at 19:01.^[67][68] Meanwhile, an American C-130 transport located the crash site at 19:15 and radioed the location to the Japanese and to Yokota Air Base.^[69][70] At 19:21, the JASDF F-4EJ fighters confirmed the fire from the air.^[71]

A United States Air Force UH-1 Iroquois helicopter from Yokota was dispatched to the scene, and American military personnel offered to coordinate search efforts and deploy rescue teams.^[70][72] However, according to a 1995 account by former US Air Force navigator Michael Antonucci, the helicopter was ordered back to base and Japan said the Self-Defense Forces would take over the search.^{[69][70][73][74]} A JASDF KV-107 rescue helicopter searched above the crash site, and a Self-Defense Force aircraft confirmed the site from the air at 20:42.^[71][75][76] Heavy black smoke, towering flames, dense forest cover on 45° slopes, and high-voltage transmission lines prevented the helicopter from landing or hoisting personnel.^[75] The pilot reported from the air no signs of survivors.^[47]

Confusion over the exact location of the crash paralyzed ground rescue efforts through the night.^[65] Reports from members of the public, the Ministry of Transport, and Japan Air Lines gave conflicting locations, placing the crash near Mount Ogura in Nagano Prefecture, at Budo Pass, or along the Gunma-Nagano border.^[65] Although an Asahi Shimbun news helicopter confirmed at 21:10 that the crash site was on the Gunma side of the mountains, ground search parties were misdirected toward Nagano.^[76][77] Instead of proceeding directly to the ridge, ground rescue units bivouacked overnight in a makeshift camp in Ueno Village, 63 kilometres (39 mi) away, to construct tents and helicopter landing pads.^[47]

Ground rescue operations finally began on the morning of August 13, more than thirteen hours after the crash.^[47][78] At 08:30, two riot police officers from the Nagano Prefectural Police were lowered onto the ridge by rope from a helicopter.^[79] At 09:00, airborne troops from the Ground Self-Defense Force 1st Airborne Brigade, led by Captain Toshiya Okabe, rappelled onto the site, while the 13th Infantry Regiment and local volunteer firefighters arrived on foot.^[78] Takeo Kurosawa, the mayor of Ueno Village and a former Imperial Japanese Navy lieutenant commander, correctly identified the crash location as Sugenozawa from television aerial footage and mobilized local firefighters familiar with the rugged logging trails to guide the search parties through steep bamboo terrain.^[80][81]

Discovery of Survivors and Forensic Recovery

At approximately 10:45 on August 13, searchers descending into the Sugenozawa ravine discovered living passengers trapped in the debris of the severed aft cabin section.^[82][83] All four survivors were female Japanese passengers who had been seated in rows 54 to 60 on the left side of the aircraft: off-duty JAL flight purser Yumi Ochiai, aged 26; Hiroko Yoshizaki, aged 34; her daughter Mikiko Yoshizaki, aged 8; and Keiko Kawakami, aged 12.^[82][83][84] The aft fuselage had broken free from the main airframe before the final impact, vaulting over the mountain ridge and sliding down the forested ravine, which significantly cushioned the deceleration and shielded the section from the intense post-crash fuel fire.^[78][85]

Medical personnel from the Japanese Red Cross Society, led by Dr. Shoichi Aiba of Maebashi Red Cross Hospital, were lowered to the crash site from a Metropolitan Police Department helicopter at 12:13.^[86] The survivors suffered from severe trauma, hypothermia, and multiple fractures.^[87] Rescuers used salvaged lavatory doors from the aircraft as makeshift stretchers to carry them up the 30° incline to a ridge where they could be hoisted into hovering military helicopters.^[88][89] The hoist evacuations were completed between 13:05 and 13:28, after which the survivors were transferred to ambulances and transported to hospitals in Fujioka, Gunma Prefecture.^[86][88][90]

Autopsies and medical examinations revealed that an estimated twenty to fifty passengers had survived the initial impact but died during the night from shock, severe exposure to low temperatures, or internal injuries that would have been treatable with prompt medical care.^[47][91] One attending physician noted that if rescue teams had arrived ten hours earlier, more survivors could have been found.^[43][91] From her hospital bed, Yumi Ochiai recounted that upon regaining consciousness amidst the wreckage shortly after the crash, she heard bright searchlight beams and helicopter rotors above, alongside loud cries and groans from other survivors; these voices gradually subsided and fell completely silent before dawn.^[47][91]

