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Spanish transition to democracy

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Contents
  1. (Top)
  2. Delimitation of the period
  3. Background: Late Francoism (1969–1975)
  4. The Arias Navarro government and the Arias-Fraga reform (1975–1976)
  5. The first Suárez government and the Political Reform Act (1976–1977)
  6. The constituent period and the 1978 Constitution (1977–1978)
  7. The second constitutional government and the crisis of the UCD (1979–1981)
  8. The 23-F coup attempt and the Calvo-Sotelo government (1981–1982)
  9. The first socialist government and democratic consolidation (1982–1986)
  10. Sociological and cultural dimensions
  11. Historiographical debates and historical memory
  12. References
Spanish transition to democracy
Spanish transition to democracy
Period1975–1982
MonarchJuan Carlos I
Prime MinistersCarlos Arias Navarro, Adolfo Suárez, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo
Form of governmentParliamentary constitutional monarchy (after 1978)
CapitalMadrid
Enacted constitutionSpanish Constitution of 1978
Preceding entitiesFrancoist Spain, Spanish Republican government in exile
CurrencySpanish peseta

The Spanish transition to democracy was the historical process through which Spain shifted from the Francoist dictatorship to a constitutional parliamentary monarchy under King Juan Carlos I. Beginning after the death of Francisco Franco in November 1975, the period was characterized by institutional reform, broad negotiation between reformist elites and the democratic opposition, the approval of the Political Reform Act of 1976, the first free elections in 1977, and the 1978 Constitution. It concluded with the 1982 general election and the peaceful transfer of power to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

Delimitation of the period

Historians have reached a broad consensus in placing the beginning of the Spanish transition on 20 November 1975, the day of Francisco Franco's death, or two days later on 22 November 1975, when Juan Carlos I was proclaimed King of Spain before the Francoist parliament.[1][2] Some historians propose earlier start dates, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco on 20 December 1973, given his central role in securing the continuity of the regime, or the passage of the Organic Law of the State in 1966.[2][3] The transition formed part of the third wave of democratization theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, which began in April 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and ended with the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989.[4]

Considerable debate exists regarding the conclusion of the transition.[5][6][7] Some scholars consider it completed with the first democratic general election on 15 June 1977.[8][9] Others date its end to the approval and promulgation of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in December of that year, which finalized the legal transformation of the state.[10][11] Alternative proposals mark the end of the period with the first constitutional elections in March 1979 or the failure of the 23-F military coup attempt on 23 February 1981, which demonstrated that armed insurrection could not reverse the democratic process.[9][11]

The prevailing view among historians places the end of the transition in October 1982, when the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) won an absolute majority in the general election.[9][12][13] This election brought about the first peaceful alternation of executive power from a government derived from the Francoist apparatus to one originating in the democratic opposition.[13][14][15] Other authors extend the transition until 1 January 1986, when Spain formally joined the European Economic Community and held a referendum on NATO membership.[9][16] A minority thesis extends the period to the 1996 general election won by the People's Party, while critical perspectives argue that the transition remains incomplete because the monarchy established under Franco continues without direct popular choice on the form of the state.[9][17][18][19]

Background: Late Francoism (1969–1975)

Following the enactment of the Organic Law of the State in January 1967, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco strengthened his position as the effective second-in-command of the dictatorship when Franco appointed him vice president of the government in September 1967.[20] Carrero Blanco initiated Operación Príncipe, aimed at securing Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, the son of the pretender Don Juan de Borbón, as Franco's designated successor.[21][22] On 22 July 1969, Franco presented Juan Carlos to the Francoist Cortes as his successor with the title of Prince of Spain, which the parliament approved by 491 votes in favor, 19 against, and 9 abstentions.[23][24] In his speech, Franco stated that through this appointment everything would be left tied down, and well tied down (atado y bien atado).[25][26]

In October 1969, Franco formed a new cabinet known as the monocolor government, composed almost exclusively of technocrats associated with Opus Dei or loyal to Carrero Blanco and his advisor Laureano López Rodó.[27] Three reform-minded ministers, Manuel Fraga, José Solís Ruiz, and Fernando María Castiella, were removed from the executive.[27] During the four years of this cabinet, divisions deepened between the inmovilistas (the hardline Búnker), who rejected any political modification, and the aperturistas, who favored controlled institutional reform.[28][29][30] Economic modernization and rapid social transformation clashed with an autocratic political structure, generating labor unrest, student demonstrations, and protests from sectors of the Catholic Church.[31][32]

In May 1973, Interior Minister Tomás Garicano Goñi resigned over the political deadlock of the regime, yet Franco responded by naming Carrero Blanco as prime minister, separating the positions of head of state and head of government for the first time in thirty-seven years.[33][34] Carrero Blanco's government lasted six months.[34] On the morning of 20 December 1973, ETA assassinated Carrero Blanco in Madrid by detonating an underground bomb beneath his car.[35] Vice President Torcuato Fernández-Miranda took temporary control of the executive, preventing hardline factions from executing extreme measures, and the military was not deployed.[35] The assassination opened the regime's deepest political crisis by eliminating the figure intended to ensure Francoism's continuity after the dictator's death.[36]

In January 1974, Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister, excluding Opus Dei technocrats and distributing ministries among traditional regime factions.[37] On 12 February 1974, Arias Navarro delivered a speech to the Cortes promising limited political openings, an initiative dubbed the spirit of 12 February.[38][39] This opening stalled within weeks.[40] The Bishop of Bilbao, Antonio Añoveros Ataún, was threatened with expulsion after publishing a pastoral letter defending Basque cultural identity, and on 2 March 1974, the Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich was executed by garrote vil despite international protests.[40][41] The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974 highlighted Francoism's isolation.[42] In July 1974, Franco suffered thrombophlebitis, temporarily delegating his powers to Prince Juan Carlos until September.[42][43] On 13 September 1974, an ETA bomb in Madrid's Calle del Correo killed twelve people, prompting the dismissal of the reformist Information Minister Pío Cabanillas and the solidarity resignation of Finance Minister Antonio Barrera de Irimo.[44][45]

Opposition forces began coalescing into unified bodies.[46] In July 1974, Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), announced the creation of the Junta Democrática in Paris, advocating a democratic break (ruptura democrática), political amnesty, trade union freedom, and a referendum on the form of the state.[47][48][49] In June 1975, moderate opposition groups and the PSOE formed the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática, preferring negotiated reform over insurrectionary rupture and expressing willingness to accept a constitutional monarchy.[47][50][51] Worsening economic conditions fueled strikes organized by the illegal Comisiones Obreras (CCOO).[52][53] Terrorist violence from ETA and the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP) increased, leading to an antiterrorist decree in August 1975.[54] Military courts sentenced eleven militants to death; Franco refused clemency for five of them, who were executed by firing squad on 27 September 1975, causing international protests and the withdrawal of European ambassadors.[55][56][57]

On 1 October 1975, the National Movement held a rally at Madrid's Plaza de Oriente where a frail Franco denounced an alleged leftist-Masonic conspiracy.[58] Franco fell gravely ill on 12 October and transferred power to Prince Juan Carlos on 30 October.[59][60] During this interregnum, King Hassan II of Morocco organized the Green March of Moroccan civilians to force Spain to hand over Spanish Sahara.[61][62] On 14 November 1975, Spain signed the Madrid Tripartite Accords, agreeing to withdraw from Western Sahara and transfer administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania.[61][62] Franco died on 20 November 1975 at the age of 82.[63][64] The only foreign head of state or government at his funeral was the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.[65] Imelda Marcos, wife of the Philippine dictator, also attended..[66]

The Arias Navarro government and the Arias-Fraga reform (1975–1976)

Following Franco's death on 20 November 1975, a Council of Regency governed until 22 November, when Juan Carlos de Borbón was proclaimed King Juan Carlos I before the Cortes Españolas.[2][67][68] After swearing loyalty to the Fundamental Laws and the Principles of the National Movement, the king delivered an address expressing respect for Franco but calling for national concord and political transformation, without celebrating the Nationalist victory in the Civil War.[67][69][70] Antifranquist opposition leaders received the speech with skepticism, while hardline deputies applauded Franco's daughter in attendance.[67][71][72] On 27 November, a religious service was held at the Church of San Jerónimo el Real, attended by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, West German President Walter Scheel, Prince Philip, and US Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.[66][73] Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón delivered a sermon calling on the monarch to govern all Spaniards without distinction.[71][74][75] On 25 November, the king granted a pardon that freed common prisoners and political prisoners.[76][77]

On 2 December 1975, the king appointed Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, his former political law tutor, as president of the Cortes and of the Council of the Realm, securing a strategic position within the Francoist institutional apparatus.[78][79][80] However, the king confirmed Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister.[79][81] Arias formed a heterogeneous cabinet on 13 December containing prominent reformists such as Manuel Fraga (Interior), José María de Areilza (Foreign Affairs), Antonio Garrigues (Justice), and Alfonso Osorio (Presidency), alongside reformist former Falangists such as Adolfo Suárez and Rodolfo Martín Villa, and military hardliners including General Fernando de Santiago.[82][83] Arias lacked an independent reform project, declaring in the National Council of the Movement that his goal was the continuity of Francoism through democracy in the Spanish way (democracia a la española).[84][85][86]