The forward and center sections of the aircraft had disintegrated upon impact with extreme force, scattering fragmented and incinerated remains over an area of 40,000 square metres.^[85][92] A temporary morgue was established at the municipal gymnasium in Fujioka.^[92] Over the course of four months, medical and forensic teams examining 2,065 body parts succeeded in identifying 518 of the 520 victims through dental records (15.1%), fingerprints (44.4%), facial features (11.6%), clothing (12.4%), physical marks (5.8%), and blood typing (0.8%).^[93] Only 177 bodies were found intact.^[92] Remains that could not be identified were cremated after a joint memorial service held in December 1985 at the Gunma Prefectural Hall in Maebashi. They were buried at the Irei no Sono memorial, about 10 km northeast of the crash site.^[94] The Fujioka gymnasium, heavily contaminated by the odor of decomposition, was demolished and rebuilt with financial support from Japan Air Lines.^[95][96]

Rescue Inefficiencies and Administrative Failures

The rescue response provoked severe public condemnation in Japan regarding administrative paralysis and inter-agency friction.^[66][97] The official disaster relief request from the Tokyo Airport Office to the Air Self-Defense Force was delayed until 20:33, more than an hour and a half after the emergency began, reportedly because Ministry of Transport officials insisted on fixing the crash location before making a formal request.^[97] The request to the Ground Self-Defense Force was further delayed until 21:30 reportedly because officials, having already made the request to the Air Self-Defense Force, did not know that a separate request to the Ground Self-Defense Force was needed.^[98]

In 1995, former United States Air Force navigator Michael Antonucci published an account in The Sacramento Bee and Pacific Stars and Stripes asserting that his C-130 crew had pinpointed the crash location twenty minutes after impact and that American rescue personnel at Yokota were prepared to deploy immediate helicopter teams, only to be ordered to withdraw by Japanese authorities.^{[70][99][100]} While US Forces Japan stated that official records of the communications were no longer held, the account rekindled domestic criticism.^[72] In response, former ASDF Public Relations Director Mamoru Sato argued that American forces had offered medevac helicopters and medical teams, and Japanese authorities had requested them to remain on standby rather than outright refusing assistance, pending coordination with domestic assets.^[101]

Self-Defense Force vehicles dispatched to the disaster zone were also asked to pay tolls at expressway toll booths.^[102] The incident was raised in the Diet of Japan, prompting the Defense Agency to issue a formal directive on September 1, 1986, establishing free toll road passage for military units during disaster mobilization.^[102][103] In addition, the aircraft was carrying a cargo of medical radioisotopes consisting of 92 packages across 13 nuclides, totalling 161.77 millicuries and weighing 489 kilograms including containers, of which 64.8 percent was recovered between August 14 and 16, 1985. Investigators also had to inspect the elevator balance weights of the Boeing 747, which contained depleted uranium ballast, confirming that all weights were accounted for.^[104]

Investigation and Findings

The accident was investigated by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission (AAIC) of Japan, led initially by Keizo Hatta and later by Shun Takeda, assisted by a team from the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) including Ron Schleede and George Sidlen.^{[105][106][107][108]} Both the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were recovered from the wreckage on August 14, buried under debris in the Sugenozawa ravine.^[104] Meanwhile, on August 13, the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Matsuyuki, conducting builder's sea trials in Sagami Bay, recovered a large section of the vertical stabilizer floating at sea and transferred it to the Maritime Safety Agency.^[109] Subsequent examination of the vertical fin in Yokohama revealed outward skin petal ruptures and hydraulic fluid residue around rivet holes, proving that high-pressure air had burst into the fin from within the fuselage.^[110]

On August 22, 1985, American investigators, including Federal Aviation Administration technical adviser Tom Swift, examined the aft pressure bulkhead remnants on Osutaka Ridge.^[111][112] By comparing the damaged bulkhead with Boeing engineering blueprints, Swift discovered that a critical splice repair had been executed incorrectly.^[111][112] Laboratory examination of bulkhead fracture surfaces at NTSB headquarters in Washington identified micro-striations indicative of cyclic metal fatigue cracking.^[112] On August 29, Swift provided the AAIC with calculations showing that the incorrect repair reduced the joint's fatigue life to approximately 14,000 cycles.^[113]

Following the 1978 tailstrike at Itami Airport, Boeing technicians had repaired the severed bulkhead.^[6][9] Approved Boeing repair procedures required replacing the damaged lower hemisphere and splicing it to the undamaged upper hemisphere using a continuous single splice plate secured with three rows of rivets to distribute structural loads evenly across the joint.^[114] Instead, the technicians cut the splice plate into two separate strips to facilitate installation, using one plate with a single row of rivets and a second plate with two rows.^[115] This improper modification rendered the middle row of rivets completely ineffective, concentrating cyclic cabin pressurization stresses onto a single rivet line and reducing fatigue resistance to 70 percent of design specifications.^[6][105]

On September 6, 1985, The New York Times published a report disclosing the Boeing repair error, based on a deliberate leak by NTSB investigator Ron Schleede under the direction of NTSB Chairman Jim Burnett, intended to make known that the basic structure of the Boeing 747 had no defect, after the AAIC's preliminary report omitted the finding.^[115][116] Later that day, Boeing issued a formal public statement acknowledging that the 1978 repair had contained defects across 17 percent of the bulkhead seam.^[117][118] In 2024, the FAA and Boeing updated documentation noting that the splice plate had been cut into two pieces because installing a single plate was structurally difficult in the confined space, leading to renewed inquiries by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in 2025 and 2026.^[119][120]

Finite element computer modeling using the Nastran program was conducted on mainframe systems at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Nagoya plant, utilizing 10,000 pages of design data supplied by Boeing.^[121][122] Airflow simulation dividing the aircraft into eight compartments established that cabin air ruptured the APU firewall 0.04 to 0.09 seconds after bulkhead failure, entered the vertical stabilizer, and blew it apart 0.2 seconds later, completing the structural breakup of the tail in approximately 0.3 seconds.^[46] This matched the 11-tonne forward acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder.^[123] Physical destruction testing on full-scale torque box assemblies at the National Aerospace Laboratory's Chofu branch on June 25, 1986, confirmed that internal air pressure of 4.5 to 5.5 psi was sufficient to burst the stabilizer structure.^[124]

The AAIC released its final report on June 19, 1987, concluding that cyclic cabin pressurization had propagated fatigue cracks from the single-rivet row of the spliced bulkhead until the structure ruptured catastrophically at 23,900 feet.^[6][125] The resulting explosive decompression tore off the vertical fin and severed all four hydraulic circuits, depriving the crew of aerodynamic control.^[6] The commission issued formal recommendations to the Ministry of Transport, urging stricter oversight of off-site aircraft structural repairs, enhanced structural inspection requirements for repaired aircraft, and new airworthiness design standards requiring tail control systems to survive localized pressure bulkhead failures.^[126]

Flight Simulations, Hearings, and Crack Detectability

Between March and April 1986, the AAIC conducted flight simulator evaluations using an All Nippon Airways Boeing 747 simulator to test whether the crippled aircraft could have been safely landed or ditched.^[50] Four separate flight crews consisting of senior flight instructors from ANA and the Civil Aviation Bureau were selected.^[50] When presented with the total loss of control surfaces without prior briefing, all four simulator crews crashed within minutes, unable to control the simulated aircraft using control columns.^[50] After receiving training in engine thrust manipulation, one crew succeeded in flying a simulated descent and executing a simulated water landing at an airspeed under 200 knots (370 km/h; 230 mph) using wing gear and electric flap extensions.^[50] However, the commission concluded that landing safely under real-world conditions was practically impossible due to high sink rates and pitch instability.^[50]