The government adopted a reform programme drafted by Manuel Fraga, known as reform in continuity, which sought to establish a bicameral constitutional system modeled after the 19th-century Canovite Restoration.[87][88][89] Fraga envisioned an elected Congress representing families and an organic Senate representing corporate bodies and provinces.[90][91] Dissenting opposition forces would be permitted to participate, but the Communist Party was excluded.[88][89] A mixed commission of the government and the National Council was formed to review changes to three Fundamental Laws.[92][93][94] On 25 May 1976, the Cortes passed the Right of Assembly Act, permitting public demonstrations with prior administrative approval.[95][96] On 9 June, the Law of Political Associations passed after Adolfo Suárez defended political pluralism in a speech that gained the attention of King Juan Carlos.[95][97][98] However, the Arias-Fraga reform collapsed on 11 June, when the Cortes rejected modifying the Penal Code to decriminalize political parties and the National Council rejected the bicameral constitutional reform.[99][100][101]

During early 1976, social mobilization increased sharply.[102][103] Between January and March, official figures recorded 17,455 strikes, 1,672 demonstrations, and 283 sit-ins across Spain.[103][104] On 3 March 1976, armed police stormed the Church of San Francisco in Vitoria during a strike assembly, using tear gas and firing live ammunition; five workers were killed and over one hundred wounded.[105][106][107] A general strike swept the Basque Country and Navarre in response.[105] On 26 March 1976, the Junta Democrática and the Plataforma de Convergencia merged to form Coordinación Democrática, popularly known as the Platajunta, establishing a united front demanding political amnesty, union legalization, and elections for a constituent assembly.[108][109] Fraga tolerated the socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) holding its 30th Congress in Madrid disguised as Study Days to divide the opposition, while keeping communist CCOO leader Marcelino Camacho imprisoned.[110][111] On 9 May 1976, during the annual Carlist gathering at Montejurra, members of the integrist Carlist faction that supported Sixto Enrique de Borbón fired on the left-wing Carlists led by his brother Carlos Hugo, killing two and wounding thirty without police intervention.[112][113]

Arias Navarro's resistance to democratic change led to irreconcilable friction with the Crown.[114][115] In April 1976, Newsweek published remarks attributed to King Juan Carlos describing Arias as an unmitigated disaster.[84][116] In June 1976, the king addressed the United States Congress in Washington, committing Spain to establish a representative democracy.[117][118] On 1 July 1976, the king summoned Arias Navarro to the Zarzuela Palace and demanded his resignation, which Arias tendered.[115][119][120] Torcuato Fernández-Miranda maneuvered within the Council of the Realm to include Adolfo Suárez alongside Federico Silva Muñoz and Gregorio López Bravo on the list of three candidates submitted to the king.[119][121][122] On 3 July 1976, Juan Carlos appointed Suárez as prime minister.[123] The appointment caused disappointment among democratic opposition leaders and foreign observers, with commentator Ricardo de la Cierva labeling it an error.[124][125]

The first Suárez government and the Political Reform Act (1976–1977)

Adolfo Suárez formed a cabinet composed of young Christian democrats from the Tácito group, such as Landelino Lavilla and Marcelino Oreja, and former Falangist reformers, while veterans such as Fraga and Areilza declined to participate.[126][127][128] On 16 July 1976, the government issued a declaration recognizing popular sovereignty, promising an amnesty, and pledging to hold general elections before 30 June 1977.[129][130] On 30 July 1976, a partial amnesty decree was enacted, releasing 400 prisoners convicted of political and opinion offenses, excluding violent crimes.[131][132][133] Torcuato Fernández-Miranda drafted the Political Reform Act (Ley para la Reforma Política), formulated under the principle of moving from the law to the law through the law (de la ley a la ley a través de la ley) to prevent legal vacuums or military intervention.[134][135] Approved by the cabinet on 10 September, the bill provided for a bicameral legislature comprising a 350-member Congress of Deputies and a 207-member Senate, elected by universal suffrage.[136][137][138]

On 8 September 1976, Suárez met with the senior military leadership to secure their acquiescence for the planned political reforms.[139][140] He assured the generals that the monarchy and the unity of Spain were non-negotiable, that no provisional government would be formed, that no retrospective accountability would be sought, and that revolutionary parties, specifically the Communist Party, would not be legalized.[140][141] Tensions escalated later that month when Deputy Prime Minister General Fernando de Santiago objected to contacts with Comisiones Obreras and opposed labor reforms.[142] Suárez dismissed him on 21 September and appointed General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, who reassigned reform-minded officers and neutralized recalcitrant commanders in the security forces.[142]

The Cortes debated the Political Reform Act in November 1976.[138][143] Conservative procurators, led by Blas Piñar and Pilar Primo de Rivera, defended the Francoist system, but the government used administrative leverage, procedural urgency, and promises of electoral inclusion to persuade the assembly.[144][145][146] On 18 November 1976, the Cortes voted 435 in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions to approve the law, in what contemporary observers termed the institutional suicide or harakiri of the Francoist parliament.[147][148] On 15 December 1976, the law was submitted to a nationwide referendum.[133][149] Coordinación Democrática advocated abstention due to the lack of an overt choice between a monarchy and a republic, but state media ran an intensive campaign centered on the song Habla, pueblo, habla.[150][151][152] The referendum recorded a 77.72% turnout, with 94.2% voting in favor, providing the reform process with democratic legitimacy.[133][149][152]

The last week of January 1977, known as the Black Week (Semana Negra), brought intense destabilization.[153] On 23 January, far-right gunmen from Fuerza Nueva murdered student Arturo Ruiz at an amnesty rally, and police tear gas killed demonstrator María Luz Nájera the following day.[153][154] On the night of 24 January, neo-fascist gunmen raided a labor law office affiliated with CCOO and the PCE on Calle de Atocha in Madrid, murdering five labor attorneys and wounding four.[155] Concurrently, the leftist group GRAPO kidnapped Council of State President Antonio María de Oriol and Supreme Military Justice President General Emilio Villaescusa, killing three policemen.[156] The PCE organized a disciplined, silent funeral for the Atocha victims, which drew hundreds of thousands onto Madrid's streets without disorder, transforming public sentiment regarding communist participation in politics.[157][158][159] On 11 February, police freed both hostages, and Suárez addressed the nation, rejecting right-wing calls for a state of emergency.[160][161]

The Atocha massacre made the legal exclusion of the PCE politically untenable.[162][163] Suárez initiated clandestine negotiations with PCE General Secretary Santiago Carrillo on 27 February 1977 at the home of journalist José Mario Armero.[162][164][165] Carrillo agreed to accept the monarchy, endorse the red-and-gold national flag, and moderate street protests in exchange for legalization.[166][167][168] The Supreme Court declined jurisdiction on the party's statutes, leaving the decision to the executive.[162][169] On 9 April 1977, during the Easter holiday, Suárez issued a decree legalizing the PCE, an event termed Red Holy Saturday (Sábado Santo Rojo).[153][162][170] Navy Minister Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga resigned in protest, and the Supreme Council of the Army issued a formal note expressing profound repudiation while accepting the decision under military discipline.[156][171][172] Carrillo convened the PCE Central Committee on 15 April with the royal and party flags, formally endorsing the parliamentary monarchy.[168][173][174] On 13 May, veteran communist leader Dolores Ibárruri (La Pasionaria) returned to Spain after 38 years in Moscow.[175]

During the spring of 1977, Francoist institutions were dismantled systematically.[176][177] On 1 April 1977, trade union freedom was established by decree and the National Movement was dissolved, its press and radio assets transferring to the state administration.[177][178][179] On 28 April, independent trade union confederations, including CCOO and the UGT, were legalized, while the Francoist vertical trade union organization (OSE) was converted into a transitional administrative entity.[179][180][181] The repressive Public Order Court (TOP) had been abolished in January and replaced by the Audiencia Nacional to handle terrorism and nationwide offenses.[182] On 14 May 1977, Don Juan de Borbón renounced his dynastic rights in favor of King Juan Carlos I at the Zarzuela Palace, uniting historical dynastic legitimacy with constitutional legitimacy.[183][184][185] In late May, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda resigned as president of the Cortes, concluding his legislative role.[186][187] In the Basque Country, a pro-amnesty week from 8 to 15 May resulted in seven deaths during police confrontations, though ETA political-military announced a partial truce on 20 May.[188][189][190]

The constituent period and the 1978 Constitution (1977–1978)

On 18 March 1977, the government issued the electoral decree-law establishing the D'Hondt proportional representation system with a provincial baseline of two seats for the Congress of Deputies, a structure that favored rural, conservative provinces over industrial urban centers.[191][192] For the Senate, a first-past-the-post plurality system was established, with 41 seats reserved for royal appointment.[183] On 15 June 1977, Spain held its first free general election since February 1936, with an 78.83% turnout.[193][194] Adolfo Suárez's Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), an alliance of Christian democrats, liberals, and social democrats, won a plurality of 34.61% of the vote and 165 seats, falling eleven seats short of an absolute majority.[195][196] The PSOE emerged as the dominant leftist party, winning 29.27% and 118 seats, marginalizing the PCE, which secured 9.38% and 20 seats.[197] Manuel Fraga's conservative Popular Alliance (AP), comprising seven former Francoist ministers, took 8.33% and 16 seats, while the Christian Democratic Team failed to win representation.[198][199][200][201] Regional parties demonstrated local strength, with the Democratic Pact for Catalonia taking 11 seats and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) winning 8.[200][202] On 21 June 1977, the Spanish Republican government in exile dissolved itself in Paris.[203][204]