At a formal public hearing held at the Ministry of Transport on April 25, 1986, pilot union representatives argued that because the crew did not use oxygen masks and remained conscious for thirty minutes, explosive decompression may not have occurred, advocating for deeper underwater searches in Sagami Bay to verify whether external factors initiated the breakup.^[127] Academic witness Tsugihiko Sato, president of Osaka Institute of Technology, asserted that the pilots should have immediately turned southwest toward the ocean to ditch rather than attempting to return to Haneda across mountain ranges.^[127] A university professor remarked that the aircraft was destroyed by colliding with mountains rather than falling from the sky, exclaiming that "the mountain killed them"; this provoked an angry response from bereaved families attending the hearing, who confronted him afterward.^[127][128]

Investigators also examined why seven major C-check maintenance overhauls performed by JAL between 1978 and 1985 had failed to detect the growing fatigue cracks.^[129] Using a three-parameter Weibull distribution model based on United States Air Force technical data, the commission calculated the probability of detecting a single one-centimeter fatigue crack during visual inspections from inside the dark tail cone at only 10 percent.^[130] Because multiple independent cracks were growing simultaneously across adjacent rivet holes (multisite fatigue cracking), the cumulative probability of discovering at least one crack during maintenance was calculated at 14 to 60 percent.^[130][131] The report recommended establishing standardized empirical guidelines for visual inspections.

Criminal Investigation and Legal Proceedings

In September 1985, the Gunma Prefectural Police set up a 50-member investigation headquarters and began a criminal investigation. Gunma police investigators traveled to the United States to question Boeing repair personnel directly; however, Boeing declined to make its technicians available for formal police interrogation, citing differences between the American and Japanese legal systems.^[132] In August 2016, former United States Department of Justice federal prosecutor Linda Candler publicly confirmed that the American government had actively urged Boeing to cooperate with Japanese authorities, disputing persistent theories that Washington had shielded the aerospace manufacturer.^[133][134]

On December 1, 1988, the Gunma Prefectural Police referred twenty individuals to the Maebashi District Public Prosecutors Office on charges of professional negligence resulting in death and injury, comprising four Boeing employees, twelve Japan Air Lines managers, and four Ministry of Transport officials.^[135][136] On November 22, 1989, the Maebashi District Prosecutors Office declined to prosecute any of the individuals, citing insufficient evidence to establish specific personal criminal liability.^[137][138] Several bereaved family members appealed the non-indictment to the Maebashi Prosecution Inquest.^[139] In April 1990, the inquest ruled that the decision not to indict two Boeing workers and two JAL employees was improper.^[140][141] However, following a secondary review, the Maebashi District Prosecutors Office reaffirmed its dismissal of charges on July 19, 1990, and the five-year statute of limitations expired on August 12, 1990.^{[142][143][144]}

Between November 1 and November 20, 1985, the Maritime Safety Agency survey ship Kaiyō and the Japan Marine Science and Technology Center undersea work vessel Kaiyō searched the seabed for wreckage using side-scan sonar and a towed deep-sea camera. Although seventeen acoustic anomalies were located on the seabed, no major fragments of the vertical stabilizer or auxiliary power unit were found, and search operations were terminated.^[145] The Japan Federation of Aviation Workers' Unions criticized the government for failing to conduct a full recovery of submerged tail wreckage.^[146] In July 2015, an underwater television expedition organized by TV Asahi located and photographed aircraft debris on the seabed 2.5 kilometres (1.6 mi) off the coast of Higashiizu at a depth of 160 metres (520 ft), believed to be fragments of JA8119.^[147]

Conspiracy Theories and Official Counter-Evidence

In the decades following the crash, numerous alternative theories emerged alleging that the Boeing 747 was struck by an errant Self-Defense Force missile or an unmanned target drone, and that government authorities staged a cover-up.^{[148][149][150]} Several books promoting these narratives became commercial bestsellers in Japan, and some were selected for school library recommendation lists.^[151][152] These claims cited a red object near the tail wreckage.^[153] They also cited a dark spot in a photograph taken by a passenger.^[154] The destroyer Matsuyuki was suspected of a missile launch because it recovered part of the tail the day after the crash.^[155]

Government agencies, the Japan Transport Safety Board, and independent aviation analysts thoroughly refuted these theories.^{[156][157][158]} The red object recovered from the sea was determined to be a piece of the red-painted wing, and chemical tests found no explosive residues on the wreckage.^[153] Former JAL pilot Hiroyuki Sugie noted that if an external missile had struck the tail fin, the flight data recorder would have registered sharp lateral g-forces and an abrupt yaw; instead, longitudinal acceleration preceded lateral acceleration, and lateral forces remained below 0.1 g, consistent with internal pressurization failure.^[159][160] Furthermore, viral images claiming that a news broadcast reported the shooting of an SDF soldier who refused to delay rescue were debunked as fabricated digital hoaxes.^[161]

Former Maritime Self-Defense Force Vice Admiral Tomohiko Madono published documented shipyard logs proving that the destroyer Matsuyuki was berthed at the Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries shipyard in Toyosu on August 12 and was not operating in Sagami Bay until its scheduled sea trials the following afternoon.^[162] Madono also confirmed that the training support ship Azuma, the only vessel equipped to launch and control target drones, was docked at Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture, from August 11 to 21.^[163] Furthermore, Sagami Bay was not designated as an SDF firing zone, and Japanese military target drones deploy emergency parachutes into the sea automatically upon radio signal loss, which Madono said made an uncontrolled collision with an airliner impossible.^[163] In August 2024, former Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force Toshiya Okabe, who had led the airborne rescue team in 1985, founded the JAL 123 Accident Clarification Committee alongside military veterans and aviation specialists to conduct symposia and formally counter conspiracy claims.^[68][164]

Voice Recorder Leaks and Civil Litigation

In August 2000, on the eve of the fifteenth anniversary of the crash, Mainichi Shimbun reported that the Ministry of Transport had begun microfilming and destroying investigative background documents prior to the enactment of the Japanese Information Disclosure Act.^[165] Concurrently, an unauthorized 32-minute cassette copy of the cockpit voice recorder tape was leaked to major media outlets.^[166] On August 8, 2000, the TBS evening news program News no Mori was the first to broadcast the leaked cockpit voice recorder audio, and other television stations followed, letting the general public hear what happened in the cockpit before the crash.

In March 2021, Motoko Kibi, chair of the 8.12 Liaison Association of bereaved families, along with the sister of First Officer Yutaka Sasaki, filed a civil lawsuit against Japan Air Lines in the Tokyo District Court, demanding the disclosure of raw, unedited four-channel CVR audio and digital flight data records.^{[167][168][169]} The plaintiffs based their demand for the CVR and FDR data on the right of personality, including privacy, under Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan and on the right to request disclosure under Article 28(1) of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information. Japan Air Lines opposed the disclosure, arguing that Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation prohibits the public release of accident investigation recordings for non-investigative purposes, and asserted that all civil claims had been settled in final agreements signed by families in 1991.^[167][170]

In October 2022, the Tokyo District Court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the 1991 settlements legally barred any further civil claims against the airline regarding the disaster.^[170] The plaintiffs appealed to the Tokyo High Court, asserting that the settlement only applied to financial damages and did not waive rights to factual transparency following new testimonies.^[170][171] On June 1, 2023, the Tokyo High Court upheld the dismissal of the appeal, leaving the raw audio recordings sealed under official custody.^[171]

Aftermath and Industry Reforms

The crash dealt a severe blow to public confidence in Japan Air Lines.^[47][172] Passenger numbers on JAL's domestic routes dropped by one-third.^[47] In the months after the crash, domestic air traffic decreased by as much as 25 percent, and some travelers considered switching to All Nippon Airways as a safer alternative.^[173] Shinkansen ridership also rose after the crash.^[172][174] In 1986, for the first time in a decade, JAL's international passenger volume during the New Year holiday fell below the previous year's levels.^[173] JAL paid ¥780 million (approximately $7.6 million) to the families of victims as condolence payments without admitting formal legal liability.^[56][175] JAL President Yasumoto Takagi resigned three days after the crash, taking moral responsibility.^[47][176] On September 21, 1985, Hiroo Tominaga, a JAL maintenance manager who had coordinated aircraft maintenance at Haneda, died by suicide to atone for the accident.^[177] In March 1987, Susumu Tajima, a 57-year-old former chief aircraft inspector for the Ministry of Transport who had approved the airworthiness of JA8119 following the 1978 repair, also died by suicide after being questioned by police.^[178][179]