The newly elected Cortes addressed the demand for political amnesty, passing the Amnesty Law on 15 October 1977.[205][206] Backed by the UCD, PSOE, PCE, and regional parties, with AP abstaining, the law freed all remaining political prisoners, including those convicted of violent crimes and blood offenses.[77][205][207] The law also granted blanket immunity to Francoist officials and security forces for crimes committed during the Civil War and dictatorship.[77][206][207] Communist deputy Marcelino Camacho defended the law in parliament as a foundational act of national reconciliation.[208][209] Historians have termed this consensus the pact of forgetting (pacto del olvido), which avoided retrospective criminal accountability and transitional justice to preserve stability.[77][207][210][211] On 21 December 1977, the government abolished the Francoist national holiday commemorating the 18 July 1936 military uprising.[212][213]

The international economic crisis originating from the 1973 oil shock struck Spain acutely in 1977, pushing inflation to 26.4%, foreign debt to 14 billion dollars, and unemployment over 800,000.[214][215][216][217] To stabilize the economy, Economy Minister Enrique Fuentes Quintana negotiated the Moncloa Pacts with all parliamentary parties, signed on 25 October 1977 at the Moncloa Palace.[216][218][219][220] The agreements implemented wage controls indexed to projected rather than past inflation, reduced public spending, and devalued the peseta, while offering compensatory social measures including expanded public education, unemployment coverage, progressive fiscal reform designed by Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, and the decriminalization of adultery and contraceptives.[221][222][223] The main labor confederations, CCOO and UGT, endorsed the pact, though the newly formed employers' confederation, CEOE, opposed its social components.[224] Inflation fell from 26.4% in 1977 to 16.5% the following year.[215] Labor conflict did not decline, however, and the number of strikes kept rising until it peaked in 1979..[215][225]

The regional question required immediate resolution.[226] On 27 June 1977, Suárez met with Josep Tarradellas, president of the Generalitat of Catalonia in exile.[227] On 29 September 1977, the government issued a decree-law restoring the Generalitat on a provisional basis, and Tarradellas returned to Barcelona on 23 October, addressing a crowd from the palace balcony with the phrase Ciutadans de Catalunya, ja sóc aquí.[204][228][229] In the Basque Country, where exile leader Jesús María Leizaola declined a similar arrangement, the government negotiated with the Assembly of Basque Parliamentarians, leading to the creation of the Basque General Council in December 1977 under socialist Ramón Rubial, with Navarre opting out.[230][231] The government subsequently established provisional pre-autonomy regimes across all Spanish regions to prevent asymmetry.[232]

The Congress of Deputies formed a seven-member subcommittee (the ponentes or Fathers of the Constitution) to draft the new constitution: Gabriel Cisneros, Miguel Herrero de Miñón, and José Pedro Pérez-Llorca (UCD); Gregorio Peces-Barba (PSOE); Jordi Solé Tura (PCE-PSUC); Manuel Fraga (AP); and Miquel Roca (Catalan minority).[233][234][235] The PNV was excluded after UCD declined to yield a seat.[236] Negotiations relied on bilateral compromises between Fernando Abril Martorell (UCD) and Alfonso Guerra (PSOE).[237] Key consensus points included defining Spain as a parliamentary monarchy, recognizing nationalities and regions within an indissoluble Spanish nation (Article 2), protecting religious freedom while mentioning the Catholic Church (Article 27), and phrasing the right to life ambiguously to allow both anti-abortion and pro-choice interpretations.[238][239][240] On 31 October 1978, the Cortes approved the text, with Congress voting 325 in favor, 6 against, and 14 abstentions (including the PNV).[241] On 6 December 1978, a national referendum ratified the Constitution with 87.78% in favor and an 67.11% turnout, although in the Basque Country the PNV's abstention campaign resulted in a 43.6% affirmative vote and high abstention.[10][242][243] King Juan Carlos promulgated the Constitution on 27 December, and it took effect upon publication on 29 December 1978.[10][244]

The second constitutional government and the crisis of the UCD (1979–1981)

Following the enactment of the Constitution, Suárez dissolved the Cortes and scheduled a general election for 1 March 1979.[245] The results reaffirmed the imperfect two-party system: the UCD finished first with 34.84% and 168 seats, while the PSOE won 30.40% and 121 seats, both falling short of an absolute majority.[246][247][248] Coalición Democrática (the rebranded AP) fell to 9 seats, the PCE took 23 seats, and Basque radical nationalists entered parliament, with Herri Batasuna taking 3 seats and Euskadiko Ezkerra 1.[246][247][249] In the municipal elections of 3 April 1979, pacts between the PSOE and the PCE gave the left control of major city councils: Enrique Tierno Galván became mayor of Madrid, Narcís Serra mayor of Barcelona, and Julio Anguita the first communist mayor of Córdoba.[250][251] Voter turnout declined in 1979, reflecting growing public disenchantment (desencanto) with political elites amid economic stagnation and persistent violence.[246][252][253]

The election defeat exacerbated internal conflict within the PSOE.[254] At the 28th Congress in May 1979, delegates rejected Felipe González's motion to drop Marxism from the party's ideological definition, prompting González to resign as general secretary.[255] At an extraordinary congress in September 1979, González was re-elected after the party redefined itself as class-based, mass, democratic, and federal, treating Marxism merely as a non-dogmatic critical instrument.[256] Organizational changes strengthened provincial federations over local branches, consolidating the control of González and Deputy General Secretary Alfonso Guerra.[257] The party adopted a moderate social-democratic orientation that appealed to urban middle-class voters and presented a credible alternative to the UCD.[258][259]

Suárez prioritized regional statutes of autonomy.[260] In the summer of 1979, he negotiated the Basque Statute of Autonomy (Statute of Guernica) with Carlos Garaikoetxea, establishing extensive regional powers, the Ertzaintza regional police, and economic accords (conciertos económicos).[261] It was approved in a referendum on 25 October 1979 by 90.3% of voters on a 59.7% turnout.[261] On the same day, the Statute of Sau for Catalonia passed in a referendum with 88.1% approval.[261][262] In 1980, regional elections brought nationalist parties to power: the PNV under Garaikoetxea in the Basque Country and Convergència i Unió (CiU) under Jordi Pujol in Catalonia.[263][264] However, when Andalusia attempted to secure the same high-level autonomy through the fast-track procedure of Article 151, the UCD government campaigned for abstention.[265][266][267] The referendum on 28 February 1980 passed in seven provinces but fell short of an absolute majority of the census in Almería, producing a political crisis that prompted the resignation of Culture Minister Manuel Clavero Arévalo and eroded UCD support in southern Spain.[263][266]

Between 1978 and 1980, political violence reached its highest intensity.[268][269] ETA killed 68 people in 1978, 84 in 1979, and 93 in 1980, with many of its victims military officers, civil guards, and police.[232][268][269][270] The armed group GRAPO continued assassinations and bombings, while far-right squads (the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance and Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey) carried out violent attacks with the complicity of hardline sectors of the police.[271] The second oil shock of 1979 doubled energy prices, driving Spanish unemployment to 12% and inflation to 16.55%.[272][273] In May 1980, the PSOE tabled a motion of censure against Suárez.[274][275] Although defeated in Congress by 166 votes to 152, the nationally televised debate elevated Felipe González over Suárez in public opinion polls.[274][275][276][277]

The UCD fractured into competing ideological factions.[274][278] Christian democrats resisted reforms, especially the divorce bill introduced by Justice Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, and formed a rebel bloc led by Miguel Herrero de Miñón and Óscar Alzaga.[274][279] Far-right newspapers, such as the Almendros collective in El Alcázar, openly agitated for military intervention, citing the September 1980 coup in Turkey.[280][281] Facing growing isolation, the erosion of royal support, and acute party division, Adolfo Suárez announced his resignation as prime minister and UCD leader on television on 29 January 1981, stating that he did not want the democratic system to be a parenthesis in Spain's history.[282][283][284] UCD barons chose Deputy Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as his successor.[285][286][287] Calvo-Sotelo fell short of an absolute majority on the first investiture ballot on 22 February, so the vote had to be repeated the next day, 23 February 1981, when a simple majority would suffice..[288][289]

The 23-F coup attempt and the Calvo-Sotelo government (1981–1982)

On the afternoon of 23 February 1981, Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero led 200 armed Guardia Civil officers into the Congress of Deputies during the investiture vote for Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, firing shots into the ceiling and holding the government and parliament hostage.[13][289][290] Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch declared a state of emergency in the III Military Region in Valencia and deployed tanks into the streets.[291] The conspiracy joined two distinct designs: Milans del Bosch and Tejero sought a military junta, while General Alfonso Armada, former secretary to the king, sought to install an all-party unity government headed by himself.[291][292][293] Armada entered the parliament building to propose his unity cabinet, but Tejero rejected the plan because it included socialists and communists.[294][295]

King Juan Carlos intervened decisively to halt the insurrection.[294] He contacted captains general across Spain, commanding them to keep units in their barracks, while General Guillermo Quintana Lacazzi secured the strategic Brunete Armored Division in Madrid.[294] An emergency administrative government of undersecretaries managed civil authority.[294] At 1:14 a.m. on 24 February, the king appeared on national television in the uniform of captain general, ordering the military to defend the constitutional order and affirming that the Crown would not tolerate any violent disruption of democracy.[296] Milans del Bosch withdrew his armored forces two hours later, and Tejero surrendered at midday, releasing the hostages.[297][298] On 27 February, one million people marched in Madrid and half a million in Barcelona in support of the Constitution.[299][300] The monarch's actions legitimized the throne in public opinion, giving rise to the political phenomenon known as juancarlismo.[301]