Japan Air Lines retired flight number 123 on September 1, 1985, renumbering the Haneda-Itami route to Flight 121 and Flight 127.^[180] The route is currently flown as Flight 133 or Flight 127 using Airbus A350-900, Boeing 767, or Boeing 777 aircraft.^[56][181] In August 2020, an aircraft enthusiast tracking flights on Flightradar24 discovered a parked Boeing 777 at Narita Airport displaying dummy callsign JAL0123 during ground maintenance; JAL issued a public apology, explaining that maintenance staff had randomly entered digits without intending to revive the retired flight number.^{[181][182][183]}

The entire fleet of Boeing 747-100SR aircraft operated by JAL was retired between 1988 and 1994.^[184][185] Aircraft JA8117 was acquired by NASA following the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, converted into a Shuttle Carrier Aircraft under registration N911NA, and operated until February 2012; it is currently displayed at Joe Davies Heritage Airpark in Palmdale, California.^[186][187] Aircraft JA8118 was bought back by Boeing as a metal fatigue test aircraft, and a section of its upper-deck fuselage, repainted in British Airways livery, is displayed at the national science and industry museum in London.^[5][185] The final 747SR, JA8124, was retired in 1994 after nineteen years of service.^[185]

On December 5, 1985, four months after the crash, the NTSB issued eight safety recommendations to the FAA.^[188][189] The FAA mandated protective blast covers over the vertical stabilizers of Boeing 747s and ordered the installation of hydraulic fuses on the fourth hydraulic system to prevent total fluid loss if the tail section separated.^[190] Boeing redesigned the aft pressure bulkhead for the Boeing 747-400, incorporating redundant tear straps and doubler plates to limit crack propagation.^[191] In July 1989, when United Airlines Flight 232 suffered a total hydraulic failure over Iowa, training instructor Dennis Fitch, who had studied the JAL 123 disaster and practiced engine-thrust steering in flight simulators, assisted the cockpit crew in executing a controlled crash-landing at Sioux City, contributing to the survival of 184 of the 296 people on board.^[192][193]

In April 2006, Japan Air Lines opened the Safety Promotion Center at Haneda Airport, displaying major wreckage components, preserved passenger farewell notes, and aviation safety archives.^{[59][194][195][196]} Attendance at the center and an annual memorial climb of Osutaka Ridge are mandatory training requirements for all new JAL employees.^{[197][198][199]} In 2024, JAL President and CEO Mitsuko Tottori, who began her career as a JAL flight attendant in 1985, participated in the 39th anniversary memorial climb.^[200] The disaster also affected the date of Japan's Mountain Day national holiday, which was set for August 11 rather than August 12 after Diet members from Gunma, the Gunma governor and the mayor of Ueno asked that it not fall on the crash anniversary.^[201]

Media Coverage and Press Misconduct

News of the disaster broke at 19:13 on August 12, when Jiji Press issued a flash wire reporting that Flight 123 had disappeared from radar screens.^[202][203] Television networks interrupted regular programming with news bulletins beginning at 19:26 on NHK, transitioning into continuous overnight coverage.^[204][205] At 11:30 on August 13, Fuji TV broadcast the first live footage of the rescue of survivor Yumi Ochiai from the ridge, providing exclusive live coverage that was relayed internationally.^[206][207] Major weekly photo magazines, including Focus, Emma, and Friday, faced intense ethical scrutiny after publishing unedited, graphic photographs of fragmented and incinerated victims on the mountain slopes.^{[208][209][210]}

The massive influx of domestic and international reporters generated widespread reports of journalistic misconduct.^[211][212] Media personnel walking through the crash site stepped on scattered body parts and stripped emergency blankets from injured survivors to photograph them.^[211][212] Several reporters who entered the rugged wilderness without adequate equipment became lost, requiring police rescue helicopters to divert from recovery efforts to assist them.^[213] At the Fujioka gymnasium morgue, reporters scaled window frames and climbed nearby utility towers to photograph corpses, forcing officials to close the blackout curtains, which raised indoor temperatures to as much as 40°C and made the post-mortem work harder.^[214] Other reporters posed as doctors in attempts to enter survivors' hospital rooms, and according to a book by nonfiction writer Ryusho Kadota, reporters entered one bereaved family's home uninvited and some tried to open a coffin to photograph the dead.^[215][216]