On 25 February 1981, the Congress of Deputies confirmed Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as prime minister by 186 votes to 158.[302] His cabinet was the first since the Second Republic to contain no military ministers, appointing Alberto Oliart to Defense.[280][303] The government prosecuted thirty-two officers and one civilian involved in the 23-F coup, and the Supreme Court increased sentences for Tejero, Armada, and Milans del Bosch to thirty years imprisonment.[304][305][306] Seeking to manage military anxieties regarding regional fragmentation, the UCD and the PSOE signed an agreement on 31 July 1981 that resulted in the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA), which leveled powers among autonomous communities and closed the Article 151 fast-track.[307][308] Nationalist parties challenged the law, and in August 1983 the Constitutional Court struck down Title I as unconstitutional.[309][310] On the labor front, the government, employers, and unions signed the National Employment Agreement (ANE) in 1981, and in February 1982, negotiations with Mario Onaindia led the political-military faction of ETA (ETA-pm) to dissolve and enter parliamentary politics.[311][312]

In foreign policy, Calvo-Sotelo moved Spain into Western defense structures.[313][314] On 29 October 1981, Congress voted 186 to 146 to apply for NATO membership, ending the non-aligned posture favored by Suárez.[315][316] The PSOE campaigned against accession under the ambiguous slogan NATO, not to begin with (OTAN, de entrada no), demanding a popular referendum, which caused public support for NATO to drop to 17%.[315][317] The campaign did not change the government's mind, and on 6 June 1982 the Atlantic Council, meeting in Bonn, accepted Spain as NATO's sixteenth member state..[316] Concurrently, following American diplomatic pressure, the government halted Project Islero, Spain's secret nuclear development program, and placed nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on 1 April 1981.[318][319]

The Calvo-Sotelo administration encountered acute internal and social crises.[320][321] In spring 1981, an outbreak of toxic oil syndrome, caused by the illegal distribution of industrial rapeseed oil for human consumption, poisoned between 12,000 and 20,000 people and killed hundreds, causing a public health emergency that forced the health minister to resign.[321][322] The divorce law divided the UCD: the Christian democrats, like the Catholic Church, opposed legalization, and when they tried to add a hardship clause agreed with the Church hierarchy, the social democratic sector voted with the opposition in the Senate and defeated it..[274][323] The UCD fragmented into rival factions: social democrats under Fernández Ordóñez formed the Democratic Action Party and allied with the PSOE, Christian democrats under Óscar Alzaga formed the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), and Adolfo Suárez left the UCD in July 1982 to establish the Democratic and Social Centre (CDS).[324][325][326] After crushing defeats in the Galician regional election in October 1981 and the Andalusian election in May 1982, Calvo-Sotelo dissolved parliament on 27 August 1982 and called general elections.[327][328][329]

The first socialist government and democratic consolidation (1982–1986)

The general election of 28 October 1982 drew an 79.8% voter turnout, the highest in Spanish democratic history.[330] Campaigning under the slogan For Change (Por el cambio), the PSOE achieved a landslide victory, winning 48.11% of the popular vote and an absolute majority of 202 seats in the 350-member Congress of Deputies.[331][332] Manuel Fraga's Popular Alliance (AP) surged from 9 to 106 seats, becoming the main conservative opposition force.[331][332] The UCD was decimated, falling from 168 to 11 seats, and dissolved in early 1983.[332] The PCE dropped from 23 to 4 seats, prompting Santiago Carrillo's resignation, while the far-right lost its sole parliamentary representative as Blas Piñar's Fuerza Nueva dissolved.[331][332][333][334] The 1982 election brought about a dominant-party system, replaced the UCD with the AP on the political right, and effected the first transfer of executive authority to the left since the 1936 Civil War, concluding the transitional cycle.[13][335][336][337]

The cabinet formed by Prime Minister Felipe González moved to eliminate military insurrectionism.[338] Defense Minister Narcís Serra enacted the Law of Army Staffs, reducing senior officer positions by 20%, bringing active commanders down from 66,000 in 1982 to 57,600 by 1991.[339] The 1984 Organic Law on Defense and Military Organization subordinated the Joint Chiefs of Staff to civilian ministerial authority and created the Chief of Defense Staff (JEMAD).[338][340] Military jurisdiction was integrated into a specialized chamber of the Supreme Court, and territorial military regions were reduced from nine to six.[341] In June 1985, intelligence services uncovered and dismantled a final military coup plot intended to detonate explosives beneath the royal reviewing stand during the Armed Forces Day parade in La Coruña, an event kept secret from the public for over a decade.[342]

On 12 June 1985, Spain signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Communities at the Royal Palace in Madrid, concluding eight years of negotiations that had been stalled by French agricultural concerns under President Giscard d'Estaing until resolved with François Mitterrand.[343][344] On 1 January 1986, Spain and Portugal officially joined the European Economic Community, ending decades of diplomatic and economic isolation.[343][344][345] Having previously opposed NATO, Felipe González convinced the 30th PSOE Congress in December 1984 that Spain should remain in the alliance under three conditions: non-integration into the unified military command structure, a ban on the installation or storage of nuclear weapons, and the progressive reduction of US military bases.[346] Foreign Minister Fernando Morán resigned in disagreement.[346] On 12 March 1986, the government held a referendum on NATO membership.[347] The Yes vote prevailed with 52.5% against 39.8% No, although No majorities were recorded in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre, and the Canary Islands.[347] The victory reinforced González's political authority, leading to another absolute majority in the June 1986 general election.[348]

The socialist government implemented structural economic and social reforms. Confronting industrial obsolescence and fiscal imbalances, the executive undertook industrial reconversion in the shipbuilding, steel, and textile sectors, causing worker layoffs and violent labor protests in northern industrial ports.[349] In university education, the 1983 University Reform Law granted institutional autonomy, while primary and secondary schooling was made compulsory up to age fourteen in 1985 and sixteen in 1990 under the LOGSE.[350] By 1988, public spending decentralization transferred 20% of the national budget to the seventeen autonomous communities, turning Spain from a centralized dictatorship into one of the most politically decentralized states in Europe.[351][352]

Sociological and cultural dimensions

The social climate of the transition was shaped by shifting mass mobilization.[32] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, neighborhood associations, student movements, and labor unions mounted street demonstrations, strikes, and assemblies, placing constant pressure on the regime.[32][353][354][355] However, once the institutional reform process began under Suárez in 1976 and the Moncloa Pacts were signed in 1977, political parties monopolized decision-making.[356] This led to political demobilization and growing public disaffection (desencanto), which remained a lasting characteristic of Spanish political life in the democratic era.[252][357][358] Demographic shifts also played a role: the generation that came to power had not fought in the Civil War, facilitating inter-elite negotiation over past ideological divisions.[352][359][360]

The transformation of civil rights produced social change, particularly for women.[361] Under Francoist civil law, married women were subjected to the marital permit (permiso marital), requiring spousal consent to open bank accounts, seek employment, obtain passports, or initiate property transactions.[361] The Moncloa Pacts of 1977 included the decriminalization of adultery and contraceptives.[222] Women in Spain now have full legal rights and formal equality..[361] Female workforce participation rose from under 30% in 1975 to over 40% during the following decade, and women's enrollment in universities expanded rapidly, eventually exceeding that of men.[361]

The Spanish media landscape underwent restructuring.[362] The repressive 1966 Press Law was dismantled, official censorship was revoked in April 1977, and constitutional protections for freedom of information were enacted.[177][363] On 4 May 1976, the progressive daily newspaper El País published its first issue, becoming an influential voice for democratic reform.[362][364] Radio and television broadcasting monopolies held by the state were gradually modified, and regional autonomous communities established their own public broadcasting networks, such as TV3 in Catalonia and ETB in the Basque Country.[362]

Cultural liberalization found expression in the urban movement known as La Movida Madrileña.[365][366] Emerging in Madrid with the support of Mayor Enrique Tierno Galván and spreading to Barcelona, Bilbao, and Vigo, La Movida broke with moral conservatism and militant political art, embracing punk, new wave music, experimental fashion, and provocative cinema.[365][366][367] Figures such as filmmaker Pedro Almodóvar and writer Gregorio Morales reflected this secular, hedonistic ethos.[366][367] This countercultural explosion coincided with the rapid secularization of Spanish society, as Catholic Church attendance dropped and ecclesiastical influence over state policies declined.[361]

Historiographical debates and historical memory

Contemporary historiography and political science analyze the Spanish transition through four debates identified by Robert M. Fishman and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca: reform versus rupture, elites versus popular movements, peace versus violence, and forgetting versus remembering.[368] Defenders of the reformist course argue that an institutional transition based on Francoist legal mechanisms avoided trauma and Civil War repetition, aligning with the desires of an expanding middle class.[369] Critics argue that by choosing reform over a clean rupture, democratic parties made concessions to Francoist elites, leaving the state judiciary, civil service, and security forces intact.[369][370] Historians Carme Molinero and Pere Ysàs note that in the 1977 parliament there was neither a republican majority nor a desire to risk confrontation with the military, making parliamentary monarchy the product of real political forces rather than an ideological surrender.[371]

A second major historiographical debate concerns whether the transition was strictly an elite pact or the result of popular mobilization.[372] The elite-pact model, formulated by scholars such as Santos Juliá, emphasizes the moderation, personal skill, and consensus-building of political leaders such as Suárez, González, Carrillo, and the King.[373] Pau Casanellas argues that the idea of an elite pact strips social protest of its role, and that popular mobilization, especially the many demonstrations of 1976, opened a breach that blocked any attempt to reform Francoism and cleared the way for a change of regime. Pamela Radcliff holds that the outcome was neither predetermined nor the product of a few members of the elite acting on their own, and that many Spaniards took part in a broad debate about the future and the meaning of democracy.. Núñez Seixas calls the transition a pact of elites that was conditioned by social mobilization. Sánchez-Cuenca argues that between Franco's death and the elections, change came from above without real negotiation with the opposition, but that popular pressure from the streets and factories forced the reform plans to go faster and further..

The traditional depiction of the transition as an exemplary, peaceful process has been challenged by recent scholarship.[374][375][376] Historian Sophie Baby characterizes the notion of a peaceful transition as a myth, documenting a cycle of political violence between November 1975 and October 1982 that caused 714 deaths across at least 3,500 violent acts, comparable in casualty numbers to Italy's Years of Lead.[377][378][379][380] More than half of the fatalities were members of the military and police assassinated by terrorist organizations, primarily ETA (over 400 deaths) and GRAPO (63 deaths).[381][382] Far-right and parapolice groups murdered 67 people, while actions by unpurged state security forces caused 178 deaths, mostly anonymous civilians.[381][382][383][384] Historian Xavier Casals argues that, paradoxically, terrorism stabilized the transition by isolating violent extremists, reinforcing political centrism, and driving voters toward moderate governing parties.[385][386]

The 1977 Amnesty Law is widely criticized today, mainly because it shields the serious human rights violations of the Franco era from investigation..[387][388][389] During the transition, forgetting was assumed to be a condition for national reconciliation, and the democratic opposition did not demand measures of redress for past human rights violations because it gave priority to overcoming the divisions of the Civil War..[211][388][389][390][391] Over 100,000 victims of Francoist executions remained buried in unidentified mass graves across the country, leaving Spain second only to Cambodia in documented unresolved disappearances.[392][393][394] In the early 2000s, the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory (ARMH) was created and encouraged the exhumation of the graves where victims had lain since the war..[394][395] In 2007, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's socialist government enacted the Historical Memory Law, formally condemning Francoist repression, removing public symbols of the dictatorship, and providing support for grave exhumations.[395][396] In 2012, the United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances urged Spain to repeal the 1977 Amnesty Law, citing that crimes against humanity have no statute of limitations.[387] On 24 October 2019, following a decree by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Francisco Franco's remains were exhumed from the monumental basilica at the Valley of the Fallen and reinterred in a modest family pantheon in Mingorrubio Cemetery.[396]

Where editions disagree (3)
End date of the transition
  • English: The transition concluded after the landslide victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) in the 1982 general election.
  • Spanish: Historians date the end variously to the June 1977 elections, the December 1978 Constitution, the March 1979 elections, the failed coup of February 1981, the October 1982 election, or the 1 January 1986 accession to the European Economic Community.
  • Asturian: Proposed end points include the 1977 elections, the 1978 Constitution, the 1979 elections, the 1981 coup, the 1982 elections, the 1986 entry into the EEC, or the 1996 election won by the People's Party.
  • Basque: Critics assert that because the monarchy restored by Franco continues without direct voter consultation on the form of state, the period has not yet concluded.
  • Galician: Proposed dates range from the 1978 Constitution and the 1981 coup to the 1982 election, the 1996 transfer of power to the PP, or the view that the transition remains incomplete.
Number of political prisoners pardoned in November 1975
  • English: King Juan Carlos pardoned 9,000 political prisoners on 22 November 1975.
  • Spanish: On 25 November 1975, the king approved a pardon releasing 5,226 common prisoners and 429 political prisoners.
  • French: On 25 November 1975, the king enacted a pardon allowing nearly 9,000 prisoners to have their sentences reduced.
  • Hebrew: King Juan Carlos pardoned 9,000 political prisoners upon taking office.
  • Hausa: King Juan Carlos pardoned 9,000 political prisoners on 22 November 1975.
Total death toll of political violence during the transition
  • Spanish: Between 500 and 700 people died from political violence from 1975 to the early 1980s, or 714 fatalities between November 1975 and October 1982 according to Sophie Baby.
  • French: 714 deaths occurred in a cycle of political violence between November 1975 and October 1982, including 178 killed by public security forces.
  • Catalan: Nearly 200 people died at the hands of state security forces alone between 1975 and 1982.
  • Russian: 714 people were killed in at least 3,500 violent acts between 1976 and 1982.
Sources (37 Wikipedia editions)

The non-English editions add extensive historical documentation, such as the Spanish and Asturian coverage of the late-Francoist technocratic cabinets, the internal factionalism of the UCD, and detailed parliamentary voting figures. Editions such as the Spanish, French, and Russian provide quantified analysis of political violence citing Sophie Baby's documentation of 714 fatalities, while the Basque and German editions detail the 1976 Vitoria church shootings, the 1985 La Coruña coup conspiracy, and the exhumation of Civil War mass graves under recent historical memory laws.

Assembled from the Wikipedia articles below, each pinned to the revision read on 2026-09-25. Together they hold 459 references; the English article alone has 13.

EditionArticleRevisionSizeRefs
EnglishSpanish transition to democracy137550262048.2 KB13
SpanishTransición española174845700405.6 KB35
AsturianTransición española4534090180.1 KB29
Thaiการเปลี่ยนผ่านสู่ประชาธิปไตยของสเปน13120106106.0 KB16
FrenchTransition démocratique espagnole23966895882.5 KB41
Arabicانتقال إسبانيا نحو الديمقراطية7647335363.3 KB44
Hebrewהדמוקרטיזציה של ספרד4385415063.2 KB36
PortugueseTransição Espanhola7293306959.3 KB16
BasqueEspainiako trantsizioa1069671755.7 KB58
ItalianTransizione spagnola15133388949.1 KB11
GreekΙσπανική Μεταπολίτευση1063191145.0 KB23
RomanianIstoria Spaniei (1977-1981)1795630934.0 KB21
HausaDemokradiyya a Spain89331032.9 KB4
UkrainianПерехід Іспанії до демократії4747379830.9 KB12
HungarianSpanyolország demokratikus átmenete2935277024.9 KB5
Persianاسپانیا در دوران انتقال به دموکراسی4443381222.1 KB21
ArmenianԻսպանիայի անցումը ժողովրդավարության995686521.3 KB6
Turkishİspanya'da demokrasiye geçiş süreci3583635921.3 KB7
RussianПереход Испании к демократии14898583020.8 KB3
CatalanTransició democràtica espanyola3803752817.3 KB6
Korean스페인의 민주화4121156416.1 KB2
GermanTransition in Spanien26689031614.2 KB16
IndonesianTransisi Spanyol menuju demokrasi2933401312.9 KB3
Chinese西班牙民主转型9149608512.5 KB0
SwedishSpaniens återgång till demokrati591300508.2 KB9
FinnishEspanjan siirtyminen demokratiaan242547267.4 KB9
InterlinguaTransition espaniol7005956.7 KB6
PolishTransformacja ustrojowa w Hiszpanii784149426.7 KB0
CzechŠpanělský přechod k demokracii254860456.6 KB0
Japaneseスペインの民主化1083685376.2 KB0
EstonianHispaania üleminekuperiood71391965.1 KB0
PapiamentoTransishon demokrátiko spañó1820954.7 KB0
simpleSpanish transition to democracy107477864.1 KB0
GalicianTransición española76846083.4 KB7
DutchSpaanse democratische overgang719122123.3 KB0
EsperantoHispana transiro82250371.9 KB0
LatinTransitio Democratica Hispanica32618880.8 KB0
The text on this page comes from the Wikipedia articles listed above, written by their contributors, and is released under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 licence. It was translated and merged from those articles, may contain errors, and has not been reviewed by Wikipedia editors. The image is from Wikimedia Commons; its own licence is on its file page. SuperCharged Wiki is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Wikimedia Foundation. How this works.