Cultural Depictions and Memorials

The disaster has been featured prominently in television documentaries and dramatizations.^{[193][217][218]} The Canadian documentary series Mayday examined the crash in the season 3 episode "Out of Control" (2005) and the season 23 episode "Pressure Point" (2023), as well as the special episode "Fatal Flaw" (2007).^{[217][218][219]} The American series Seconds from Disaster covered the accident in the season 6 episode "Terrified over Tokyo" (2012).^[220] Japanese networks produced multiple docudramas, including the 2005 TBS special Voice Recorder: The Truth of the 20th Year, which dramatized the struggle of the cockpit crew using restored audio recordings.^[221]

Hideo Yokoyama, who worked as a journalist at the Jōmō Shimbun in Gunma at the time of the crash, authored the bestselling novel Climber's High (published in English as Seventeen), depicting the ethical dilemmas of local journalists reporting on the disaster; the novel was adapted into an NHK television drama in 2005 and an award-winning feature film in 2008 directed by Masato Harada.^[222][223] Toyoko Yamasaki's novel Shizumanu Taiyō (The Unbroken Sun), published in 1999, portrayed corporate politics and grief surrounding the disaster under the fictional name National Airlines; it was adapted into a 2009 feature film starring Ken Watanabe and featuring violin compositions by Diana Yukawa, whose father died on the flight.^[224][225]

The cockpit voice recorder audio formed the basis of the 1999 American documentary theatre play Charlie Victor Romeo, which staged the pilots' dialogue verbatim.^[226] German band Rammstein drew inspiration from the crash for their 2004 album Reise, Reise, embedding the final moments of the flight recorder audio into the pregap of the first track on certain CD pressings.^[227] Singer Toshiki Kadomatsu dedicated "Ramp In" and "Song for You", from his November 1985 album T's Ballad, to the cabin crew and to the passengers of Flight 123 respectively. In 2016, Machiko Taniguchi, the widow of victim Masakatsu Taniguchi, published the illustrated children's book My Papa's Persimmon Tree based on her family's experience of grief and remembrance, which was translated into English in 2020.^{[228][229][230]}