References

  1. Powell, 2002, pp. 11; 127-128.
  2. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar (2005) Los socialistes europeos y la transición española (1959-1977). Madrid: Marcial Pons, páx. 22. ISBN 84-95379-88-0. «lo que podríamos llamar la transición a la democracia puramente dicha, que s'empecipió'l 20 de payares de 1975, fecha de la muerte de Francisco Franco»
  3. (Gaztelaniaz) «Historia de España: La Transición política» www.historiasiglo20.org (kontsulta data: 2019-01-05).
  4. Powell, 2002, p. 12.
  5. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar (2005). Los socialistas europeos y la transición española (1959-1977). Madrid: Marcial Pons. p. 22. ISBN 84-95379-88-0. «Lo que podríamos llamar la transición a la democracia propiamente dicha... se inició el 20 de noviembre de 1975, fecha de la muerte de Francisco Franco. [...] Con respecto al final del proceso de la transición española, existen diferencias de opinión entre los especialistas de este periodo».
  6. Powell, 2002, p. 128.
  7. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar (2005) Los socialistes europeos y la transición española (1959-1977). Madrid: Marcial Pons, páx. 22. ISBN 84-95379-88-0. «Con respectu a la fin del procesu de la transición española, esisten diferencies d'opinión ente los especialistes d'esti periodu.»
  8. Prego, 1995.
  9. Jiménez-Díaz, J.F. & Delgado-Fernández, S. (2016): “Introduction”, en Jiménez-Díaz, José Francisco & Delgado-Fernández, Santiago -Editores-: Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975-1982). Nueva York, Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 2016, páxs. 1-20.
  10. «Constitución española. Elaboración y aprobación de la Constitución Española de 1978». Congreso de los Diputados. 2003.
  11. Fuentes Aragonés, Juan Francisco (2006). "«Lo que los españoles llaman la transición»: evolución histórica de un concepto clave". Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez (in Spanish). 36 (1): 131–149. doi:10.4000/mcv.2359.
  12. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 191-192. «Para más de un analista, el triunfo del PSOE suponía el fin de la Transición, no del proceso de transición institucional, culminado con la aprobación de la Constitución en diciembre de 1978, sino del proceso de transición política: la prueba de fuego para la consolidación definitiva del nuevo sistema político formado entre 1976 y 1978 debía ser permitir el acceso al gobierno de quienes venían de la oposición democrática y no de las filas reformistas del régimen dictatorial. Ahora comenzaría la fase de la consolidación y normalización de la democracia española, que en las dos décadas siguientes habría de convertirse en un miembro homologado y homologable del bloque occidental».
  13. Casanova & Gil Andrés 2014, p. 291. (Casanova, Julián; Gil Andrés, Carlos (2014). Twentieth-century Spain. A History. Translated by Douch, Martin. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60267-0. OCLC 870438787.)
  14. Preston, 2001, p. 353. «En las elecciones del 28 de octubre de 1982, prevaleció la voluntad popular. La transición concluyó. El cambio real pudo comenzar».
  15. Chislett, William (2025). "The Transition to Democracy, 1975–1982". Spain: What Everyone Needs to Know (in English) (دوم ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/wentk/9780197806173.003.0004.
  16. «Convergencia de recuperación: Transición a la democracia y adhesión a las Comunidades Europeas (1975-1986) - España y la construcción europea. Vectores de convergencia, factores de cohesión y paradigmas cambiantes - CVCE Website». www.cvce.eu. Consultado el 8 de junio de 2022.
  17. (Gaztelaniaz) Gómez Villar, Antonio. (2007-05-04). «Entrevista a Julio Anguita: "La Transición o la segunda restauración borbónica"» Rebelión.
  18. (Gaztelaniaz) Molina, Pablo. (2009-02-20). «Otra Restauración que se acaba» Libertad Digital.
  19. Caballero Bonald fala dunha transición que non foi tal
  20. Payne, 2007, p. 210.
  21. Payne, 2007, p. 213.
  22. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 153-154.
  23. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 154-155.
  24. Moradiellos 2000, p. 154-155. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMoradiellos2000 (help)
  25. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 11.
  26. Molinero & Ysàs 2018, p. 11. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMolineroYsàs2018 (help)
  27. Tusell, 1997a, p. 267.
  28. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 173-174.
  29. Mateos y Soto, 1997, pp. 68-72.
  30. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 49. «El Gobierno formado en octubre de 1969... puso punto final a las tentativas reformistas a pesar de que, en ningún caso, suponían el más mínimo cuestionamiento del orden franquista. A partir de este momento, la imagen que proyectó el nuevo Gobierno fue la de absoluto inmovilismo. La posición de Carrero Blanco era que simplemente debía "perfeccionarse" lo ya existente, y rechazaba no combatir frontalmente, "en nombre del aperturismo y de todas esas zarandajas", todo aquello que a su rígido entender era contrario al ideario y al orden franquista».
  31. Pinilla García, 2021, pp. 38-39. «El país había hecho en los años sesenta una suerte de transición económica, social y cultural que, sin embargo, no se trasladaba a nivel político e institucional».
  32. Campuzano 2011, p. 40
  33. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 175.
  34. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 180-181.
  35. De Riquer, 2010, p. 705.
  36. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 182-183.
  37. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 183.
  38. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 183-184.
  39. Mateos y Soto, 1997, pp. 87.
  40. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 185.
  41. Mateos y Soto, 1997, pp. 82.
  42. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 186.
  43. De Riquer, 2010, pp. 711.
  44. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 186-187.
  45. Mateos y Soto, 1997, pp. 87; 92.
  46. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 192.
  47. Moradiellos, 2000, pp. 192-195.
  48. Juliá, 1999, pp. 208-209. «En su primer manifiesto, la Junta [Democrática] se declaró a favor de la ruptura con el régimen por medio de la formación de un gobierno provisional que tomaría el poder gracias a una huelga general o acción democrática nacional, aunque dejaría para un referéndum posterior la decisión popular sobre la forma de gobierno, si monárquica o republicana. [...] Los comunistas pretendían desempeñar en 1975 el papel que los socialistas habían jugado en 1930: huelga general, caída del régimen monárquico, formación de un gobierno provisional y convocatoria de elecciones generales... para un plazo de dieciocho meses a partir de la constitución del gobierno provisional».
  49. Juliá, 1999, p. 208.
  50. Juliá, 1999, pp. 208-209. «Aun si proclamó la ruptura democrática, como la Junta [Democrática], la Plataforma [de Convergencia Democrática] se mostró dispuesta a entrar en negociaciones con el gobierno con objeto de ir conquistando parcelas de libertad. Desde el primer momento, la estrategia de ruptura propugnada en declaraciones y manifiestos quedó matizada por la disposición a negociar con los sectores del poder que se comprometieran en un proceso democratizador, y a ir ocupando un espacio cada vez mayor en la escena política».
  51. Juliá, 1999, p. 208-209.
  52. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 188.
  53. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 29. «En primer lugar, porque el aparato represivo estuvo plenamente operativo hasta el fin del régimen, lo que contribuyó al mantenimiento en la sociedad de un miedo extenso, alimentado además por la memoria de la extrema violencia del primer franquismo. En segundo lugar, por la notable extensión de la pasividad en sectores diversos de la población, en unos casos con el miedo como factor determinante, pero también por las expectativas de mejora de las condiciones de vida en un contexto de intenso crecimiento económico y de cambios sociales, sin olvidar la apatía política o la simple aceptación del orden establecido, por convicción o por interés. Por último, a pesar de la progresiva extensión de la conflictividad antifranquista, sus expresiones más intensas se encontraron con muchas dificultades para manifestarse fuera de las principales concentraciones industriales y urbanas del país».
  54. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 188-190.
  55. Suárez Fernández, 2007, pp. 797.
  56. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 190; 199.
  57. Campuzano 2011, p. 43
  58. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 190.
  59. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 191.
  60. Tusell, 1997a, pp. 294-295.
  61. Moradiellos, 2000, p. 199-200.
  62. Mateos y Soto, 1997, pp. 106-108.
  63. Suárez Fernández, 2007, pp. 800-8011.
  64. Zur dreißigsten Wiederkehr dieses Datums 2005 vgl. Walter Haubrich: Als Spanien stillstand. In: Die Zeit. Nr. 47, 17. November 2005 (zeit.de).
  65. Preston, 1998, p. 961; 967.
  66. Tusell, 1997, p. 12-13.
  67. Tusell, 1997, p. 12.
  68. Casanova & Gil Andrés 2014, p. 292. (Casanova, Julián; Gil Andrés, Carlos (2014). Twentieth-century Spain. A History. Translated by Douch, Martin. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60267-0. OCLC 870438787.)
  69. Preston, 2003, p. 359-360.
  70. Story 1977, pp. 474–95. (Story, Jonathan (1977). "Spanish Political Parties: Before and After the Election" in Government and Opposition (4 ed.). Cambridge University Press. JSTOR 44482173. Retrieved May 4, 2024.)
  71. Juliá, 1999, p. 213.
  72. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 155. «Considera que Juan Carlos es un títere en manos de la camarilla franquista».
  73. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, p. 316-317.
  74. Tusell, 1997, p. 13.
  75. Tusell, 1997, p. 13. "Tarancón fixo una allabancia de Franco a la so entrega, pero tamién mentó los sos inevitables errores y realizó una meridiana alusión a la necesidá de serenidá y tactu"
  76. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 35-36. «No era la amnistía general, pero podía ser una señal positiva para la oposición».
  77. Campuzano 2011, p. 79
  78. Tusell, 1997, p. 16-18.
  79. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 36.
  80. Tusell, 1997, p. 16-18. "[El rei] yera consciente de que'l primer gobiernu de la monarquía había de ser de transición"
  81. Ruiz, 2002, p. 20.
  82. Juliá, 1999, p. 214.
  83. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 168.
  84. Tusell, 1997, p. 22.
  85. Ruiz, 2002, p. 21.
  86. Tusell 1977, p. 22. (Tusell, Javier (1977). La transición española. La recuperación de las libertades [The Spanish transition. The recovery of liberties] (in Spanish). Madrid: Historia 16 : Temas de Hoy. ISBN 84-7679-327-8. OCLC 37354322.)
  87. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 70. «Frente al proyecto de Fraga, Antonio Garrigues presentó una propuesta de reforma rápida, consistente en una ley breve, que debería someterse a aprobación antes del verano, facultando al Gobierno para efectuar cambios "constitucionales", que el rey promulgaría después, a partir de la afirmación de la soberanía nacional, la monarquía constitucional, un Parlamento bicameral, el respeto a los derechos humanos, la adecuación de la legislación sindical a los acuerdos internacionales y el reconocimiento de la autonomía de las regiones».
  88. Juliá, 1999, p. 215.
  89. Juliá 1999, p. 215. (Juliá, Santos (1999). Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad [A century of Spain. Politics and society] (in Spanish). Madrid. ISBN 84-9537903-1.)
  90. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 68-70.
  91. Tusell 1977, pp. 23–24. (Tusell, Javier (1977). La transición española. La recuperación de las libertades [The Spanish transition. The recovery of liberties] (in Spanish). Madrid: Historia 16 : Temas de Hoy. ISBN 84-7679-327-8. OCLC 37354322.)
  92. Tusell, 1997, p. 21.
  93. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 175. «Los ultras torpedearán la Comisión, impedirán su avance y antes del verano, la reforma de Fraga estará muerta, entre otras razones porque lo acontecido en la calle exige un ritmo de cambio mucho más acelerado —y determinado— que el impreso por el Gobierno».
  94. Tusell 1977, p. 21. (Tusell, Javier (1977). La transición española. La recuperación de las libertades [The Spanish transition. The recovery of liberties] (in Spanish). Madrid: Historia 16 : Temas de Hoy. ISBN 84-7679-327-8. OCLC 37354322.)
  95. Juliá, 1999, p. 215-216.
  96. Juliá 1999, pp. 215–216. (Juliá, Santos (1999). Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad [A century of Spain. Politics and society] (in Spanish). Madrid. ISBN 84-9537903-1.)
  97. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 41. «Con todo, la Ley de Reunión, y más tarde la de Asociación, supuso un avance significativo, en la medida en que permitía a los aún clandestinos partidos, grupos políticos y sindicatos salir a la superficie y actuar de forma pública, mediante mítines y concentraciones, en una borrosa frontera entre la legalidad y la ilegalidad, compensada con la tolerancia discreccional del Ejecutivo hacia unas siglas en detrimento de otras».
  98. Gil Pecharromán 2008, p. 331. (Gil Pecharromán, Julio (2008). Con permiso de la autoridad. La España de Franco (1939–1975) [With Permission from Authority: Franco's Spain (1939–1975)] (in Spanish). Madrid: Temas de Hoy. ISBN 978-84-8460-693-2.)
  99. Juliá, 1999, p. 216.
  100. Tusell, 1997, p. 23-24.
  101. Juliá 1999, p. 216. (Juliá, Santos (1999). Un siglo de España. Política y sociedad [A century of Spain. Politics and society] (in Spanish). Madrid. ISBN 84-9537903-1.)
  102. Juliá, 1999, p. 216-217.
  103. Casanova & Gil Andrés 2014, p. 298. (Casanova, Julián; Gil Andrés, Carlos (2014). Twentieth-century Spain. A History. Translated by Douch, Martin. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60267-0. OCLC 870438787.)
  104. Casanova & Gil Andrés 2014, p. 298. (Casanova, Julián; Gil Andrés, Carlos (2014). Twentieth-century Spain. A History (ภาษาอังกฤษ). แปลโดย Douch, Martin. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60267-0. OCLC 870438787.)
  105. Ruiz, 2002, p. 23.
  106. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 185-187.
  107. (Gaztelaniaz) Txasko, Andoni. (2010-03-04). «3 de marzo, sinónimo de impunidad» Gara.
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  110. Ruiz, 2002, p. 25.
  111. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 198-199.
  112. Ruiz, 2002, p. 23-24.
  113. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 208-209.
  114. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 93.
  115. Tusell, 1997, p. 30.
  116. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 202.
  117. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, p. 337.
  118. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 211. «La prensa internacional lo aplaude, igual que los periódicos reformistas y prodemocráticos en España. La oposición interpreta con cautela las palabras del rey, porque los actos no terminan de ajustarse a los discursos, y es que todavía hay miembros de esa oposición en la cárcel o perseguidos por expresar públicamente sus opiniones. Por su parte, el búnker se inquieta ante las palabras del monarca, que parece haber olvidado, según ellos, el legado franquista que representa».
  119. Juliá, 1999, p. 218.
  120. Pinilla García, 2023, pp. 220-221.
  121. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 221-222.
  122. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 98.
  123. Pinilla García, 2023, p. 221.
  124. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 61.
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  129. Tusell, 1997, p. 34.
  130. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 64.
  131. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 101. «Los opositores se veían beneficiados al ser excarcelados pero, como activistas, su situación no cambiaba y podían ser detenidos nuevamente por las mismas actividades políticas democráticas —asociación, reunión, manifestación—, ya que estas continuaban siendo ilegales y, por lo tanto, les podían llevar nuevamente a la cárcel».
  132. Amnesty Decree (10/1976) (in Spanish). 30 July 1976. Retrieved 25 October 2023.
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  135. Pinilla García, 2021, p. 91. «Torcuato Fernández Miranda se retira el 21 de agosto de 1976 a su chalet de Navacerrada. Durante ese fin de semana redactará las líneas básicas de la Ley para la Reforma Política, cuyo objetivo es iniciar un cambio de régimen sin violentar la legalidad franquista».
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  138. "Historia de un Cambio". Ayuntamiento de Dúrcal. Archived from the original on 28 September 2007.
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  147. Rodríguez Jiménez, 1997, p. 437. «Los tenientes generales Barroso, Castañón, Galera, Iniesta, Lacalle, Pérez Viñeta, Díaz Benjumea, y los generales De la Torre Galán y Coll de San Simón».
  148. Juliá, 1999, p. 222.
  149. Jiménez Díaz 2016, pp. 41–58. (Jiménez Díaz, José Francisco (2016). "Adolfo Suárez González". In Jiménez Díaz, José Francisco; Delgado Fernández, Santiago (eds.). Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975–1982). Political Leaders and Their Assessment. New York: Nova Publishers. ISBN 9781634844017. OCLC 936205218.)
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  154. Rodríguez Jiménez, 1997, p. 470.
  155. Juliá, 1999, p. 223.
  156. Juliá, 1999, p. 224-225.
  157. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 128. «El Gobierno intentó evitar la masiva manifestación del entierro, pero finalmente se vio obligado a ceder pues la actitud del PCE fue firme y los dirigentes opositores le hicieron ver que los comunistas no estaban dispuestos a permitir quelos funerales y entierro fueran clandestinos, que estaban decididos a celebrarlos sin autorización; además se había desatado una fuerte ola de solidaridad, particularmente entre la abogacía. La movilización comunista ante los asesinatos de Atocha fue impresionante, en especial durante el entierro de los abogados, con decenas de miles de personas ocupando la calle y un servicio de orden organizado por el propio partido formado por más de 2000 militantes; al mismo tiempo, la exhibición de fuerza se vio acrecentada por el esfuerzo de contención y disciplina de que hicieron gala».
  158. Juliá, 1999, p. 224.
  159. Juliá, 1999, p. 224. "La opinión pública sufrió un entorno espectacular: si n'ochobre de 1976, namái se declaraben a favor de la llegalización del PCE un 25 por 100 de los españoles, mientres otru 35 manifestar en contra, n'abril de 1977 la proporción habíase más qu'invertíu: 55 a favor contra namái un 12 por 100 en contra"
  160. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, p. 347.
  161. Núñez Seixas, 2017, pp. 79-80.
  162. Tusell, 1997, p. 42.
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  164. Pinilla García, 2021, p. 98. «Cuando es presidente del Gobierno, Adolfo Suárez acabará acudiendo a Armero para continuar los contactos con Carrillo que ya estableciera el rey en vida de Franco. Desde agosto de 1976, el presidente de Europa Press [Armero] y el secretario del PCE se reúnen en la casa de verano que Teodulfo Lagunero posee en Cannes, así como en distintos hoteles de París, para pulsar la actitud de los comunistas ante la inminente reforma política y, sobre todo, para gestionar la concesión del pasaporte a Carrillo por parte del gobierno. Suárez contemporiza, no quiere concederle el pasaporte al líder comunista porque eso sería tanto como legitimar, de facto, al PCE. La legalización puede poner en peligro la reforma...»
  165. Pinilla García, 2021, p. 100-101.
  166. Núñez Seixas, 2017, pp. 101-102.
  167. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, p. 349.
  168. Juliá, 1999, p. 226-227.
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  173. Pinilla García, 2021, p. 104-105.
  174. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 132. «Carrillo llegó a la conclusión de que debía ayudar a Suárez para resistir la presión y evitar que el proceso hacia la democracia pudiera descarrilar».
  175. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, p. 351.
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  185. Casanova & Gil Andrés 2014, p. 295,306. (Casanova, Julián; Gil Andrés, Carlos (2014). Twentieth-century Spain. A History. Translated by Douch, Martin. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-60267-0. OCLC 870438787.)
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  189. Floren Aoiz "El jarrón roto" pag 261 ISBN 84-8136-329-4
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  193. La Vanguardia
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  195. Juliá, 1999, p. 230.
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  201. "Appendix A: Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977–86". Country Studies: Spain. Library of Congress.
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  205. «Alianza Popular sostuvo que la amnistía de 1977 no era "buena medicina"». 18 de abril de 2010.
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  207. Juliá, 1999, p. 233-235. «Olvidar es no recordar lo ocurrido; echar al olvido es olvidarse voluntariamente, enfrentarse al pasado para llegar a la conclusión que no determinará el futuro».