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99. “新聞「Pacific stars and stripes」の1985年8月27日に掲載とされている、Michael Antonucci氏の原稿を探している。”. レファレンス協同データベース. 国立国会図書館. 2026年4月19日閲覧。
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120. “＜独自＞米ボーイング、日航に謝罪 修理ミスの記述を削除「混乱招いた」 墜落事故41年”. 産経新聞. 2026年8月12日. 2026年8月25日閲覧.
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122. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 165–168. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
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124. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 168–171. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
125. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 314–315. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
126. 勧告 1987. (“航空機の耐空性確保に関する勧告”. 運輸省航空事故調査委員会 (1987年6月19日). 2020年5月12日閲覧。)
127. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 158–162. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
128. 美谷島邦子 2010, pp. 97–102.
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130. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 213–215. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
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132. 尾崎修二; 高橋努; 松本惇 (2015年8月13日). “クローズアップ2015 日航機墜落30年 空の安全、課題今も”. 毎日新聞. 2016年6月4日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ.
133. “米元検事初証言、捜査協力促した 日航機墜落事故”. 共同通信. 2016年8月11日. 2016年8月12日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ.
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135. 「ボ社、日航、運輸省“競合過失”ジャンボ機墜落 20人を書類送検」『読売新聞 (朝刊)』1988年12月2日、1面。
136. 「日航機墜落、20人を書類送検 群馬県警」『朝日新聞 (朝刊)』1988年12月2日、1面。
137. 「日航機事故 刑事責任不問で捜査終了 全員不起訴 検察 修理ミス解明できず」『読売新聞 (朝刊)』1989年11月23日、1面。
138. 「ジャンボ機墜落 全員不起訴 前橋地検発表 ボ社・日航・運輸省の30人」『朝日新聞 (朝刊)』1989年11月23日、1面。
139. 「きょう検察審査会へ不起訴不当申し立て 日航機惨事で遺族ら」『読売新聞 (朝刊)』1989年12月19日、30面。
140. 「「不起訴不当」に歓声も 日航機惨事検察審決議 声を詰まらす遺族」『読売新聞 (朝刊)』1990年4月26日、30面。
141. 「日航機事故不起訴不当 「最高の判断」と遺贈側 「意見は尊重」検察淡々」『朝日新聞 (朝刊)』1990年4月26日、30面。
142. 「重かった5年の歳月 8・12 日航惨事 公訴の時効成立」『読売新聞 (朝刊)』1990年8月12日、27面。
143. 「日航機墜落から5年 やるせない…時効 遺族ら、ろうそく供養 慰霊の園」『朝日新聞 (朝刊)』1990年8月12日、27面。
144. 美谷島邦子 2010, pp. 71–75, 93–125.
145. 鶴岡・北村 1991, pp. 107–109. (鶴岡憲一、北村行孝『悲劇の真相―日航ジャンボ機事故調査の677日』読売新聞社、1991年7月17日。ISBN 9784643910599。)
146. “「日本航空 便の御巣鷹山墜落事故に係る 事故調査報告書についての解説」 に対する日乗連の考え方”. 日本乗員組合連絡会議. 2023年5月9日閲覧。
147. 123便の残骸か･･･相模湾海底で発見 日航機墜落30年ANNnewsCH 2015.8.12
148. 角田四郎『疑惑 JAL123便墜落事故―このままでは520柱は瞑れない』早稲田出版、1993年12月。ISBN 9784898271520。
149. 池田昌昭『完全犯罪 JAL123便撃墜事件』文芸社、2003年7月。ISBN 9784835562896。
150. 小田周二『日航機墜落事故 真実と真相 御巣鷹の悲劇から30年 正義を探し訪ねた遺族の軌跡』文芸社、2015年3月14日。ISBN 9784286157290。
151. “御巣鷹事故「自衛隊が撃墜」、偽情報を自民佐藤正久氏が問題視 中谷元防衛相「対応する」”. 産経新聞 (2025年4月10日). 2025年4月28日閲覧。
152. “日航機墜落事故をめぐる陰謀論に危機感”. 産経新聞 (2025年4月17日). 2025年4月28日閲覧。
153. 堀越豊裕 2018, pp. 211–213.
154. 『『日航123便墜落『撃墜説』の真相』』PHP研究所、2026年2月12日、130-147頁。
155. “産経WEB 日航機墜落に関与指摘の護衛艦、事故当日は東京湾に係留 乗員が証言 陰謀説の立脚点が…”. 2025年7月29日閲覧。
156. “佐藤正久・参院議員「JAL123便は自衛隊が訓練中に誤って撃墜」と発言? 恣意的な切り取り【ファクトチェック】”. 日本ファクトチェックセンター(JFC) (2025年4月21日). 2025年4月28日閲覧。
157. “御巣鷹の日航機墜落事故 「自衛隊が撃墜説」に国交相「正確な情報発信する」”. 産経新聞 (2025年4月11日). 2025年4月28日閲覧。
158. “JAL123便墜落事故 自衛隊＆米軍陰謀説の真相：陰謀説に終止符を打つ！（杉江弘）”. 宝島社 (2017年12月8日). 2025年4月28日閲覧。
159. 杉江弘 2003, pp. 94–97.
160. 杉江弘 2017, pp. 49–54.
161. “(3ページ目)「自衛隊のミサイルが命中した」「自衛隊標的機が衝突した」…年々盛り上がる「日本航空123便墜落事故」の陰謀論を徹底検証《NHKは「偽動画であり…」と回答》”. 文春オンライン (2025年8月12日). 2025年8月13日閲覧。
162. 『日航123便墜落『撃墜説』の真相』PHP研究所、2026年2月12日、86-108頁。
163. 『「日航123便墜落『撃墜説』の真相」』PHP研究所、2026年。
164. “火炎放射器を使用した自衛隊による証拠隠滅の嘘”. 2025年2月1日閲覧。
165. 「日航機墜落の資料廃棄 運輸省事故調「保存期間切れた」」『毎日新聞 (朝刊)』2000年8月7日、27頁。オリジナルの2000年9月3日時点におけるアーカイブ。
166. “操縦室音声記録装置”. 日本航空. 2019年5月10日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2021年4月23日閲覧。
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