  208. «Sesión Plenaria núm. 11» (PDF). Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (24). 14 de octubre de 1977. Consultado el 5 de febrero de 2024.
  209. «transición diariu de les cortes».
  210. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 119.
  211. Juliá, 1999, p. 233-235. "Escaecer ye nun recordar lo asocedío; echar al olvidu ye escaecese voluntariamente, enfrentase al pasáu pa llegar a la conclusión que nun va determinar el futuru"
  212. Gil Pecharromán, 2008, pp. 356.
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  244. "Constitución de 1978". کنگره نمایندگان اسپانیا (in Spanish). Retrieved 13 اوت 2026.
  245. Juliá, 1999, p. 246-247.
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  248. (Gaztelaniaz) «Votaciones de investidura y mociones de censura 1979 - ...» www.historiaelectoral.com (kontsulta data: 2019-01-05).
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  251. Ruiz, 2002, p. 50-51.
  252. Tusell, 1997, p. 70-72.
  253. A partire dal film documentario El desencanto (del regista spagnolo Jaime Chávarri, del 1976), nella vulgata mediatica della fine degli anni Settanta in Spagna il termine per indicare questo sentimento pubblico fu “desencanto”, che richiamava indirettamente la nozione weberiana.
  254. Tusell, 1997, p. 88-89.
  255. Ruiz, 2002, p. 51-52.
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  267. Juliá, 1999, p. 249-250.
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  269. "Acciones Terroristas: Víctimas Policiales de ETA". La Guardia Civil. Archived from the original on 2005-08-16. Retrieved 2005-09-23.
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  273. Pinilla García, 2021, p. 147-148.
  274. Juliá, 1999, p. 251.
  275. (Gaztelaniaz) «El Gobierno sólo contó con sus votos para superar la moción de censura socialista» El País 1980-05-31 ISSN 1134-6582. (kontsulta data: 2019-01-05).
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  277. Tusell, 1997, p. 74.
  278. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 161.
  279. Juliá, 1999, p. 251-252.
  280. Juliá, 1999, p. 254.
  281. Juliá, 1999, p. 252.
  282. Ruiz, 2002, p. 57-58. «Y veinte años después de su dimisión, en declaraciones a algunos medios de comunicación, Adolfo Suárez volvió a reiterar que fueron la crisis de su propio partido, el acoso del PSOE y la defensa de la monarquía de Juan Carlos I los que le habían llevado a presentar la dimisión, descartando la influencia de los aún entonces poderes fácticos, como el ejército, la banca y los empresarios de la CEOE».
  283. Pinilla García, 2021, pp. 170-171. «Suárez dimite porque el último (y ya único) asidero al que se aferraba se tambalea, ya no confía en él y, de hecho, le ha abandonado. Ese asidero es el rey. Pero hay un motivo probablemente más urgente, de bajo vuelo político, de pura inmediatez, que no pude soslayarse; y ese motivo es la nueva moción de censura que se prepara contra él, en la que la oposición y hasta miembros de su partido están pactando su caída. Y luego está Armada, su "gobierno de concentración"... Suárez pensaba que su dimisión desactivaría el "golpe de gobierno" en marcha, pero se equivocó: lo aceleraría, convirtiéndolo en un peligroso "golpe de Estado"».
  284. Ruiz, 2002, p. 57-58. "Y venti años dempués de la so dimisión, en declaraciones a dellos medios de comunicación, Adolfo Suárez volvió repitir que fueron la crisis del so propiu partíu, l'acoso del PSOE y la defensa de la monarquía de Xuan Carlos I los que lu llevaren a presentar la dimisión, refugando la influencia de los entá entós poderes fácticos, como l'exércitu, la banca y los empresarios de la CEOE"
  285. Tusell, 1997, p. 82. «El nombre de Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo para la Presidencia del Gobierno fue sugerido por el mismo Suárez. Colaborador estrecho de éste, el nuevo presidente nunca se adscribió a una tendencia en el seno de UCD. […] Inteligente, culto y hábil e incluso mordaz parlamentario, Calvo Sotelo parecía más derechista que Suárez, pero también más sólido que él».
  286. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 164. «Calvo Sotelo, no adscrito a ninguna de las familias ideológicas del partido,... gozaba de la confianza de los círculos financieros y empresariales y no despertaba aversión ni en la oposición ni en los distintos sectores de UCD. Su nombre era una decisión que ya había sido pactada por el sanedrín de dirigentes de UCD en vísperas de la dimisión de Suárez, sin consultar a los órganos del partido».
  287. Juliá, 1999, p. 252-253.
  288. Juliá, 1999, p. 253.
  289. Juliá, 1999, p. 253-254.
  290. Ruiz, 2002, p. 61-62.
  291. Ruiz, 2002, p. 61-63.
  292. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 168. «[El golpe bando] apelaba al rey para que autorizase un cambio de rumbo político mediante el relevo de Suárez en la presidencia del Gobierno, la reforma de algunos apartados de la Carta Magna, la "reconducción" del proceso autonómico y la aplicación de mano dura contra el terrorismo de ETA. La segunda solución [el golpe duro] preconizaba la asunción del poder por el Ejército, en teoría con el consentimiento del rey, aplicando las recetas conocidas del golpe de los coroneles en Grecia o las dictaduras militares sudamericanas, que algunos oficiales habían conocido de primera mano en el curso de intercambios y visitas».
  293. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 209. «En realidad, el 23 de febrero confluyeron en el Congreso de los Diputados dos tipos de conspiraciones, la estrictamente militar —encabezada por el coronel Tejero— y otra con ramificaciones civiles, patrocinada por el general Armada».
  294. Ruiz, 2002, p. 63.
  295. Tusell, 1997, p. 79.
  296. Tusell, 1997, p. 80.
  297. Molinero y Ysàs, 2018, p. 209. «La experiencia histórica y familiar debió influir de forma sustancial en las decisiones del monarca y de su entorno en un momento tan crítico».
  298. Ruiz, 2002, p. 63-64.
  299. Ruiz, 2002, p. 58; 64.
  300. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 172.
  301. Núñez Seixas, 2017, pp. 172-173.
  302. Pinilla García, 2021, pp. 191-192. «Suárez ha hecho amago de volver, pero la suspensión de la investidura implica un obstáculo técnico, y jurídico, difícil de esquivar. Aunque lo que en realidad disuade a Suárez es que ya es una figura política "quemada", pues ni siquiera sus compañeros de partido lo quieren al frente del gobierno. Mucho menos la oposición, que sigue abogando ——el PSOE, por ejemplo— por un gobierno de concentración "más necesario que nunca", dicen, habida cuenta de los últimos acontecimientos».
  303. Núñez Seixas, 2017, pp. 172-173. «Cqlvo Sotelo temía que un gabinete de concentración [UCD-PSOE] agudizaría aún más las disputas internas entre los ministros centristas».
  304. Juliá, 1999, p. 254-255.
  305. Ruiz, 2002, p. 65. «La condena de los principales golpistas brindaría por primera vez a los demócratas españoles, desde los tiempos del general Sanjurjo en 1932, la posibilidad de presenciar la subordinación del poder militar al civil, cumpliéndose de ese modo con el precepto constitucional».
  306. Ruiz, 2002, p. 65. "La condena de los principales golpistes brindaría per primer vegada a los demócrates españoles, dende los tiempos del xeneral Sanjurjo en 1932, la posibilidá de presencies la subordinación del poder militar al civil, cumpliéndose d'esa manera col preceptu constitucional"
  307. Juliá, 1999, p. 255.
  308. Núñez Seixas, 2017, p. 174.
  309. Tusell, 1997, p. 84.
  310. Juliá, 1999, p. 255-256.
  311. Ruiz, 2002, p. 66.
  312. Pinilla García, 2021, pp. 193-194.
  313. Tusell, 1997, p. 112. «En realidad, no hubo más que algunos signos superficiales de esta actitud [neutralista] como, por ejemplo, recibir a Yasir Arafat o enviar representación a la conferencia de países convocada por Fidel Castro en La Habana».
  314. Tusell, 1997, p. 112. "En realidá, nun hubo más que dellos signos superficiales d'esta actitú [neutralista] como, por casu, recibir a Yasir Arafat o unviar representación a la conferencia de países convocada por Fidel Castro en L'Habana"
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  336. Juliá, 1999, p. 261. «Se ha atribuido a las elecciones de octubre de 1982 un efecto religitimador de la Democracia y se ha visto en ellas el fin del proceso de la transición política. En verdad, las elecciones cortaron en seco la tendencia hacia una creciente abstención y despejaron todas las dudas respecto al nivel de legitimidad que la Democracia pudiera disfrutar entre los españoles».
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  359. Il convient de remarquer ici que le qualificatif de « modéré » s’applique à la posture et aux revendications exprimées durant le processus de négociation, et non à l’idéologie du parti. Ainsi, dans le cas de la transition espagnole, c’est le Parti communiste, théoriquement révolutionnaire, qui a joué un rôle prépondérant dans le processus de négociation pour l’établissement d’une monarchie. Les communistes ayant été les éternels ennemis désignés du franquisme (les membres du PCE ont subi une forte répression durant toute la période), ceci a contribué à apporter une grande légitimité au produit de ces négociations. Le PSOE pour sa part, idéologiquement plus modéré, s’est toujours montré partisan de la république.
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  375. Fishman y Sánchez-Cuenca, 2025, p. 119.
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  379. Baby 2022.
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  385. Casals, 2016, pp. 18-20; 556-558; 562; 565. «La violencia política no fue un elemento accidental en el desarrollo de la Transición, sino consubstancial al mismo… El ritmo de la Transición fue establecido tanto por citas a las urnas como por episodios violentos que imprimieron distintos tempos. El caso más evidente lo ofreció el País Vasco, donde el azote terrorista frustró la normalidad política y la aprobación de la Carta Magna tuvo escaso apoyo. […] La violencia política no solo fue importante, sino determinante en la Transición».
  386. Casals 2016, p. 18-20; 556-558; 562; 565. «La violencia política no fue un elemento accidental en el desarrollo de la Transición, sino consubstancial al mismo… El ritmo de la Transición fue establecido tanto por citas a las urnas como por episodios violentos que imprimieron distintos tempos. El caso más evidente lo ofreció el País Vasco, donde el azote terrorista frustró la normalidad política y la aprobación de la Carta Magna tuvo escaso apoyo. […] La violencia política no solo fue importante, sino determinante en la Transición».
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